Spot Light on Regional Affairs

Every child has a right to education. It enables children to learn and grow, developing their personality and potentials. It gives them tools to understand the world and participate in society as a useful citizen. It also helps in the fight against child labour and exploitation. It is vital for economic development and gives children when they are grown up chance to earn more and be more productive.(1) Unfortunately, this is not the case for millions of children in the world. Around 77 million of them have no access to school or to schools that provide quality education.(2) This is indeed relevant to India, where primary education has historically been neglected, with educational expenditures being concentrated on tertiary education.(3) India being such a large democracy in the world is marked with vast inequalities in providing education and is among the group of countries where outcomes systematically tend to be gender-discriminatory: favouring boys against girls.(4) In September 2000, the international community recognizing the importance of primary education pledged to ensure a full course of primary schooling for children everywhere, boys and girls alike, by 2015. In September this year, the struggle towards attaining this goal, launched in September 2000, is going to complete its 10 years. Within this context the paper attempts to discuss India’s progress towards achieving this Millennium Development Goal — Universal Primary Education.

The aim of the paper is to provide insights into this prolonged effort. It seeks to answer the following questions: Would the target be achieved in the given timeframe? How far is India from attaining this goal? Is India on the right track? What are the problems and prospects vis-à-vis universal primary education? For this purpose, the paper is divided into three sections. The first section presents historical background to the educational goal. The second discusses India’s commitment towards “Sakshar Bharat” (educated India). This section comprises a brief introduction on India’s national educational policies, plans and schemes such as Operation Blackboard (OB), Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (education for all), Mahila Samakhya (education for women’s equality), Kasturba Gandhi Balika Vidyalaya Scheme (residential primary schools for girls), Midday Meal Scheme (MMS) and National Programme for Education of Girls at Elementary Level. The third section discusses National Family Health Surveys 1992-93 and 1998-99; Annual Status of Education Report (ASER), 2009; Ministry of Human Resource Development Mid-Decade Assessment and Annual Report of 2008-09, and MDGs: India Country Report, 2007, released by the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation to analyze India’s current standing in primary education.

In the end the paper sums up its findings in the light of the above-mentioned initiatives and surveys’ findings. The paper concludes that the initiatives that India has been taking vis-à-vis universal primary education are of immense importance for achieving the target. However, their efficiency depends entirely upon continuous reappraisal to cater to emerging demands. The paper argues that the attainment of universal primary education for all children by 2015 is a “challenging” goal. Thus, without effective policy intervention intertwined with proper implementation both by the centre and states attaining the MDG would remain a pipedream.

Related literature

Relevant to this study is Sonia Bhalotra & Bernarda Zamora’s paper “Primary Education in India: Prospects of meeting the MDG target” and Dr. Anil Deolalikar’s “Attaining the Millennium Development Goals in India.” The former used data from the survey conducted by National Family Health of India (NFHS) in 1992-93 and in 1998-99 to asses the prospects of meeting the MDG target. The entire study was focused on two indicators: the school attendance rate and the primary school completion rate. According to the data taken from two rounds of survey, the school attendance rate increased from 69.5 per cent in 1992-93 to 82.5 per cent in 1998-99, while the completion rate declined from 65.3 per cent to 61.7 per cent. Comparing the data the study found that the surge in primary school attendance rate was encouraging, though the completion rate fell within this timeframe. The study projects that all girls and boys will be attending primary schools by 2015, and the corresponding completion rate will be 65 per cent for boys and 70 per cent for girls. The paper concluded that it is challenging, a priori, to expect both of these rates to rise to 100 per cent by 2015.(5)

Dr. Anil Deolalikar used 55th round of the National Sample Survey (NSS), conducted in 1999-2000 for his analysis. He proposed three alternative scenarios in which India could achieve the target by 2015. All of these scenarios involve an assumed change in nine predictor variables. These are: adult schooling amongst men and women, household consumption, annual public expenditure on elementary education per 6-14 years old child, village access to pucca roads and electricity, the number of primary schools per 1,000 children, the pupil-teacher ratio at the primary level, and crimes against women and girls. The entire focus remained over the progress of poor states. In the first scenario, the specified characteristics in the poor states of the country are elevated to the national average. In the second scenario, they are elevated to the average of non-poor states and in the third scenario if they are elevated at a specific rate per annum between 1999-2000 and 2015.(6) The study concludes that the attainment of MDG in education largely depends upon the performance of poor states.

In this study we use the National Family Health Survey findings, the Annual Status of Education Report released by Pratham in 2009 and the Millennium Development Reports to evaluate the current status of primary education in India. The paper seeks to present a fair analysis of India’s efforts towards achieving this goal. The study concludes that despite the progress made so far India still has to go a long way to reach the target. In this regard the public, private and global initiatives are crucial. However, their effectiveness entirely depends upon continuous reappraisal to cater for emerging demands. The attainment of universal primary education for all children by 2015 is a “challenging” goal. Without effective policy intervention intertwined with proper implementation by the centre and states success would remain a pipedream.

About educational goals:
Global commitment

Foundation of this goal dates back to the World Conference on Education for All, (1990). Participants from 155 countries and representative of 160 government and non-government agencies adopted an international declaration on education for all (EFA). The international community observed a huge gap between the theory and practice. Despite remarkable steps taken by countries around the world (since the recognition of the right to education for all in 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights) there were still more than 100 million children — including 60 million girls — who had no access to primary education. More than 960 million adults, two-thirds of them women, are illiterate and more than one-third of the world’s adults have no access to printed knowledge, modern skills and technologies. In an attempt to bridge this gap a comprehensive framework to meet basic learning needs was launched. It comprised over ten articles aimed at addressing fully the right of education for all and called on governments, relevant organizations and volunteers to join in this urgent undertaking. The “Dakar Framework for Action” was the second phase in the development of EFA goals. In April 2000, the “World Education Forum” was held in Dakar, Senegal. The forum assessed the progress made in ten years and resulted in the “Dakar Framework for Action” which set out twelve major strategies and six goals to achieve by 2015. In this document the first two goals are related to primary education. These goals were further enhanced in September 2000, where 189 countries met at the United Nation Millennium Summit and adopted a Millennium Declaration. The declaration set out eight Millennium Development Goals in which education is prioritised in goal two: “Universal Primary Education.”

Achieving Educational Goals:
India’s commitment

Following the footsteps of Universal Declaration of Human Rights on 10 December 1948, Dr. Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar, one of the architects of the Indian Constitution, formulated fundamental rights for the people of India. Education was recognized as a “fundamental right” among the other rights: right to freedom, right against exploitation, right to freedom of religion, cultural rights and right to constitutional remedies. Later, these rights were included in the Constitution under part III. To ensure educational right Article 45 of the Constitution demands that states make provisions within ten years for free and compulsory education for all the children until they complete the age of 14 years. There is also a provision for early child care and education which requires that “the state shall endeavour to provide early childhood care and education for all children until they complete the age of six years.”(7) The 86^th Constitution Amendment Act 2002 led to the insertion of new article 21-A in fundamental rights which made education free and compulsory to all the children aged 6-14 years.(8) The successive governments are made responsible for formulating strategies to achieve this goal enshrined in the Constitution.

