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Vol. XXVIII: 2010 |
No. 1 |
CHANGING DYNAMICS OF RELIGIOUS POLITICS IN INDIA
Public Disenchantment and Denunciation
ARSHI SALEEM HASHMI
Research Analyst
Theorists of modernity had written off religion in the 1950s and 60s and predicted that it would become unimportant as a marker of identity. However, the very reverse has happened and religion today plays an increasingly significant role in the cohesion and operation of identities on a global scale.
Cultural theory suggests that religion is, among many other things, a lens through which actors themselves understand the world, and a vocabulary through which they explain that world and justify their actions within it. Much of the sociology of religion contributing to the development of a strong programme does not, however, engage with these insights from cultural theory, focusing instead on individuals’ beliefs and practices apart from the social context in which they are manifested. While these beliefs and practices are shaped by participation in the social (e.g., organized religion) or affect individuals’ social behaviours, much of religion itself is conceptualized in an individual-centric way. We find these questions less compelling than the ones that, drawing on cultural theory, are attuned to the social and relational quality of religion. What we have come to call a “sociology of social religion” shifts the focus from an individual’s supposedly coherent set of deeply held beliefs that motivate action to an emphasis on religion’s social manifestations, such as how people draw on religion to make sense of their lives in varied and context-specific ways. It asks what this variation says about the contexts as much as what it says about religion.
Even in countries such as the United States, which recognize the necessity of a separation between church and state, there will always be interaction between religious and political leaders. It seems to be an unavoidable result of the way most societies work, and it is unreasonable to imagine that politicians will be without religion, or religious leaders without politics. Both fields claim idealism and purport to seek ways to better the society.
Within India, on a day-to-day basis, the vast majority of people engage in ritual actions that are motivated by religious systems that owe much to the past but are continuously evolving. Religion, then, is one of the most important facets of Indian history and contemporary life.
In theory, religious tolerance in India finds expression in the definition of the nation as a secular state, within which the government since independence has officially remained separate from any one religion, allowing all forms of belief equal status before the law. In practice, however, it has proven difficult to separate religious affiliation from public life. In states where most people follow one religion, the boundary between government and religion becomes permeable; in Tamil Nadu, for example, the state government manages Hindu temples, while in Punjab an avowedly Sikh political party usually controls the state assembly. One of the most notable features of Indian politics, particularly since the 1960s, has been the steady growth of militant ideologies that see the way to salvation in only one religious tradition and demand that public institutions conform to their interpretations of scriptures. The vitality of religious fundamentalism and its impact on public life in the form of riots and religion-based political parties have been among the greatest challenges to India’s political institutions in the 1990s.
The starting point for any meaningful understanding of the political science literature on the role of religion in political life, including issues related to governance, in developing countries is secularism. In social sciences, the emergence of the “ideal” secular state, typically as found in the United States, has been characterized by the creation of a “wall of separation” between church and state. The exact form this separation has taken varies considerably in different states, resulting in varieties of state secularism, e.g. for the USA, France and India.(1) Secondly, secularism is associated with the broader process of secularization of society in which the political influence of religion and religious institutions gradually declines. The two aspects are, of course, not unrelated, and in developing countries the establishment of a secular state was often seen as the agent for the eventual secularization of society.
Although the post-colonial states in Africa and Asia shared many of the legacies of colonialism — problems of legitimacy, fragility, the “lack of organic unity or shared values between state and society”(2) — there was little uniformity in the process of state-building that was influenced very much by the nature of the nationalist movements and, above all, the leadership of the political parties that secured independence for their people. By the 1980s the secular state in the developing world was in retreat. Even its most successful example, India, was faced with the challenge of Hindutva (the Hindu Right).
In the construction of political legitimacy, moreover, appeals to cultural values, traditional forms of authority and indigenous values were common, if at times somewhat symbolic. When it comes to separation of church and state, the Indian Constitution(3) has some very clear provisions on the role of religion in politics. However, the point whether the Constitution is implemented in letter and spirit in this regard, is arguable.
With the change in India’s economic and political status globally, Indian society is also going through changes. Socio-religious issues appear to attract less interest of the Indian public than high income level, high standard of living and employment opportunities. Is it a temporary phenomenon? Will it change the politics of India or it will continue to be a highly religious society with an appetite for economic prosperity?
The use of religion in Indian politics could be traced back to the country’s pre-independence era. Not only were the British rulers unacceptable and seen as alien to the culture and religion of the Indians but also the Hindus largely blame the British rule for separatism among the Muslims, which obviously is a one-sided view of the majority community. The Act of 1909 by the British administration to meet the Muslim demand for reserved seats in the legislature and separate electorates is also generally resented by the Hindu nationalists as a “divisive” move.