Although there was a constitutional impetus behind educational commitment, yet no comprehensive policy was there even after two decades since independence. The first National Policy appeared in 1968, which set out 17 broad principles for the development of education. Free and compulsory education for all the children up to age 14 was placed as the top priority. Further, guidelines related to teachers’ education, development of languages, equalization of educational opportunities — common school system (CSS), university education, promotion of literacy and adult education and the development of common educational structure — were also spelled out.(9) The policy was supposed to be reviewed after every five years for further development. The CSS and common educational structure are noteworthy steps. The former is aimed at setting up of such schools which would be open to all children irrespective of caste, creed, social location and sex.(10) The purpose behind this is to equal the standard of highly expensive schools which tend to scare away ordinary parents owing to exorbitant cost of schooling. This kind of schooling system is also operational in developed countries such as the comprehensive schools in the United Kingdom and neighbourhood school system in the United States of America. The latter is meant to ensure adoption of uniform educational structure — 10+2+3 in all parts of the country.(11)

The policy was a breakthrough in the history of education in India. The aim was to bring radical changes in the existing system to improve its quality at all levels. It was drafted in line with the decisions of the central government on the recommendations of the National Commission on Education, 1964-66. Later, in 1986, followed by a countrywide debate and careful study a new Policy on Education materialized. The key developments made in the previous policy remained intact; for instance; Common School System and common educational structure. Regarding the further break-up of first ten years the commitment was made to move towards an elementary system comprising five years of primary education and three years of upper-primary, followed by two years of higher education.(12) In May 1990, a committee was set up under the chairmanship of Acharya Ramamurti to review the policy. It submitted its report in December 1990. The Central Advisory Board of Education (CABE) had some reservations on the report. Owing to the reservations, in July 1991 again a committee was set up under the chairmanship of Shri N. Jhanardhana Reddy, chief minister of Andhra Pradesh, to monitor the modifications.(13) Finally, in 1992 the modified National Education Policy was announced.

National Policy on Education, 1992, has come up with a new thrust for achieving universal primary education. The policy specified three areas in which efforts were required to accomplish universal goal; universal access and enrolment; universal retention of children up to 14 years of age; and improvement in the quality of education.(14) Ideally, these areas cover the entire gamut of issues concerned with universalization of primary education. The Indian government has pledged to provide facilities in order to turn this dream into reality.

India is a large country, the inequalities and marginalization of Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) in education are widespread. The literacy level amongst the SCs/STs and Muslims is far below the level of all others. The National Policy lays special emphasis on the removal of disparities and to equalize educational opportunities for all irrespective of caste, creed and religion. In this regard certain initiatives are noteworthy, such as incentives for the poor families to send their children to school regularly up to age 14, constant micro-planning and verification to ensure enrolment, retention and successful completion of SC students, hostel facilities for SC students, construction of school buildings in STs areas, and incentive schemes to cater for their needs and lifestyles.(15)

The period when education policy was being modified is also important because the World Declaration on Education for All (EFA) was adopted in March 1990. The declaration reaffirmed the notion of education as a fundamental right and urged countries to expedite efforts to address basic learning needs of all.(16) The international community pledged to ensure primary education for all children and ascertain the basic learning needs while taking into account the culture, needs and opportunities of a community. The targets set in the Jomtein Framework of Action were to be achieved by 2000. Countries around the world remained unable to achieve tangible success. To bridge the gap between theory and practice, the World Education Forum was held in Dakar, Senegal. The Dakar framework set six major goals to be achieved by 2015. The first two goals are related to the education of children. Commitment was made to ensure universal primary education for children, particularly girls, in the given timeframe. This goal was further enhanced in September 2000 at the United Nations Millennium Development Summit.

India has been an active participant in all international ventures and is signatory to all declarations. These global initiatives towards universalization of primary education have helped expedite India’s indigenous efforts in many ways. Since the Human Rights Declaration 1948, India has been undertaking many initiatives to achieve the target. The following are noteworthy.

Operation Blackboard

This scheme was launched in 1987 to provide minimum essential facilities to all primary schools in the country. The government instituted an important programme for improving physical facilities through a phased drive in all primary schools in the country. It was a step towards implementation of child-centred approach adopted in the National Education Policy of 1986. The basic idea was to bring qualitative improvement in elementary education. It was formulated on assumption that improvement in school environment would increase the enrolment rate, retention rate and attainment levels of primary school children. Under the scheme a building would be provided comprising at least two reasonably large all-weather rooms with a deep veranda and separate toilet facilities for boys and girls.(17) At least two teachers would be provided to every school, one of them a women, if possible. Essential teaching-learning material such as blackboards, maps, charts, toys and other equipment would also be provided.

Recently this scheme has been revised to provide flexibility to schools in arranging teaching-learning materials relevant to their curriculum and local needs. To relate the scheme with micro-planning wherever undertaken, steps are taken to see that supply of inputs is matched by demand-side interventions to promote participation. There is another provision in the revised scheme for its extension to upper primary schools.(18) Since its launching in 1987 the scheme has covered almost all rural schools in India.

Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan

The Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA), also known as the Education for All, was launched in 2000 as the flagship programme by the government of India. This scheme aims to bridge social, regional and gender gaps, with active participation of the community in the management of schools.(19) The SSA programme is an endeavour to provide an opportunity for improving capabilities of all children, through the provision of community-owned quality education in a mission mode. The scheme was launched with the following specific targets.

— All children in school, Education Guarantee Centre, Alternate School or ‘Back-to-School’ camp by 2003.

— Focus on elementary education of satisfactory quality with emphasis on education for life.

— Bridging all gender and social category gaps at the primary stage by 2007 and at the elementary education level by 2010.

The mission statement urges calls for “empowering children to be active participants in knowledge society; a result-oriented approach with accountability towards performance and output at all levels; a people-centred mode of implementation of educational interventions with the involvement of all stakeholders, especially teachers, parents, community, Panchayati Raj institutions and voluntary organizations; an equity-based approach that focuses on the needs of educationally backward areas and disadvantaged social groups including children with special needs; a holistic approach to ensure convergence of investments and initiatives for improving the efficiency of the elementary education system; institutional reforms and capacity building to ensure a sustained effort for universal primary education.”(20) To ensure progress under this scheme a comprehensive monitoring structure has been set up. The prime minister of India heads the National Mission for SSA which monitors the progress made. The minister for Human Resource Development chairs the Executive Committee of the National Mission.

The SSA is being implemented in all states and Union Territories and reaches an estimated 194 million children in 1.2 million habitations in the country. The programme seeks to open schools in areas lacking schooling facilities. It also supports strengthening existing school infrastructure through provision of additional classrooms, toilets, drinking water, maintenance grants and school improvement grants. In this regard existing schools with inadequate teacher strength are provided with additional teachers, while the capacity of existing teachers is being strengthened by extensive training, grants for developing teaching-learning materials and strengthening of the academic support structure at cluster, block and district levels.(21) Under the SSA more than 23,000 schools, 96,000 additional classrooms, and 25,000 toilets have been constructed. The SSA is also committed to promoting girls’ education and education for children with special needs. Provision for girls under SSA include:

· Intensive community mobilization efforts for enrolment and retention for girls in schools

· Need-based interventions under the “Innovative Fund” in every district for ensuring girls’ attendance and retention

· Early Childhood Care and Education Centre (ECCE) in/near schools where aganwadi centres do not exist

· Teachers’ sensitization programmes to promote equitable learning opportunities

The SSA is working to ensure, in partnerships with states, that all the habitations in the country have access to elementary schools with adequate infrastructure and teachers.(22) Other initiatives, particularly for promotion of girls’ education, include the National Programme for Education of Girls at Elementary Level (NPEGEL), Kasturba Gandhi Balika Vidyalaya (KGBV) and Mahila Samakhya.

National Programme for Education of Girls
at Elementary Level (NPEGEL)

This programme was launched in July 2003 to provide additional support in achieving SSA goals and is a distinct and separate gender component plan of SSA. The gender component (under-privileged/disadvantaged girls) is necessary to achieve universal education for girls in educationally backward areas. These areas include Educationally Backward Blocks (EBBs) and Blocks of Districts and Selected Urban Slums. EBBs means a block where the level of rural female literacy is less than the national average and the gender gap is above the national average. Blocks of districts are those which have at least 5 per cent Scheduled Castes and Tribes and their literacy rate is below 10 per cent.(23) The aim of this programme is to develop and promote facilities to provide access and to facilitate retention of girls and to ensure greater participation of women and girls in the field of education. Secondly, it endeavours to improve quality of education through various initiatives and emphasize the relevance and quality of girls’ education for their empowerment.(24) The NPEGEL has reached 3,246 blocks, 40,332 clusters, 39,852 model cluster schools, more than 11,000 early childhood care and education centres, and 27,282 additional classrooms.

The NPEGEL works through village-level women and community groups to follow up girls’ enrolment, attendance and achievements. The community is engaged in suggesting village-specific actions based on their understanding of local issues.(25) Another initiative in educationally backward areas is Kasturba Gandhi Balika Vidyalaya (KGBV).

The KGBV Scheme

The scheme was launched in July 2004. It targets those areas where schools are at great distances, challenging the security of girls. Under this scheme adolescent girls who are unable to go to regular schools, out-of-school girls in the 10+ age group who are unable to complete primary education and younger girls of migratory populations in difficult areas of scattered habitations that do no qualify for primary/upper primary schools are being covered.(26) The scheme addresses these problems through setting up residential schools in the block itself. In line with this thinking, the government of India has drawn up a plan to establish 750 residential schools with boarding facilities for girls from the Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), Other Backward Classes (OBC) and minorities in difficult areas. The objective of the scheme is to minimise the gender disparities that prevail massively in rural areas.

— Setting up of residential schools in areas where there are a minimum of 50 girls predominantly from the SC, ST and minority communities available for schooling at the elementary level. The number can be more than 50 depending on the number of eligible girls. Three possible models for such school have been identified and given in Annex-I (a) to I (c);

— To prepare and procure necessary teaching/learning material and aids for the schools;

— To put in place appropriate systems to provide necessary academic support and for evaluation and monitoring;

— To motivate and prepare the girls and their families to send them to residential school;

— At the primary level the emphasis will be on the slightly older girls who are out of school and were unable to complete primary schools (10+). However, in difficult areas (migratory populations, scattered habitations that do not qualify for primary/ upper primary schools) younger girls can also be targeted;

— At the upper primary level, emphasis will be on girls, especially, adolescent girls who are unable to go to regular schools;

— In view of the targeted nature of the scheme, 75% girls from SC, ST, OBC or minority communities would be given priority for enrolment in such residential schools and only thereafter, 25% girls from families below the poverty line; or

— Established NGOs and other non-profit making bodies will be involved in the running of the schools, wherever possible. These residential schools can also be adopted by the corporate groups. Separate guidelines are being issued in the matter.

Both schemes, NPEGEL and KGBV, are complementary to the SSA mission. While NPEGEL is designed to work through the day school, KGBV establishes residential schooling facilities for girls in difficult areas. The latter is being implemented by the states governments through the Mahila Samakhya (MS) and through SSA where MS is not functioning. A brief introduction of MS is given below.

Mahila Samakhya

Mahila Samakhya means education for women’s equality. Parallel to Operation Blackboard, this programme was launched in 1988 to pursue the goals established in National Educational Policy of 1986 related to education for women and girls. In the Mahila Samakhya Programme, the empowerment of women is seen as a critical precondition for the participation of women and girls in the education process. The principal strategy identified for ensuring women’s participation is through mobilizing and organising them into mahila sanghas (groups).(27) These mahila sanghas comprise Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes women, and women belonging to landless marginalized families. Mahila Sangha is the nodal point of this programme and all the activities are planned around the sangha. It provides space where women can meet, be together, and begin the process of reflecting, asking questions, speaking fearlessly, thinking, analysing and above all feeling confident to articulate their needs through this collective action.(28)

Mahila Samkhya was launched as a pilot project in 10 districts of Karnataka, Gujarat and Uttar Pradesh in 1989. It was extended to Andhra Pradesh in 1992 and to Kerala in 1998-99. In 2003-04 the states of Bihar, Jharkhand and Assam also came under this scheme. Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh societies got themselves registered in 2006-07.(29) The programme and has organic linkages with educational schemes aimed at universalization of elementary education such as SSA and works in tandem with them. It provides resource support to SSA in terms of gender-related issues, training and development of textual material.(30) Currently it is being implemented in 89 districts of nine states covering more than 28,000 villages. Beside promotion of girls’ education the government of India has also arranged nutritional support to primary students under the universal primary education programme. In this regard, a Midday Meal Scheme was initiated in 1995.

Midday Meal Scheme

In an attempt to give boost to the universalization of primary education by increasing enrolment, retention, and attendance and simultaneously improving nutritional levels among children, the Midday Meal Scheme was launched in 1995. The rationale behind the scheme is to promote school participation, preventing classroom hunger, facilitating the health growth of children, fostering social equality and enhancing gender equity. The main objectives include improving the nutritional support of the children in classes I-VIII in government, local-body and government-aided schools, encouraging poor children from the disadvantaged sections to attend school regularly and providing nutritional support to children of primary stage in drought-affected areas during summer vacation.(31) The programme provides free cooked meals to children with food grains contributed by the central government at the rate of 100 grams per child per day. In October 2007, the scheme was extended to upper primary level. The caloric value for this level has been fixed at 700 calories and 20 grams of protein by providing 150 grams of food grains per child per day. Currently the scheme is covering 120 million children in almost one million schools countrywide.

After having discussed various schemes we now look at the current status of primary education in the light of National Family Health Surveys, 1992-93 and 1998-99; Annual Status of Education Report (ASER), 2009; Ministry of Human Resource Development Mid-Decade Assessment and Annual Report of 2008-09 and MDGs India Country Report, 2007, released by the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation.

National Family Health Survey is a large-scale survey conducted in the country by the International Institute for Population Sciences (IIPS), tasked by India’s Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MOHFW). The survey provides information on reproductive and child health at state and national levels. It also contains school education information which is our main concern. The table below shows that attendance figures among 6-14 years olds were 72.4 per cent for males and 51.4 for females in rural areas. In urban areas 85.2 per cent for males and 78.7 per cent for females was recorded in 1992-93. In the second round the table shows an increase of 8.4 per cent for males and 16.9 per cent for females in rural areas, reflected in the figures 80.5 per cent and 68.3 per cent, respectively. In urban areas, there was a slight increase of 3.2 per cent for males and 7.2 per cent for females with the percentage standing at 88.4 and 85.9, respectively.

School Attendance from Two Rounds of National Family Health Survey, 1992-93 and 1998-99

In this short period of six years, the age group wise data shows that attendance among the rural 6-10 years old girls and boys has increased by 20 and 12 percentage points, respectively. In rural areas there was a slight increase for males. On the other hand, girls attendance was increasing satisfactorily in the 11-14 age group which saw 5.1 per cent rise for boys and 13.7 per cent for girls, respectively. The urban increases were smaller as compared to the rural ones. There were only 5.5 and 7.3 per cent increases for boys and girls respectively in the age group of 6-10 and 0.9 per cent and 7.1 increases for girls in the 11-14 age group. However, both attendance and level of education of rural areas is still below that of urban areas, particularly for girls. For all 6-14 years old rural girls the figure was 68.3 per cent in 1998-99, compared to 85.9 per cent for urban girls. The overall attendance rate was 80 per cent for all children 6-14 years old in 1999.

The latest National Family Health Survey conducted in 2005-06 shows no significant increase in educational attainment particularly in rural India. Table 2 shows that almost 42 per cent females of age 6 and over never attended school while the percentage for males stood at 22. Eighteen per cent females and 21 per cent males have less than 5 years of completed education. Those who have completed 10-11 years of schooling the ratio was 7 per cent and 11 per cent for females and males, respectively. The ratio for 12 or more years of schooling was 8 per cent and 13 per cent for females and males, respectively. The progress in rural areas is much slower. For females the urban-rural differential in median years of schooling is 6 years as compared to 4 for males. Although the proportion with no education in the population of age 6 and above among females has declined, yet the rate of change is extremely slow. Only 3 per cent decline has been observed between NFHS-2 and NFHS-3.

The net attendance ratios (NAT) and gross attendance ratios (GAR) are shown in Table 3. During 2005-06, only 72 per cent children of 6-10 age group who should have been at primary school did attend the primary school. For boys the rural and urban NARs are similar, but for girls the urban ratio is higher than the rural one. The GAR for primary schooling in rural areas at 83 per cent is higher by 2 percentage points compared to urban areas. This suggests that there is greater underage/or average primary school attendance in rural areas. However, the gender parity index (GPI) for primary schooling is one or almost one in urban areas whereas in rural areas it is below one. This shows girls’ access to age-appropriate education is much less than that for boys. This gap further widens in secondary and higher education.