In 1915, Hindu nationalists formed the Akhil Bharatiya Hindu Mahasabha (All India Hindu Assembly)(4) to counter the Indian Muslim League and the secular Indian National Congress, a forum founded in 1885 that subsequently became a political party. In 1923, Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (popularly known as Veer Savarkar), the Hindu Mahasabha founder, coined the word ‘Hindutva’ (Hindu-ness) to define who is a Hindu. (Numerous Hindu nationalist groups today promote the Hindutva ideology.) In 1925, K.B. Hegdewar, the Hindu Mahasabha vice-president, founded the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS).(5)
The tensions between sections of the Hindu and Muslim communities resulted in the Muslim League demanding a separate homeland for Muslims. When the colonial rulers were to formally leave the country in 1947, the British India was divided into the “Hindu-majority” India and the “Muslim-majority” Pakistan. The Partition resulted in a mass migration of 14.5 million people from India to Pakistan and vice versa, and the killing of around one million people — Hindu, Sikh and Muslim — in the violent communal riots that followed. In 1951, the RSS launched a political party, the Bharatiya Jana Sangh or BJS, under its leadership and control. In 1980, the BJS was succeeded by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).(6)
Religion became a burning issue when the BJP, which was struggling to become a national party and an alternative to India’s one and only major party at the time, the Congress, adopted a resolution in June 1989 to build a temple of Rama in Ayodhya (Uttar Pradesh state), which the party claimed as the Ram Janmabhumi — the birthplace of god Rama. The BJP and Hindu nationalists allege that Muslim ruler Babur had demolished a Rama temple to build the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya in the 16th century. In September 1990, BJP leader Lal Krishna Advani undertook a rath yatra (procession on a chariot) to promise the construction of a temple of Rama. The Ayodhya issue began reaping political dividends for the BJP. Rath yatras may have religious connections; but as far as Advani was concerned it was essentially a political means to mobilise the masses in favour of the BJP. In the recent past Advani has undertaken — either alone or in collaboration with others — several rath yatras, such as, the Ram Rath Yatra (1990), the Janadesh Yatra (1993), the Suraj Yatra (1996), the Swarna Jayanti Yatra (1997) and the Bharat Uday Yatra (2004), traversing the length and breadth of India in order to mobilise public opinion in support of the BJP, and to indoctrinate the masses with ideas of Hindu cultural nationalism. The rath yatra is a concrete example of politicisation of Hindu religion. Some Hindu scriptures prescribe precise modes for the procession of the deity through the village streets. This was to enable people, especially those of “untouchable” castes who were normally barred from visiting temples, to get a glimpse of their favourite deity. The obvious religious symbolism of the rath yatra found a political expression in the 1980s when political party leaders used it to drum up mass support. The most famous instance was the emotional cross-country yatra in a modern version of the rath, a Toyota van, by BJP leader L.K. Advani in 1990. Again, the fall of the V.P. Singh government constituted a landmark in the history of modern India because for the first time since India’s independence a central government fell on a Hindu issue.
In July 1992, Advani, the leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha (House of the People — the Lower House of the bicameral legislature), reportedly told the House, “You must recognize the fact that from two seats in parliament in 1985, we have come to 117 seats in 1991. This has happened primarily because we took up this issue (Ayodhya).”(7)
In December 1992, alleged activists of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), a sister organization of the RSS and the BJP, demolished the Babri Mosque. This not only incited communal violence in several parts of the country claiming around 2,000 lives,(8) but also polarized people along religious lines. As a result, the BJP emerged as a mainstream party. Gradually, the BJP came to power at the national level for the first time in May 1996, but the government lasted for only 15 days. It again gained power in March 1998 as the leader of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), and ruled the country until March 2004. In 1998, the BJP began targeting Christians after Sonia Gandhi, an Italian-born Catholic and wife of the late former prime minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, became the president of the Congress. Till today, the BJP seeks to divide the Hindu majority community and the religious minorities as a political strategy.
Religious ideology, particularly that expressed by the Hindutva movement, has strongly influenced Indian politics in the last quarter of the 20th century. Certainly, though, many of the elements underlying India's casteism and communalism originated during the British Raj, particularly after the late 19th century, as the authorities and others often politicised religion. Some alleged the Indian Councils Act of 1909 — widely known as the Morley-Minto Reforms Act — which established separate Hindu and Muslim electorates for the Imperial Legislature and provincial councils, was particularly divisive. It was blamed for increasing tensions between the two communities.(9) Considering the high degree of oppression suffered by lower castes, the Constitution of India included provisions for affirmative action for certain disadvantaged sections of society. Growing disenchantment with the Hindu caste system has led thousands of Dalits (also referred to as “Untouchables”) to embrace Buddhism and Christianity in recent decades.(10) In response, many states ruled by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) introduced laws that made conversion more difficult; they assert that such converts are often forced or lured into changing their religion.(11)
Both the Congress Party and the BJP have been accused of exploiting the people by indulging in vote-bank politics. The Shah Bano Case,(12) a divorce lawsuit, generated much controversy when the Congress was accused of appeasing the Muslim orthodoxy by bringing in a parliamentary amendment to negate a decision of the Supreme Court. After the 2002 Gujarat violence, there were allegations of political parties indulging in vote bank politics.(13) During an election campaign in Uttar Pradesh, the BJP released an inflammatory CD targeting Muslims.(14) This was condemned by the Communist Party of India (Marxist) as playing the worst kind of vote bank politics.(15) Several parties have been accused of using their political power to manipulate educational content in a revisionist manner. During the Janata Party government (1977–1979), the government was accused of being too sympathetic to the Muslim viewpoint. In 2002, the BJP-led NDA government tried to change the school textbooks prepared by the National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT) through a new National Curriculum Framework.(16) A section of the media referred to it as the “saffronisation” of textbooks, saffron being the colour of the BJP flag.(17) The next government, formed by the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) and led by the Congress Party, pledged to de-saffronise textbooks.(18) Hindu groups alleged that the UPA promoted Marxist and pro-Muslim biases in school curricula.(19)
Unfortunately, it is the misuse of religion that we see at play in politics today, and not the use of virtues found in it. More regrettably, almost all political parties, religio-political parties and religious leaders included, are in one way or the other, guilty of using religion-related issues for narrow political gains. This is perhaps because religion is a source of identity and a bonding factor in the lives of people, mainly in developing societies like India. And politics in a democracy that is still maturing is inevitably coercive and amoral.