		NAR		GPI		GAR		GPI
Residence	Male	Female	Total		Male	Female	Total
PRIMARY SCHOOLE
Urban	73.9	73.7	73.8	1.00	82.9	80.7	81.9	0.97
Rural	72.9	69.4	71.2	0.95	85.6	81.2	83.5	0.95
Total	73.2	70.5	71.9	0.96	84.9	81.1	83.1	0.95

Note: The NAR is the percentage of population that is attending school whereas the GAR is the total number of students. GAR is always higher than the NAR. The GPI is the ratio of NAR (GAR) for females to the NAR (GAR) for males.

According to the NFHS-3, the overall percentage for all children aged 6-10 years, both urban and rural, stands at 84.7. For all children age 11-14, both urban and rural, it stands at 77.2 per cent. The overall percentage of all children 6-14 years old attending school in 2005-06 is 80.9. (See figure 1 below).

This percentage is almost the same as recorded in the 1999 survey. There is no significant increase in the overall percentage we have observed. However, rural areas showed some progress in school attendance but the pace is too slow to meet universal attendance or even get to the level of urban areas. In urban areas the gender disparity is negligible but in rural areas the gap persists and even increases with children’s age. One in five children of 6-10 years is not attending school with a persistent gap in rural areas. To sum up, the universal attendance target is attainable by 2015 but only in urban areas. However, this universal attendance does not guarantee universal primary education completion. The rate of completion is far below the attendance rate. According to the Bhalotra and Zamora observation based on NFHS, the rate of completion even declined between 1992-93 and 1998-99 from 69.5 per cent to 61.7 per cent, respectively. There are a number of reasons which Deolalikar has highlighted in his study. Now we look at the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER), 2009, findings.

The ASER is also the largest annual survey of rural children in India. The survey was facilitated and published by Pratham, a non-governmental organization established in 1994 to provide education to children in the Mumbai slums. The survey was conducted in 2009, in 575 districts, over 16,000 villages and 300,000 households and covered almost 700,000 children. The report shows almost 96 per cent enrolment rate in the 6-14 age group these, 73 per cent children are enrolled in government schools and 21.8 per cent in private schools. In 2006, the enrolment stood at 93.4 per cent. This indicates that rural India is progressing towards universal enrolment at the primary level. States like Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal, Jharkhand, Orissa, Chhattisgarh and Gujarat had more than 10 per cent girls in the 11-14 age group who were out of school in 2006. But in 2009 these states have shown progress, particularly in Bihar where the figure fell from 17.6 per cent in 2006 to 6 per cent in 2009.(32) However, the learning level is strikingly low.

In 2006, almost 47 per cent children studying in grade 5 were not able to read the story text. In arithmetic, around 55 per cent of grade 5 and 25 per cent of grade 8 children could not solve a simple division problem. In 2009 the situation is no more different. There is little evidence of significant improvement since 2006. The percentage of children in grade 5 in government schools who can read at grade 2 level has been around 50 per cent. This implies that half the rural children are at least 3 grades behind. In mathematics, the overall progress is not satisfactory; hardly any other states except Madhya Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, show any significant progress.

We conclude from both surveys that India is no doubt approaching the universal primary education enrolment goal. However, universal completion is a big challenge. In this regard poor states’ performance, particularly for girls, will play a pivotal role in attaining this goal. On the other hand, the quality of education is strikingly low. Parallel to attainment of universal primary education, huge effort is required to ensure quality education for all children irrespective of caste, creed and religion. The following study further highlights the status while taking into account the Mid-Decade Assessment and Annual Report of 2008-09 released by the Department of School Education, Ministry of Human Resource Development.

The mid-decade report presents a five years review starting with the Dakar Declaration in 2000 to 2005-06. The report aims to analyse the national progress towards achieving educational goals and to identify the gaps that remain. The report shows that between 1999-2000 and 2005-06 enrolment for primary education increased significantly, particularly at the upper primary stage. The annual increase in enrolment was 3.2 per cent for primary and 3.9 per cent for upper primary in which girls’ enrolment remained higher than that for boys. Gross enrolment increased from 95.7 per cent to 109.4 per cent. The corresponding dropout rate also declined — from 40.7 per cent in 2000-01, to 25.4 in 2005-06. India has also made significant progress towards universal access to primary education. The report shows that more than 87 per cent children have access to primary education within one-three kilometres from their residence. Between 2002-03 and 2006-07 about 133,928 schools were opened in different parts of the country,(33) increasing the access rate to 98 per cent.

Year	Primary I-V (6-11 years)			Elementary I-V III (6-14 year)
	Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls	Total
2000-01	104.9	85.9	95.7	90.3	72.4	81.6
2001-02	105.3	86.9	96.3	90.7	73.6	82.4
200-03	97.5	93.1	95.3	85.4	79.3	82.5
2003-04	100.6	95.6	98.2	87.9	81.4	84.8
2004-05	110.7	104.7	107.8	96.7	89.9	93.5
2005-06	112.8	105.7	109.4	98.5	91	94.9

Stage	2000-09	2001-02	2002-03	2003-04	2004-05	2005-06
Primary Schools (I-V)
Boys	39.7	38.4	35.85	33.74	31.81	28.53
Girls	41.9	39.9	33.72	28.57	25.42	21.54
Total	40.7	39.0	34.89	31.47	29.00	25.47

The annual report, 2008-09, shows the same increase of 98 per cent in access to school facilities. Number of schools increased from 133,928 to 270,590 until March 2009. The gross enrolment ratio for primary level increased to 123.71 in the 6-14 age group from 96.3 in 2001-02 and for upper primary it has increased to 75.65 in 2006-07 from 60.2 in 2001-02. The gender parity index also improved to 0.94 in 2006-07 from 0.83 in 2001-02 at primary level and 0.90 at upper primary level increased from 0.77 in 2001-02.(34) The dropout rate declined to 25.43 per cent in 2006-07 from 39.03 per cent in 2001-02.(35) This rate is almost the same as observed in Mid-Decade Assessment Report 25.47 per cent for 2005-06. To assess the progress particularly focusing on the Millennium Development Goal 2 achievement we look at the latest MDGs — India Country Report released in 2007.

Gross enrolment in primary education for boys tended to remain near 100 per cent. For girls, the ratio increased by 23 percentage points from 1992-93 to 2004-05.(36) The all-India dropout rate for primary school fell from 41.96 per cent in 1991-92 to 29.00 per cent. Previously, in the 2005 report the dropout rate for primary education during 2002-03 was 34.89 per cent. The gross enrolment ratio in primary education was also near 100 per cent for boys and recorded an increase of nearly 20 percentage points in the ten years period from 1992-93 to 2002-03 for girls — 93 per cent.(37) The net enrolment ratio (which is proportion of students of 6-11 age group enrolled in grade I-V to the proportion of children of age 6-11 years is the MDG indicator for primary enrolment) according to the District Information System for Education (DISE) is 81.90 in 2004-05 as compared to 73.99 in 2003-04. The proportion of children starting grade 1 who reach grade 5 — the survival rate — improved from 55.0 in 1992-93 to 71.0 in 2004-05.

Indicator/Year	1992-93	2000-01	2004-05
Gross enrolment ratio in primary education Total	84.6	95.7	107.80
Boys	95.0	104.9	110.70
Girls	73.5	85.9	104.67
Proportion of children starting Grade 1 who reach Grade 5 Total	55.0	59.3	71.0
Boys	56.2		60.368.2
Girls	53.3		58.174.6

A study state-wise survival rate shows that Bihar, Jharkhand, and Manipur have the lowest survival rate: 39.23, 37.33 and 36.16 per cent, respectively. Only three to four states have shown universal survival rates. These states are Kerala, Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu (see Fig.2). The latest DISE report shows overall 76 per cent survival rate in primary education for 2008-09. The girls’ percentage in overall enrolment stands at 48.38 for 2008-09. The percentage of Scheduled Castes and Tribes as usual remained static at 19.72 per cent and 11 per cent for the last three years. For Muslims, no significant progress was observed: only 10 per cent recorded in 2008-09 with a minor increase of hardly 2 per cent from 2006.

From the above data we can conclude that the gross enrolment rate has reached a satisfactory level. The net enrolment rate also nears the universal rate. However, in terms of retention and completion India is lagging behind. There are persistent disparities in the education system of India. Take a look at the bar graph below. It displays the primary school NAR by sex, area of residence, and household wealth for the year 2006. Ninety-six per cent of all primary-school-age children from the richest household quintile are in school. With declining household wealth, the share of children in school also falls. In the poorest household quintile, the primary NAR is only 69 per cent — almost one third below the NAR in the richest households. As a consequence, children from the poorest households make up almost half of all the children out of school in India. Progress at this level has been very slow. With this pace India cannot reach the target of universal primary education for all by 2015. In this regard, poor and neglected regions’ development is going to play a pivotal role in making this dream a reality.

Conclusion

The paper discussed India’s progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals in education. It discussed the various schemes launched to reach the target of universalization of primary education by 2015. It also discussed statistical data from different sources to determine the current status of primary education. The paper concluded that the initiatives which India has been taking are of immense importance and vital for achieving the target. These initiatives have led India close to universal primary education “enrolment.” However, their efficiency depends entirely upon continuous reappraisal to cater for emerging demands. After more than 20 years of Operation Blackboard millions of children are still huddled together in a single classroom and often have just one teacher in school. The quality of teaching and the lack of facilities such as classrooms and basic water supply and sanitation is leading to a lack of functional literacy for those who mange to complete school. The SSA on the other is well-funded scheme ironically hampered by lack of in depth-monitoring and effective resource utilization. People seem complaining of actual and timely delivery of things. Similarly, in the case of Mid-Day Meal programme, is not being implemented as per government guidelines.

The paper also argued that the attainment of universal primary education for all children by 2015 is a “challenging” goal because of lower “retention” and “completion” rates. Both rates have been lower than expected. No significant progress has been made at these levels. The major reason behind this is the poor performance of rural India, particularly for girls, despite a number of remarkable initiatives taken in this regard. India is off-track in terms of improving the proportion of girls to boys. Gender disparity prevails across the country and is highest in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan. The schools in many poor states still lack basic facilities. Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes and Muslims have no or little contribution in overall universalization of primary education. These are the two big challenges among the others in the way of achieving complete universalization.

MDGs of education cannot be achieved without optimum utilization of existing resources and raising funds. The government expenditure on education has been below the 6 percent target having been set as far as 1986 by Kothari Commission. Beside government funding, foreign aid is a lynchpin to ensure 100 percent primary education for all children. Lack of international commitment is challenging this goal as Canada has recently announced to freeze aid budget by 2011. If the donor countries recede from prior commitments India might have to face hardships and big delay. Furthermore, there must be a comprehensive accountability mechanism of all organisations involved. For instance, the Examination Boards are not for the sole purpose of conducting of examinations and declaring results. They are equally responsible for the overall students’ performance.

India needs to work on these fronts if it has to achieve the target of 100 per cent primary education for all by 2015. With effective policy intervention intertwined with proper implementation India can surpass 67.5 per cent completion of primary education projected by Bhalotra for 2015. On the other hand, if the poor states and SCs/STs and Muslims do not grow to a satisfactory level success would remain a pipedream.
NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. ‘Goal 2: Provide free and compulsory education for all’, <http://www.unesco.org/en/efa/the-efa-movement/efa-goals/primary-education/>.

3. Sonia Bhalotra and Bernarda Zamora, “Primary Education in India: Prospects of meeting the MDG Target,” Working Paper No. 08/190, The Centre for Market and Public Organization (CMPO), University of Bristol, UK, January 2008. available at http://www.efm.bris.ac.uk/ecsrb/papers/educ41_MDG.pdf.d…….

7. Constitution of India, Ministry of Law and Justice, complete document available at <http://lawmin.nic.in/coi/coiason29july08.pdf>.

9. National Policy on Education, 1968, complete document is available at <http://www.education.in/policy/npe-1968.pdf>.

11. Before the establishment of 10+2+3 education structure, recommended in the 1968 National Policy on education , there were four patterns operational in many parts of India : 10+2+3, 10+2+2+2, 11+3, and 11-12+1+3.

12. National Policy on Education 1986, complete document is available at <http://www.education.nic.in/cd50years/g/T/49/toc.htm>.

13. National Policy on Education, modified in 1992, available at <http://www.education.nic.in/policy/npe86-mod92.pdf>.

16. “Education for All, Background and History,” available at <http:www.unescobkk.org/education/efa/efa-background/>.

17. “EFA: Goals and Objectives,” <http://www.educationforallinindia.com/page36.html>.

19. “Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan,: Education for All,” <http://india.gov.in/ spotlight/spotlight_archive.php?id=31>.

20. Annual Report 2008-09, Department of Education, Ministry of Human Resource Development, India, complete report available at <http://education.nic.in/AR/AR2008-09/AR2008-09.pdf>.

21. Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, “A programme for the universalization of elementary education,” available at <http://ssa.nic.in/>.

28. Mahila Samakhya, Eleventh Plan Document, <http://education.nic.in/ ms/XIth%20Plan%20document%20of%20MS.pdf>.

33. Education For All, Mid-Decade Assessment: Reaching the Unreached, complete report available at <http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/ India/India_EFA_MDA.pdf>.

36. Millennium Development Goals: India Country Report, 2007, available at <http://www.mospi.gov.in/mospi_cso_rept_pubn.htm>.

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)- India Country Report, 2005, Press release <http://www.mospi.gov.in/mospi_social_pr.htm>.

AFGHAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGION

Democratic process in Afghanistan

Over the past three decades Afghanistan went through the experience of three mutually different political systems: Soviet-style socialism, the Taliban version of Islam, and Western democracy. On 20 August 2009 the country held its second presidential election since the US invasion and the ousting of the Taliban in 2001. The first elections in the post-Taliban Afghanistan were held in 2004, with US and international community’s assistance. As the country is presently in the grip of grave insecurity owing to an upsurge in the Taliban insurgency, the elections had pivotal significance for Afghanistan, the US and the international community. To conduct elections in a war-ravaged country with insurgents in action almost everywhere posed many formidable challenges for everyone. Yet it was accomplished not just because of the huge international presence, but also owing to the hopes and aspirations and willingness of the Afghan people that were supporting the system. These elections were also different from the previous one in many ways. The bottom line is that the hard task of fighting the insurgency and having a continued political process in the country at the same time was handled rather well, the electoral flaws notwithstanding.

Main argument

The 2009 presidential elections in Afghanistan were spoiled by the flawed process and legitimacy crisis in spite of special attention given to every part of the process. There are many reasons, one being a new political system in a country where tribal laws and cultural traditions are so deeply ingrained in the polity and the people that their hold is far too strong than the writ of the central government. Another reason is that prior to the elections it was already known that Hamid Karzai will be returned to power as decided by the US. To have any high expectations from elections in a country that is in the throes of a raging war for so many years with disruptive consequences for the political and socio-economic system is itself irrational.

The electoral outcome failed to reinforce political stability and could not bring political strength to Karzai. Actually, it opened a Pandora’s box exposing former Karzai government’s crooked and fraudulent practices. Also, the role of the US administration cannot be glossed over as they kept on ignoring the urgent need for helping lay the basis for forming the state and build the polity. The role of the international community and the foreign donor agencies that failed in prioritizing assistance and funding and showed lack of commitment created more mistrust in the system. Moreover, both Afghanistan and the US strove hard to exclude the vital regional actors from the whole process which added to the chaos already prevailing in the country because the potential of neighbours’ shared commonalities was not allowed to come into play, without realizing the isolationist impact it would have on Afghanistan itself.

The paper focuses on the 2009 presidential elections and an analysis of the elections held in 2004. It highlights the political and security scenario and what significant interest it holds for both Afghanistan and the outside world, the neighbouring countries in particular. The paper looks into the challenges facing President Karzai in the future and the different and divergent interests of regional players in Afghanistan.