According to Jaffrelot, militias in India have been organized along three general lines: political, ethno-nationalist, and religious fundamentalist. Although disparate, these movements all serve to undermine centralized state governments by playing an increasing role in regional governance. The religious extremists profiling can be done by the following points:(20)
Roots: Hindu militias have their roots in non-violent resistance, which has cyclically been abandoned and embraced over the last decades. Currently, many of these groups are becoming more violent.
Constituents: Hindu militia and terrorist organizations are generally made up of three types of people: religious authorities, former and current army officers, and disillusioned mainstream Hindu nationalists.
Power: Some groups, such as the RSS in Gujarat, control regional policy by setting up parallel administrations and pressuring Hindus to conform to their fundamentalist programme. In some areas, militia control is so strong that interfaith marriage is impossible.
Targets: Muslims are the biggest target of Hindu extremists, followed by Christians.
Long-term goals: Hindu extremists want a regime change in India that would support religious nationalistic ideology.
Fears: Because they feel that their Muslim counterparts are stronger and better coordinated, Hindu extremists are increasingly emulating Muslim terrorist tactics.
An academic analysis of the last 30 years explains that Indians have voted for change each time in the national elections; only in the 1984 elections India voted Rajiv Gandhi into power in the sympathy wave following Indira Gandhi’s assassination. Nevertheless, the 2009 elections were rooted more in basic issues than religious rhetoric. The main national issues in election 2009 were still very local despite a lot of noises political parties especially the BJP made about Talibanization threat and terrorists attacking India once again. Local issues like development programmes for the rural poor and infrastructure projects were key considerations for many voters. Interestingly, when it comes to religion in Indian politics, it is not just Hindu nationalists seeking vote from the Hindus but many political parties pamper minorities so that minority votes could be isolated and used in their interest. Nevertheless, it is promising to note that while the BJP tried Hindu vote-bank politics it never succeeded in capturing power with that policy. People of India have come a long way in democracy and realized that only secularism — and nothing else — can lead to progress.
Without doubt, the 2009 Indian election results showed public distaste for right-wing Hinduism and support for the non-religious Congress Party. The BJP, a Hindu nationalist party, was defeated quite solidly. The Washington Post reported that defeat in elections led to re-evaluating the support of candidates in BJP who supported anti-Christian and anti-Muslim violence.(21) The results triggered an especially introspective debate among younger members of the BJP, which won 116 seats compared with 205 for the ruling Congress party. “For instance, some party members have questioned the number of campaign meetings addressed by one of its controversial leaders, Narendra Modi, who is accused of abetting sectarian violence that left more than 1,000 dead in the western state of Gujarat in 2002.(22)
The question whether religious parties’ worldview is out of touch with the changing aspirations of new India, is coming frequently in the discourse and with BJP’s rout in the 2009 election, it is now being highlighted by the proponents of secular India that religion in politics is a thing of the past. No doubt, BJP’s share of the national vote has remained static since the 2004 elections. Many political analysts have said the party’s growth is limited because its aggressive Hindu ideology appeals only to certain pockets in the country. They assert that in the 2009 election, the pluralistic impulse of Indians has re-coalesced.
The shift from Nehru’s secular ideas to more rigid Hindutva position of RSS was not without reasons. International environment did play some role as well. Communism and socialist ideas were enough to scare the right-wing conservatives to preserve Hinduism. Hence they came up with the slogan of protecting Hinduism in India. BJP’s rise was swift, growing from two seats in the lower house of Parliament in 1984 to 138 seats in the 2004 national election. Its aggressive brand of Hindu nationalism has created deep divisions about the notion of secularism in this multi-religious nation of 1.2 billion people.
The Indian politics has seen some changes in recent years, as a result of which most parties are beginning to move towards the political centre. From a two-party system, the country has moved to an era of coalitions – although the two main parties, the Congress and the BJP, continue to lead the two major coalitions, the UPA and the NDA respectively.
Coalition politics has mainly affected the BJP vis-à-vis its Hindu nationalist agenda. The party finds itself in a tough situation. While its parent organization, the RSS, wants it to remain committed to Hindu nationalism, its allies threaten to pull out of the NDA when it tries to apply its core ideology. Sandwiched between the allies and the ideological mentor, the BJP has changed its traditional, aggressive approach to Hindu nationalism. This change, however, is merely characterized by moderation in the use of terminology. Hindu nationalism has now become “cultural nationalism”, a pro-Hindu stand is now referred to as “true secularism”, and anti-Muslim stand is now camouflaged as “emphasis on internal security.”(23)
However, at state levels, the BJP continues to function explicitly as a hardliner. The extent of its persistent implementation of Hindu nationalism can be gauged from the fact that it rules – directly or through a coalition – 12 states out of the country’s total of 29 states. The party has a stand-alone rule in six states: Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh and Karnataka. In addition, the party is the head of the ruling coalition in Uttarakhand state, while it is a partner of the ruling governments in the states of Bihar, Orissa, Punjab, Nagaland and Meghalaya. The only time the party ruled for a full five-year term nationally was from 1999 to 2004, when it put forward the avuncular and moderate Atal Bihari Vajpayee to lead a coalition government.
In the 2009 election, the party chose its 81-year-old leader, L.K. Advani, as its candidate for prime minister. Advani’s career mirrors much of the party's present dilemma. In 1990, he climbed aboard a Toyota truck remodelled to look like a chariot and rode across the country to mobilize Hindus. That campaign culminated in a watershed event in contemporary Indian politics: demolition of the 16th-century Babri mosque in 1992 by zealots who demanded the construction of a Hindu temple at the site. In the past 10 years, Advani has tried to refashion himself as a moderate, which left many of the party's core voters dissatisfied. It is still being debated whether Advani was neither fully centre nor totally right.
Nevertheless, Hindu nationalists’ ideology remains the core and constant foundation of their identity. Ram Madhav, a senior member of the RSS had stated in 2003 that Hindu nationalism is not a variable that can be changed with every election outcome; he believed that there would always be a genuine place for a conservative, right-wing alternative in Indian politics.”(24)
The voters in India can broadly be classified into religious and caste communities. Christian and Muslim communities support the Congress while sections of the Hindus vote for the BJP – a considerable number of Hindus believe in secularism. Over 80 per cent of the country’s more than 1 billion people are Hindu, while Muslims and Christians account for 13.4 and 2.3 per cent of the population respectively. ‘Dalits’ are generally pro-Congress, given the party’s policy on affirmative action in government jobs and educational institutions. However, their vote is divided in some states, as there are numerous caste-based parties, such as the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) in Uttar Pradesh state and the Lok Janshakti Party (LJP) in Bihar state. The BJP, on the other hand, is seen as an upper-caste party.
Another cluster of communities is recognized as the “Other Backward Classes” or OBCs, which are believed to be socially and educationally disadvantaged. Almost all parties, including the Congress, the BJP, the Rashtriya Janata Dal, Janata Dal-United, Janata Dal-Secular, the LJP, the BSP, and the Samajwadi Party (SP), try to woo different communities within the OBCs. According to some estimates, the OBCs account for more than 50 per cent of the country’s population.(25)
India also has religion-based registered and recognized (by the Election Commission of India) political parties, such as the Muslim League in the Kerala state, the All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen in Andhra Pradesh, and the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD, a Sikh party) and its breakaway SAD-S (led by Simranjit Singh Mann) in the Punjab state. However, barring the SAD, which is a ruling party in Punjab, the other religion-based parties have a negligible number of representatives in the parliament or state assemblies.
When it comes to minorities and their role in politics, unlike other societies, where minorities get together to demand their religious rights, in India, minorities are more inclined towards secular politics and the majority is interestingly more insecure of its religious identity.
Religion and politics coincide when minorities express anxieties about their self-respect and their consequent demands for cultural equality or when religious majority attacks religious minorities in the name of protecting the nation-state from enemies within. In the case of majoritarian excesses against minorities, the state, along with its territory and sovereignty, become critical variables. Majoritarian activists claim that no legalities or niceties of democracy should hold them back in “setting right” the targeted minorities, who are their enemies because the “minorities' loyalties are with their co-religionists in other countries.”
In India, minority-inspired religious politics is no longer that strong. On the contrary, what is more than obvious is the strength of the majoritarianism (of Hinduism). In the Punjab, a Sikhs-majority state, most of them have more or less come to accept the status quo, though the grievance of not having a capital of their own still becomes a political issue. The militant secessionist movement of the 1980s is now a distant memory and most Sikhs do not want to be reminded of it. Other major significant unrest where a non-Hindu community has taken the lead is in Indian-held Kashmir. Unlike Sikh politics in Punjab, Kashmiris want to secede from India, though it is vague whether the demand is entirely religious or only seems religious as Muslims numerically dominate the Kashmir Valley. Interestingly, Indian Muslim religious leaders are not spearheading this movement, nor are the “jihadis from across the border” always welcome in the Kashmir Valley, even by those who are fighting against the Indian state. Another factor that makes the Kashmir dispute appear religious is that a majority of Hindus oppose the demand for an independent state of Kashmir. The fear of becoming a minority in a sovereign Kashmir state has pushed these Hindus to support sectarian organizations like the BJP. It is clearly in the interest of Hindu leaders to give the Kashmiri secessionists a religious cast in order to gain political legitimacy.