Political developments since 2001

Following the US invasion and ousting of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in reaction to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the US soil, the Bonn Agreement, which was actually a series of agreements, was signed at the end of 2001, in Bonn, Germany. Negotiations were held between the US and various Afghan groups under the UN auspices in November 2001. The agreement aimed at ending the conflict in Afghanistan by promoting national reconciliation, lasting peace, stability and respect for human rights in the country. It aspired to secure for Afghans their right to freely establish their own political future as the country since 1979 lacked proper legal and law and order mechanism.(1) It included establishing institutions like the judiciary, the army and the police force, the constitutional commission, the election commission, banking, the drug enforcement directorate and an independent human rights commission, disarming and demobilization of militias, drafting of a new constitution, fighting terrorism, drugs and organized crime, repatriation and resettlement of refugees, and other related subjects. The entire process was supposed to establish a multi-ethnic, fully representative government, elected through free and fair elections by the people of Afghanistan.(2)

Under the agreement it was decided to have a transitional period of two and a half years. Hamid Karzai was appointed as the head of the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) in December 2001. Karzai organized an Emergency Loya Jirga, grand assembly usually set up to decide political and national matters of importance, in accordance with the agreement in June 2002. The Loya Jirga elected Karzai as the Chairman of the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) for a period of two years, i.e., until June 2004. Under the Bonn Accords national elections were to be held before the end of that term. Though, due to deteriorating security situation and incomplete voter registration, the Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB) of Afghanistan declared to have presidential election on 9 October 2004. The 2004 presidential election marked an end of provisional government and on 3 November 2004 the JEMB declared Hamid Karzai as the elected President of Afghanistan for next five years. The highly centralized presidential form of government as envisaged in the new Constitution stands in sharp contrast to the current political realities in Afghanistan where provinces remain under the firm control of various factional and local commanders.(3)

During the Transitional Authority phase the Afghan Constitution Commission was formed under the Bonn Agreement to draft a new constitution with the consent of Afghans. The Loya jirga during the time used the 1964 constitution as the basis for drafting a new constitution. The 502-member Constitutional Loya Jirga presented the new constitution of Afghanistan on 4 January 2004.(4) The Constitution was formally ratified by President Hamid Karzai at a ceremony in Kabul on 26 January 2004. The 162-article Constitution provides for a presidential form of government with a bicameral legislature, Meshrano Jirga (Upper House) and Wolesi Jirga (Lower House).(5)

During the Bonn process, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was given the pivotal task of helping establish governing structures. The United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) was tasked with the political oversight of the election process while the UNDP also supported the 2004 presidential and 2005 parliamentary and provincial council elections along with managing all resource mobilization and donor relations for the 2005 elections. The UN Office for Project Services was the implementing agent for all electoral activities in 2005. Throughout the election time capacity building and technical support was provided to the JEMB, which was temporarily invested with electoral management and administration powers of the Independent Election Commission (IEC) as contemplated under the constitution, up until the inauguration of the National Assembly on 18 December. (under Article 57 of the Electoral Law).(6)

Established under Article 156 of the 2004 Constitution, the IEC consists of five commissioners, a chairperson, and a deputy chairperson. Its decisions are implemented by the IEC Secretariat, which is based in Kabul.(7) The IEC is the successor to the JEMB which conducted the 2004-2005 elections. On the recommendation and in consultation with the IEC and other stakeholders, a comprehensive project document was developed, “Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow (ELECT),” to support the capacity-building process of the newly established Independent Election Commission in addressing the needs beyond 21 September 2006. A key element of ELECT is an inter-organizational agreement to coordinate electoral support activities. For the 2009-10 elections the ELECT after evolving a political consensus announced holding presidential and provincial council elections in the fall of 2009 and the parliamentary and district council elections in the summer of 2010. On 9 July the IEC announced it would conduct a voter registration exercise from 6 October 2008 to 2 February 2009, assisted by ELECT in appointing a new chief electoral adviser, chief of operations and other staff, and supported IEC down to the provincial and regional levels. The ELECT also organized programmes for mediapersons, security community, observers, agents, members of civil society, and voters providing information, training, and support.(8) An Office of Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) was also formed which is a temporary body established under Article 61 of the 2010 Decree on Electoral Laws and consisting of five commissioners appointed by the president. It is responsible for hearing and adjudicating complaints related to the electoral process, including challenges to the list of candidates and complaints about the conduct of campaigns and polling.(9)

The electoral laws according to the Afghanistan Constitution provide for IEC to conduct ‘free, universal, secret and direct ballot’. Laws for the electoral officials are aimed at helping them perform their duties as assigned to them in “an impartial and unbiased manner” with “decency, truthfulness, and confidentiality.” They are “not to seek or receive instructions from any government or non-government official or authority, except the Director of the Secretariat.”(10) The president is elected for a five-year term and must receive more than 50 per cent of the votes cast nationwide. The Constitution states that if none of the top candidates succeeds in receiving more than 50 per cent of the votes in the first round, a run-off must be called within two weeks.(11) In the 2004 presidential elections Hamid Karzai won 56 per cent vote with an official turnout of about 70 per cent,(12) though at the time everyone knew about him being the US choice. His main rival at the time was Younus Qanooni, an ethnic Tajik and a member of Northern Alliance. These elections were conducted under the supervision of the UNAMA. Arrangements were even made for some two million refugees with all the required facilities to vote in both Pakistan and Iran.(13) There was a huge rush and enthusiasm at polling centres from early morning particularly in Kabul.

2009: Karzai’s second term

The second presidential election held on 20 August 2009, saw a blend of fear and determination among the voters. There were pre-election controversies over the date of the polling. Constitutionally, the election date is to be set 60 days before the serving president’s term ends.(14) The date was falling in May but due to security risks and financial reasons IEC put the date back to 20 August. The UN role in these elections was meant to be advisory as well as coordinating international assistance to all aspects of the polls.(15) Compared to the 2004 elections many Afghans had somewhat many options to choose from among a large number of candidates.

The 2009 voter registry update was done in four stages countrywide between October 2008 and February 2009. It was based on climate and security situation of the provinces. It was a change from the 2004 election when the registration process was conducted in two phases — one for the urban and the other for the rural areas — which took nine months. IEC said that 17 million were registered as voters among whom additional 4.5 million voter cards were issued for the newly registered people, including 3.8 per cent women.(16)

Afghan refugees in both Pakistan and Iran were facilitated to participate in the 2004 election and special arrangements were made for them. However, this time around the refugees criticized their government for not providing such facilities. The reason given by the IEC was the lack of international funding to arrange polls in Pakistan and Iran. Another inescapable issue was the ongoing military operation and lack of security in the tribal areas of Pakistan.(17)

Political participation and election process

A significant development during the 2009 election observed among Afghans was the tendency to look beyond ethnic lines over president’s nomination. Field research conducted by the International Council on Security and Development (ICOS) revealed that particularly among the youth an increasing tendency of crossing traditional tribal lines was evident. A notable openness was evident towards female candidates as well. Afghans were determined to follow democratic inclinations. They insisted on good governance and opposed corruption and all those who were a part of the old fraudulent system.(18)

Major political parties among the many contesting were: the National United Front of Afghanistan (UNF); National Democratic Front (NDF); Payman-e-Kabul, mainly comprising former Leftist and Maoist groups; and the Afghan Social Democratic Party (Afghan Mellat). Prominent among the minor political parties were, Afghanistan’s Islamic Mission Organization, National Solidarity Movement of Afghanistan, National Islamic Unity Party, Peace and National Unity Party, National Congress Party of Afghanistan, Afghanistan Peace Movement and the Liberal Democratic Party of Afghanistan. The primary focus of generally all the political parties was on strengthening the democratic system, putting an end to insurgency and lack of security, cutting down foreign interference in Afghanistan, pursuing negotiations with Taliban and seeking bigger role for Pashtuns in the national political system.(19)

There were 44 candidates registering with the IEC. Three of the candidates withdrew their nominations just days before the elections took place and threw their support for two of the top contenders.(20) Each presidential candidate ran with two vice-presidential candidates. Karzai also ran with two candidates, Karim Khalili from the Hazara ethnic group who was a key ally of former army chief of staff General Rashid Dostum, and the second was Muhammad Qasim Fahim, a former Tajik warlord. Fahim had been listed by the human rights group among the “worst perpetrators” of HR violations and was accused of being a former Communist secret police chief, murdering war prisoners during the 1990’s and much worse.(21) Hence, Karzai’s choice for his vice-presidential tickets earned him criticism everywhere.