While Kashmir’s fate is still part of the Indo-Pakistan discourse, whether Kashmiris are for Pakistani or India or for independent status, one thing is coming clear through Kashmiri leaders that most Kashmiri Muslims do not identify with other Muslims in India — at least their leadership claims that. This became apparent after the 2002 mass killings of Muslims in Gujarat. Leading opposition parties in Kashmir failed to generate popular support for their call for a statewide agitation in sympathy with the persecuted Muslims of Gujarat. Kashmiri Muslims clearly see themselves as quite distinct from their co-religionists elsewhere in the sub-continent and have little in common with them. In fact Abdul Ghani Bhatt, a leading Kashmiri activist, argued that this was because Muslims in India “never reacted to whatever has been happening in Kashmir over the past 12 years… We don’t hold any grudges against them about it because we see them as Indians.”(26)
But when it comes to expressing Hindu majoritarianism, religion and politics combine frequently, and with telling impact. In India, religious politics did not win much favour during the struggle for independence. This in itself is surprising given the potential for using this sentiment against the British. Indeed, there were Hindu activists from the 1920s onwards who tried to work up religious nationalism, but they never made it to the mainstream of the nationalist movement, which remained firmly in the control of the secular Congress party.
Hindu extremist organizations like the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and the Jana Sangh portrayed the Muslims who stayed behind in India as traitors and agents of Pakistan. To this day, the memory of the partition is invoked in the many riots that have targeted Muslims in India. In order to comprehend the overall appeal of Hindu majoritarianism, it is necessary to factor in Pakistan and the significance of territory in the popular imagination of the nation-state. The tension clearly is between citizens and people. Under nationalism, being "a people" means more than an aggregation of citizens. In a liberal democracy, however, it is not the people but citizens that take precedence. A nation-state is thus faced with two options: to be liberal democratic or nationalist. Either it delves into memories of blood and soil, or it moves on to a different form of national identity that is based on citizenship. In the latter case, the focus is on delivering education, health, employment, and other essential public goods and services to citizens
Fortunately, Election 2009 sent a stern message to the political parties that they cannot take people for granted in the name of identity, particularly religious identity. What are needed are good education and better economic conditions and a social change towards equality. Unfortunately, those who harp on caste have no idea of how to annihilate it. The issue of caste and Dalits needs to be addressed in a way similar to the Civil Rights movement in the United States. It must be about much more than a few seats in parliament and the empowerment of elite leaders in the name of communities.
Religion and politics are so closely tied together that the very idea of India and its premise for pride revolve around religion-related issues. Hindu nationalistic ideology evolved around the 20th century when India’s independence was foreseeable. A section of the Hindu community believed that freedom from the British alone would not mean real independence; it should result in the formation of a nation where the majority community would have the dominance. The pamphlet entitled Hindutva: Who is a Hindu? brought out by Veer Savarkar in 1923 gives a glimpse of Hindu nationalist aspirations. The Hindutva saw India as the homeland of the Hindus, who consider the country their fatherland as well as their holy land. It sought to highlight historical “oppression” of Hindus by “invading forces” like the Muslims and the Christians, calling for “reversing” of the influence resulting from these “intrusions.” It also called for establishment of a “Hindu nation” to “protect Hindus and revive the Hindu culture,” and where conversion to other religions and cow slaughter would be banned.(27)
Hindu nationalists believe in and promote Hindutva even today. They do not necessarily object to the fact that India is a secular state under its Constitution, which was written in 1949, but they offer a different definition of secularism. (The word “secular” was woven into the Preamble to the Constitution in 1976, although it had secular provisions prior to the amendment.)
BJP president Rajnath Singh’s argument over the translation of the word “secular” in Hindi language is interesting. According to him, the word “secular” actually means “panthnirpeksh,” meaning neutrality to different religious sects, but it was “publicized” as “dharmanirpeksh,” which means neutrality to religion per se. Panth or sect symbolises devotion towards any specific belief, specific way of prayer and specific form of god, but Dharma symbolises absolute and eternal values, which can never change like the laws of nature, he maintained.(28) Most importantly, he opposed the idea of separation of religion and state while linking India’s past to its Hindu traditions and Hindu religiosity. Besides, while talking about different religions in India, he made no mention of Christians and Muslims.
Another argument against the religio-political parties by the secularists is that the VHP and other Sangh Parivar outfits aim at the communalization of education through various religious schools; for instance, the “Vanavasi Kalyan Ashram” and “Ekal Vidyalas.”(29) It is strongly believed that one strategy is to Hinduise communities, exploit divisions among the marginalized, and indoctrinate the youth, in order to both turn them against one another and use them as foot soldiers in the larger cause of religious nationalism. Such inculcation has had serious repercussions in Gujarat where tribals were manipulated into attacking Muslims. Secularists believe that while Hindu fundamentalists do not have a monopoly on religious intolerance in India, their actions are holding the country hostage. Well organized, widespread and acting in the name of the majority religion in India, Hindu extremism is positioned to silence diversity through force and terror, the rhetoric of Hindu supremacy. Muslims are the biggest target of the BJP and Shiv Sina and branded as supporters of terrorism. Anti-Muslim rhetoric is common; Bal Thackeray of Shiv Sina said in July 2008 that Hindus needed to form a “suicide squad” to fight “Islamic terrorism.” Thackeray made the statement in response to the arrest of two extremists from Hindu nationalist groups in June 2008 for allegedly exploding a bomb in a theatre in Maharashtra’s Thane district.(30)
The Liberhan Commission that probed the Babri Masjid demolition came down heavily on mixing politics and religion and recommended a law providing for exemplary punishment for such misuse to acquire political power. The voluminous report of the Commission was tabled in both Houses of Parliament by Indian Home Minister P Chidambaram.(31) The 13-page Action Taken Report (ATR), accepted the recommendation and contemplated enactment of the Communal Violence Bill to prevent and control riots and setting up special courts to deal with them. The ATR makes no reference to the indictment of top BJP leaders, including L K Advani, Murli Manohar Joshi, Kalyan Singh and leaders of various Sangh Parivar outfits made in the report.
In order to prevent any dent in its secular character, the Indian government decided to constitute the Liberhan Commission to investigate the Babri Masjid dispute. The commission was constituted ten days after the demolition of the disputed structure in Ayodhya on 6 December 1992.(32) The commission maintained that the Constitutional scheme to separate religion from politics was intended to insulate issues of governance from those of theology. The Commission said, “While it may be useful and indeed desirable to import certain aspects of ethics and morality into the political arena, the use of religion, caste or regionalism is a regressive and dangerous trend capable of alienating people and dividing them into small sections.” The report said any government formed on the premise of religion or having religious issues on its political agenda must be barred. "A government which is formed by professing its support to a particular religion or which has a religious issue or purpose as its stated agenda must therefore fall foul of the explicit and implicit proscriptions of the Constitution,” it declared. The commission recommended that political leaders, holders of constitutional offices, offices of profit, especially those holding cabinet positions sometimes simultaneously hold offices in religious organizations and trusts which could colour one's judgment. The reaction of the Indian government was diplomatic. While it accepted the observation in part and felt that political leaders holding public office should not simultaneously hold offices in religious organizations, it did not come out with any concrete implementation of the commission report.
An educational system based on narrow interpretation of religion injects communalism into the minds of young children. They grow up with intolerance against others. Nehru could not secularize the education system because it is a state subject and does not come under the centre. Organizations like the RSS kept on training people in communal ideas and putting them in various cadres like teachers, police, army, bureaucrats, and journalists. Communal ideas and violence have gone very deep into Indian system. India being such a diverse country, identity becomes more and more important and nation building is a challenge. Though the common Indians would like to retain their religious identity, yet politically when organizations like Shiv Sena come up with “sons of the soil” theory, emphasizing all jobs to Maharashtrians, it becomes an issue of survival than religion. Ironically, the Indian dilemma is that religion was instituted in certain circumstances and believers respond accordingly. If extremism pays, they will resort to extremism. If moderation pays, they will respond to moderation. Religion by itself is neither extremist nor moderate. It is its followers who become extremist or moderate according to their situation.
In countries where religion plays a vital role in the lives of most people, it can be safely assumed that politics in these countries is driven by religion. Religion provides many with the language of ethics and, often, an actual “list” of rules to live by, some of which can be interpreted as being of particular importance to fighting both material and moral corruption. Despite this, many of the most corrupt countries in the world — according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index — also rank high in terms of religiosity (according to indicators such as the Pew Global Attitudes Projects).(33) This raises some important questions: Do people separate public and private morality? Are people behaving corruptly despite their own moral imperatives not to? How do they then justify their actions? Does the specific religion make a difference to corrupt behaviour?
Economic life has witnessed tremendous structural change in Indian society. Changes are also witnessed in the system of social stratification. Significant changes are observed in the case of caste system, which is an important structural reality of Indian social system. With rising economy, Indian society is now engaged in discourse; for instance, traditional values and institutions are not necessarily discarded while taking up new values in the process of change. Society adopts new values because they are considered more efficient and rewarding.
It is pertinent to call attention to the fact that modernization and economic development in India has not been a uniformly progressive movement. Two crucial issues may be pointed out in this regard. First, in the process of modernization several traditional and religious institutions and activities have been reinforced. For example, religious preachers are using the modern media to spread their ideas. Some television channels in India are exclusively devoted to religious preaching. Caste associations are using new modes of communication to consolidate their position.
India is undoubtedly going through lots of contradictions. For instance, democratic participation is increasing despite increase in caste conflicts, and modernization in India has not thoroughly dispensed with traditional/religious institutions. Yogendra Singh has appropriately highlighted this fact in his study titled Modernization of Indian Tradition. He writes, “The form of traditional institutions may remain intact but their substance might undergo major transformations incorporating modernization.”(34) In this sense the modernization process in India has acquired a typical form. Religion will continue to influence society and politics, though prioritization of religion and economic development will keep on changing according to the need of the time. Expecting the Indian public to completely do away with religion is far too unrealistic. Therefore, Indian politics will be affected and will affect the polity through politicization of religion.