Individual versus political parties

The top two candidates in the elections were Hamid Karzai and Dr Abdullah Abdullah. Hamid Karzai ran as an independent candidate while Abdullah was fielded by the United National Front.(22) Within a day of vote counting there were claims from both the Karzai and Abdullah camps of obtaining over 50 per cent majority. However, days later Hamid Karzai was reported to have been re-elected in a landslide victory. This led to unending allegations from the opposition camps, in particular from Dr. Abdullah, of vote rigging. Abdullah accused Karzai of “stealing” the elections by committing fraud. Complaints of massive vote rigging were submitted to the Election Commission while Abdullah’s supporters threatened to resort to violence if their candidate lost. A senior Western diplomat said that hundreds of thousands of ballots for Hamid Karzai were from as many as 800 fake polling sites where no one had voted in reality. In Kandahar, home province of Karzai, Western officials reported that only about 25,000 people actually voted as compared to the initial results of more than 350,000 ballots.(23)

As a result of serious allegations pouring in from all over, the UN-backed Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) and the IEC announced having convincing fraud evidence and ordered recounting at polling stations accused of fraudulent process. There were accusations of stuffing ballot boxes, printing fake voter cards and tampering with the indelible ink used for marking voters fingers to prevent them casting multiple ballots. International actors also came in to resolve the contended delay in elections.(24)

A number of visits and phone calls from foreign officials began aiming to avert a crisis. They pressed for both Karzai and Abdullah to a power-sharing deal. Sen John Kerry, chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, met Karzai at least twice and met separately with Abdullah Abdullah, stressing “the necessity of a legitimate outcome.” Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, of France, arrived in Kabul to press both candidates to respect the recount process. Other officials were negotiating through phones, including US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton; Richard Holbrooke, the special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan; Defence Secretary Robert Gates; and the British Prime Minister Gordon Brown.(25) However, it was decided to conduct a run-off on 7 November due to proven fraud conducts. In fact the official audit findings of the ECC left Karzai with 49.67 per cent of the vote and Abdullah with 30.59 per cent. These were the certified results of the August elections.(26)

Basically, incumbency gave Karzai an edge in the whole electoral scenario. The Supreme Court of Afghanistan in March 2009 extended Karzai’s term until a new leader got elected, saying that the continuation of the president and his deputies was in the interest of Afghans.(27) His opponents were critical of the decision and regarded it undemocratic and unconstitutional as it put Karzai in a position to exploit the office to his benefit.(28) Besides this, the UN election monitoring report said that there was evidence of government using state resources to support Karzai and it was also reported by the Election Commission that the state-run radio and TV of Afghanistan had reserved 71 per cent of the prime-time news coverage for the sitting president.(29)

The run-off campaign began formally on 24 October and Karzai’s leading rival Abdullah Abdullah began stressing the urgency for the dismissal of three top IEC officials, including Azizullah Ludin, the Karzai-appointed head of the Independent Election Commission. Dr. Abdullah also called for the suspension of three ministers, those interior, education and tribal affairs, who he said exploited their positions to swing the election in Karzai’s favour. He accused them of fraudulent involvement in the first round of elections.(30) With a start marked by unending confusion and anxiety Abdullah Abdullah announced his withdrawal from the run-off on 1 November. The reason he gave was that his demands against the Election Commission were not met and that made transparent elections impossible.(31) Abdullah’s withdrawal cleared the way for Karzai and on 2 November IEC officials announced cancellation of the run-off and Hamid Karzai became president for a second time.(32)

Karzai’s victory

The presidential elections in Afghanistan came with a new mood domestically and internationally. The narrative of the elections reveals that they were not up to expectations. However, at present it is crucial to understand whether the electoral developments would bring progress or stagnation. No doubt the new government is confronted with numerous challenges and an unforgettable credibility crisis, but that should be expected in developing countries struggling along with fragile fledgling democracy. Afghanistan is no different. It is important to understand the past and present circumstances in which the country took such a bold step, a country where the transfer of power was usually done through guns. Moreover, what is most remarkable is the fact that the country manages to hold elections so as to continue the democratic process while a violent war is going on on its soil.

The positive approach in this crisis were the steps taken by the existing institutions such as the Electoral Complaints Commission and Afghan civil society organizations in not just pointing out but actually carrying out actions against electoral fraud. The whole investigative and recounting process culminating in the decision to hold a run-off was a big step forward in restoring the legitimacy of democratic electoral process. It was also supported as elections are the only mechanism that provides legitimacy to leadership and ideas. Therefore, with excluding officials who committed fraud and with candidates, mainly Karzai, agreeing to have a run-off for bringing credibility in the eyes of Afghans generally was a mature approach which gives an insight into the shifting moods within Afghanistan.

Although the run-off was cancelled leaving Karzai alone facing legitimacy criticism, yet he showed a new hope and willingness to bring a progressive change to his country and suffering people with the help of international players. In his inaugural address at the presidential palace in Kabul, Hamid Karzai spoke in Dari and Pashto to reach out to country’s two largest ethnic groups in front of an audience of about 800 which included government officials, military officers and tribal elders. The most notable among the allied representatives were Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and British Foreign Minister David Miliband.(33)

Future administration

Hamid Karzai's speech was a litmus test of his commitment to reform which appeared to be meeting the US expectations. He is under lot of American pressure and their demands for visible deeds are high. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton bluntly said that the US would not provide civilian aid to assist Afghanistan if their ministries were not held accountable for the way funds were being used.(34) Therefore, the US and the NATO allies responded approvingly to the six main priorities Karzai outlined in his speech. These included good governance; security; peace and reconciliation; economic development; regional cooperation; and foreign policy affairs.(35) The president has another five years to prove his credibility and an opportunity to set his record straight and disprove the charge of being a puppet by becoming a leader in deed. These six crucial matters are required to be practically dealt with in a rational way.

The most important of all these matters is good governance which must ensure strict enforcement of law and order. If there is no law and good governance then all the other above-mentioned matters would be in a constant mess. Karzai emphasized creating a transparent and accountable government which would take action against corruption and against all those involved in it. Basically, corruption in Afghanistan has to be checked at all levels, starting from the ministerial and provincial and going down to the district and village levels. In this regard Karzai referred to the narcotics problem and pledged to prosecute those involved in the country’s illicit narcotics industry that generates corruption and sustains the Taliban insurgency. According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, Afghanistan is ranked second-most corrupt country in the world.(36) Consequently, to check corruption and bad governance at public level Afghanistan’s Attorney General announced setting up a special court to try corrupt government officials who cannot be tried under regular judicial system.(37)

President Karzai announced setting up an anti-corruption unit and a major crime fighting force. The American FBI and Britain’s Serious Organized Crime Agency would be assisting this unit which would comprise investigators from interior ministry and national security directorate. Their task would be to investigate kidnappings, public and administration corruption as well as organized crimes.(38) The steps announced are good though it is crucial to have an effective implementation of these policies. Afghanistan already had an anti-corruption unit for over a year but it could only manage a handful of arrests. One reason is the lack of proper authorization on part of government to prosecute and punish the culprits.

President Karzai realizing the immense US and Western allies pressure for curbing favouritism and corrupt cronies who tainted his government for years, proposed forming a new cabinet of professionals. Coming up with a cabinet nomination list was a difficult task for him as he had to deal with both the international pressure and repaying favours to those who campaigned for him. In order to please the US, key ministers favoured by the US and Western governments are secured with top positions in the government.