Rightist political forces seek to make the Indian state Hindu. Their rising influence since 1980 has occurred during a period of radical change in Indian society and politics, and has been accomplished by electoral means as well as by organized violence. The 1996 elections was a major test of their power and of the influence of Hindu majoritarianism among the Indian electorate. The massive violence following the destruction of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya on 6 December 1992 challenged the secular politics of Congress party. Interestingly, the “return of religion” in India is also being linked to the broader processes of globalization.(35) While globalization is a much contested concept, and for many it is simply identified with the processes of economic liberalization, the similarities in the responses to the new social conditions across faith traditions, especially with the rise in violent religious movements that seek to resist change or transform the existing social and political order, is seen as a mode of response to the “loss of control in their followers” lives.’(36) So religiosity of Indian polity is more to do with reaction against powerful economic forces than actual spirituality just like in the Muslim world. Much of the resentment against the West, as often claimed, is rooted in the western defined modernization and globalization. Globalization is both seen as further hastening the secularization of the world and as a new species of what Karl Polyani called a ‘great transformation;’(37) and the religious responses to it are indicative of “society fighting back against the ravages of the unregulated free market,” modernization and liberal forces.(38)
In order to study the link between economic prosperity and religion, some researchers have increasingly argued that such explanations for growth should go further to include religion. Religion influences the formation of beliefs that shape individual traits such as honesty, work ethic, thrift, and openness to strangers. Religious beliefs and related character traits can be seen as “spiritual capital,” a concept that is analogous to the human capital that economists have found to be important for worker productivity. Human capital includes the skills and knowledge that come from formal schooling, on-the-job training, and guidance from parents. Analogously, spiritual capital includes formal education through organized religion, as well as influences from family and social interactions. Thus, the economic effects of organized religion can be seen as operating through the formation of spiritual capital. The question however is, does Indian society believe in this theory or it is now being drifted away from religion to more and more materialism?
In almost every government, there is some sort of power struggle between religion and government. Either a government seeks to repress religion in order to emphasize some abstract governmental theory, or uses it in order to promote its own ideology. Or, a religion may be so dominant in a society that a populist revolution occurs, installing a religious leader. Finally, a religion may use the government in order to push a religious agenda. In each of these situations the theoretical “wall of separation between church/temple/mosque and state” is very important to both church and state as neither would be able to usurp power from the other.
However, this is also true that the modern state system has greatly influenced the perceptions of scholars about religion and has led to the predominant belief in the “separation of church and state.” The idea that the ‘state’ and the ‘church’ exist as separate entities and that these entities interact on a number of levels is both a Western and a Christian concept, and one that is not easily transferable to other contexts, despite the contrary assumption implicit in the overwhelming majority of both political science and economics texts. In comparative political analysis the issue of the relationship between religion and politics is usually seen in the context of state-church interaction, we may assume a single relationship between two clearly distinct, unitary and solidly but separately institutionalized entities.
There is implicitly one state and one church, and jurisdictional boundaries are clearly delineated, with both state and church being relatively autonomous actors, but with the former enjoying predominance.(39)
In the case of India however, Hinduism is critical to the fabric of India, as are all the other cultures and religions that inhabit this land and frame the imagination of this nation. It will require considerable effort to conceive a secular nation where religion is indeed separate from the integrity of the state, where pluralism guarantees rights and respect to the religious and non-religious alike. Unlike Shiv Sena’s rhetoric, the only way to continue as a strong, pluralistic polity, Indians need to denounce that to be Indian is to be “Hindu only “ and should challenge the assertions that a secular constitution is “anti-Hindu”. Politicization of majoritarian religion will lead to India’s secular and democratic fabric to be irreparably damaged.
It is also a matter of fact that denunciation and disenchantment towards religious politics is obvious in the present-day India, yet people do not want to give up on religion or the role of religion in society which obviously facilitates intrusion of religion into politics. Even a party like the Congress which is considered to be secular, cannot afford to challenge religiosity in politics and in fact uses it as and when required. Nevertheless, public opinion in India is increasingly raising questions about the abuse of religion and politicization of religion; they are asking, for instance, why caste is still the defining factor in Indian politics. If India wants to really avail the opportunity that forces of globalization and economic development have brought to its door, it needs to change; it needs to inculcate the values of “otherness.” An open discourse on the issue of status of religion in politics is needed where society should question the authority of religious leaders and their role in politics. India’s goal of being the next economic giant seems inconceivable with the kind of religious intolerance that prevails, even within majority Hindu religion. Caste-based politics will continue to create hurdles in ‘India’s desire to become a modern, truly pluralistic economic power.”
Notes and References
1. See for details, D. E. Smith, India as a Secular State, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).
2. C. Clapham, Third World Politics: An introduction, (London: Routledge 1985), p.42.
3. According to the Indian Constitution — Article 25, Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion-(1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part — all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice and propagate religion. The Constitution further says that (2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law — (a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice; (b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus. Article 26 talks about Freedom to manage religious affairs — Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right — (a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes;(b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion; (c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and (d) to administer such property in accordance with law.
4. Christopher Jaffrelot (ed.), Hindu Nationalism: A Reader (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2007).
5. Arun R. Swamy, Hindu Nationalism: What’s Religion got to do with it? Asia Pacific Centre for Security, Studies, Occasional Paper Series, March 2003.
6. Vishal Arora, Oxford Centre for Religion and Public Life, Washington DC, 28 July to 1 August 2008 available at <http://www.ocrpl.org/? p=260>, accessed 2 April 2010.
7. Ibid.
8. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/6/newsid_3712000/3712777.stm>, accessed 28 April 2010.
9. See for details on history and education in India: <http://www.sacw.net/India_History/DelHistorians.pdf>, accessed 28 March 2010.
10. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6050408.stm>, accessed 14 April 2010.
11. International Religious Freedom Report 2003-Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor- <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2003/24470.htm>, Accessed 28 March 2010.
12. The Shah Bano case was a controversial divorce lawsuit in India, in which Shah Bano, a 62-year-old Muslim woman and mother of five, was divorced by her husband in 1978 and subsequently denied alimony. The case created considerable debate and controversy about the extent of having different civil codes for different religions, especially for Muslims in India. This case led the Rajiv Gandhi government, with its absolute majority, to pass the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, which diluted the secular judgment of the Supreme Court and, in reality, denied even utterly destitute Muslim divorcees the right to alimony from their former husbands. Shah Bano, because she had no means to support herself and her children, approached the courts for securing maintenance from her husband. When the case reached the Supreme Court of India, seven years had elapsed. The Supreme Court invoked Section 125 of Code of Criminal Procedure, which applies to everyone regardless of caste, creed, or religion. It ruled that Shah Bano be given maintenance money, similar to alimony. The orthodox Muslims in India felt threatened by what they perceived as an encroachment upon the Muslim Personal Law, and protested loudly at the judgement. Their spokesmen were Muslim community leaders Obaidullah Khan Azmi and Syed Shahabuddin . They formed an organization known as the All India Muslim Personal Law Board and threatened to agitate in large numbers in all major cities. The then prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi, bowed to their demands and cited the gesture as an example of secularism.
13. The Times of India, 25 March 2002, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/4806609.cms-Togadia wants parties to stop 'vote bank politics' TNN, Mar 25, 2002, 01.22am IST>, accessed 11 April 2010.
14. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6538445.stm BJP protests in campaign CD row>, accessed 15 April 2010.
15. People’s Democracy, Vol. XXXI, No. 15, 15 April 2007 -<http://pd.cpim.org/2007/0415/04152007_edit.htm>, accessed 15 April 2010.
16. Nalini Taneja, “The Saffron Agenda in Education: An exposé” <http://www.indowindow.com/sad/article.php?child=29&article=28->, accessed 22 March 2010.
17. M. Mukherjee and A. Mukherjee (December 2001). “Communalisation of education: the history textbook controversy” (PDF). Delhi Historians’ Group. <http://www.sacw.net/India_History/DelHistorians.pdf>, accessed 15 March 2010.
18. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (8 November 2005). “International Religious Freedom Report 2005.” 2005 Report on International Religious Freedom, U.S. State Department. <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51618.htm>, accessed 11 April 2010.
19. R. Upadhyay, “The politics of education in India: the need for a national debate". South Asia Analysis Group, 21 August 2001, <http://www.saag.org/%5Cpapers3%5Cpaper299.html> and R. Upadhyay, “Opposition in India: in search of genuine issues.” South Asia Analysis Group, 26 February 2000, <http://www.saag.org/ %5Cpapers2%5Cpaper107.html>, accessed 17 April 2010.
20. Christopher Jaffrelot and Gilles Dorronsoro, From Hindu Militants to Hindu Terrorism? Resisting and Emulating the Islamists in India, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 28 September 2009.
21. Rama Lakshmi, “India’s Hindu Party Reflects on Election Drubbing,” The Washington Post, 18 May 2009.
22. “Post-Godhra toll: 254 Hindus, 790 Muslims,” Press Trust of India, 11 May 2005.
23. Vishal Arora, “Religion and Politics in India,” the Oxford Centre for Religion and Public Life, available at <http://www.ocrpl.org/? p=260>, accessed 22 March 2010.
24. Madhav Ram, “Symbol of an Awakened Civilization, 14 March 2003, Hindu Vivek Kendra, <http://www.hvk.org/articles/0303/190.html>, accessed 22 March 2010.
25. Arora, op.cit. (ref.23).
26. The Indian Express, New Delhi, 5 March 2002.
27. Arora, op.cit. (ref.23).
28. Ibid.
29. Angana Chatterji, “For Dissent Against Hindu Extremism, 28 July 2002, <http://dissidentvoice.org/Articles/AChatterji_DissentAgainstHinduExtremism.htm>, accessed 22 March 2010.
30. Arora, op.cit., (ref.23).
31. The Indian Express, 24 November 2009.
32. Asghar Ali Engineer, “India: Babri Masjid Demolition and Liberhan Commission Report,” Secular Perspective, 1-15 December 2009, <http://www.sacw.net/article1243.html>, accessed 15 April 2010.
33. Marquette and Gurharpal Singh, “Whither Morality? Disciplinary Secularism in the Political Economy of Corruption in Developing Countries,” paper presented at APSA 31 August-2 September 2006, available at <www.odi.org.uk./marquette_singh_political_science_corruption_secularism.pdf>, accessed 7 March 2010.
34. Yogendra Singh, Essays on Modernisation in India, (Delhi: Manohar Publications), 1978. <http://www.docstoc.com/docs/975977/Chapter-1/>, accessed 11 March 2010.
35. Inglehart and Baker, “Modernization, Cultural Change and the Persistence of Traditional Values,” American Sociological Review, 65, (Feb) 19, 51-2000.
36. J. A. Williams, “Can Liberals understand religious conflicts?,” 2002 <http://pbisotopes.ess.sunysb.edu/fsp/services/religious-conflict.htm>, accessed 22 April 2010.
37. Karl Polyani, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, 1944. xiii + 305.
38. Williams, op.cit., (ref.36) p.4.
Marquette & Singh, op.cit., (ref.33).