Karzai’s list of cabinet nominees presented to the Parliament excluded former ministers of Mines and Hajj who were accused of graft and pocketing donor money. Still, his cabinet list could not get the majority approval from the Parliament. Most of the names were rejected apart from the reputed defence, interior and finance ministers. The rejected ones are believed to be Karzai's political cronies and under the influence of warlords or supposedly unqualified.(39) Karzai defended his choices which he believed was a balanced representation of country’s ethnic communities. He wanted to keep water and power minister Ismail Khan, a warlord from the Herat province criticized for retaining considerable local power; but he too was also rejected. The only woman nomination on Karzai’s team, Minister of Women’s Affairs Husn Bano, was also rejected by the parliament. This shows a welcome sign on the part of Afghanistan’s parliament as they refused to rubber-stamp Karzai’s choice. Their main concern was that the list presented to them had faces that were responsible for inefficient and corrupt government.(40)

Speaking on foreign policy President Karzai specifically appreciated that the US-Afghanistan friendship was not limited to a joint fight against extremists; rather, it was a long-term relationship and mutual interests of both countries were expanding it further. He thanked the US for being the largest contributor to Afghanistan’s security, economic development and good governance.(41) However, at the same time he pointed to the need for gradually reducing the role of international players in Afghanistan. By mentioning this he tried to allay Afghan fears and complaints from different segments against Western control in the country.

Karzai emphasized the need for building a secure and self-sufficient Afghanistan where he planned for both the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan Police to take lead in the unstable parts of the country for the next three years to provide security and stability. Karzai with international backing wants to implement this plan of securing Afghanistan before his five-year term expires, although with NATO forces to remain there for support if the situation gets wrong.(42) On a closer look these targets are too ambitious and could only be achieved if responsibly striven for. However, it will still be up to the NATO generals to decide whether and when could the main security tasks be handed over to Afghans.

President Karzai’s speech reflected a shift in his approach from being an anti-Taliban to becoming a conditional accommodator with them. He highlighted the peace and reconciliation process which focused on opening negotiations with those Taliban and insurgents who pledge to support the Afghan government and lay down arms. For this purpose he offered to hold a loya jirga (assembly) and invited the disgruntled compatriots not directly involved in international terrorism to return to Afghanistan.(43) Taliban insurgents have so far rejected Karzai’s reconciliation offer and regard it useless unless negotiations focus on their condition — absolute independence of Afghanistan with an Islamic system. They call these western-backed reconciliatory efforts an eyewash.(44)

However, the president remains hopeful and has called for Saudi assistance as well in restoring peace and persuading Taliban militants for joining Afghan political system.(45) Karzai managed to get the support of international community on the matter which previously was not backed by the US and its western allies. At the London conference held on 28 January 2010 the international community pledged to provide $500 million for a pay-for-peace proposal so that Taliban combatants could be assimilated into civilian fold once they renounced violence.(46)

President Karzai made a sensible shift on understanding the importance of regional cooperation. Instead of continuing with past policy blunders he showed interest in relying on regional actors for promoting peace in Afghanistan. Significant regional initiatives were taken at the trilateral summit hosted by Turkey and attended by Afghan and Pakistani leaders for strengthening cooperation in areas of economy, security, terrorism, etc.(47) Another important meeting at foreign ministerial level was held between Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The main theme of the discussion was the key role of immediate regional players in providing security umbrella for Afghanistan and trilateral cooperation in all sectors for future stability.(48)

To bring economic development Karzai proposed creating a legitimate national economy in accordance with the realities of the Afghan society that is achievable only within the framework of a market economy. He supported the National Solidarity Programme and other similar programmes along with facilitating young Afghans with vocational training based on the reconstruction needs in Afghanistan.(49) The ideas are good but can only be worked out with international support so that once qualified and trained, these young Afghans can take reins of their country’s economy and play central role in carrying out developmental projects. As highlighted by Karzai, international funds were inadequate and should be raised by 40-50 per cent over the next two years along with a transparency mechanism for keeping a check on disbursement of funds.(50) In addition to this, these economic measures are only possible if donor countries are fully committed and build coordination among themselves so that funds are properly spent instead of going back to the donors as observed these past years in Afghanistan. Over the past eight years there has been talk of building of infrastructure and many development projects though the reality is quite different. In this area investment and development projects by oil-producing Muslim countries, if pursued, could yield significant results.

Hence, the post-electoral developments highlight Afghan government’s understanding of the dire situation facing the country and their pledges to fight instability and militancy. Top

Public response: Hopes, concerns and criticism

During the electioneering Afghan people’s expectations were high and putting aside tribal affiliations a new generation was looking forward to participating in the polls. As more information about the actual electoral process came to light the people expressed disgust and anger. First of all, insecurity has crippled the country; yet ignoring insurgents threats and risking their lives they took part in what later turned out to be a flawed election. They felt betrayed. For Afghans to expect a meaningful vote in the future has become questionable. Hamid Karzai had been criticized earlier also. People were frustrated over his corrupt governance and lack of effective development. He was blamed for leading the country into greater chaos and failing to check the re-emergence of Taliban. Therefore, some significant challenges for Karzai and his new government which seriously concern the Afghans cannot be ignored.

A legitimate government recognized by the vast majority of citizens that understands the needs of its people is a key factor for ensuring stability in Afghanistan. Good governance is the bottom line as it promises to take care of all the other issues. The legitimacy crisis was not over yet when the choice of cabinet nominees irked the country. Most Afghans have a deep animosity towards the warlords or powerbrokers in their government; they get away with their frequent human rights abuses as well as gain power through their private militias. Therefore, expectations are high from the new government especially after Karzai’s inaugural speech. The ordinary Afghans were hoping for a cabinet that would stand for their rights and needs and bring progressive reforms.

Reputation for corruption ranging from incompetent officials to tardy bureaucratic procedures and from disloyal police to corrupt judiciary mostly defines the Afghan government. This remains a matter of serious public concern. As a result, how the Karzai government would be pursuing the agenda of establishing the writ of the state and accountability all over the country is yet to be seen. Large parts of the country are still ruled by tribal authorities and in many cases by Taliban insurgents. Lately a Shinwari tribe in Nangarhar province of eastern Afghanistan took the initiative in standing against Taliban insurgency only because they were frustrated by their government’s inability to provide support and facilities.(51) Hence checks and balances on governing bodies get debatable if undertaken by the government itself with power-brokers sharing privileges.

Security and the resurgence of Taliban is the most crucial concern of Afghans that poses the biggest danger to the country. As time passes the security problem becomes more complex. The required amount of resources both human and material originally needed was not committed. There had been differences between Karzai and the US over the tactics used to deal with insurgency. This even went against Karzai like some military practices that included raids and house searches by the US soldiers were offensive to Afghan culture and tradition. Afghans saw it as a personal insult and it aroused negative feelings both towards Karzai and foreign actors’ policies. This went into insurgent’s favour and got immensely expensive as well as far more challenging for the international mission. Initially the violence was stemming from the southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan but now there are signs of instability in northern Afghanistan also. The hopeful goal of President Karzai and international community of assigning the Afghans the leading role in the security of the country and an exit strategy for the US are too optimistic. Drug addiction and lack of training is not discussed much by the Karzai government. According to an estimate done in late 2009, 15 per cent of the Afghan army and up to 60 per cent of the Afghan police in Helmand province are drug addicts.(52)

To counter Talibanization the announcement of a Reintegration Plan to support and provide an honourable status in society to those renouncing violence is a matter that needs clarity. The amount pledged by the international community, $140 million for the first year, is not enough to support the initiative as well as the number of people renouncing militancy.(53) The unemployment rate in Afghanistan is already too high, poverty rate has been rising as mentioned earlier and Afghans already serving in the country’s army and police are not getting sufficient benefits. What needs to be seen is what kind of jobs will be created for those among the population who renounce insurgency keeping in mind the low literacy rate and lack of skills among Afghans.

President Karzai promised building Afghanistan’s private sector for economic development but again how would this be pursued is still not clear. Afghanistan has become 27th country to reach completion point of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative.(54) In fact most of the foreign goes waste owing to government functionaries corruption or high salaries and consultancy expenditures on foreign experts. Consequently, in the end only a handful amount is left to initiate developmental process, resulting in unfinished work. Most Afghans believe that foreign development aid is actually meant for the personal benefit of foreigners.(55)

Afghanistan being an agricultural country is one of the most poverty-stricken nations in the world. Afghans are highly concerned over the basic needs of life. According to a national survey done by ABC News in 2009 the availability of food is with time worsening and 63 per cent of the people cannot afford to buy all or even some of it.(56) The availability of seeds, fertilizer and farm equipment are a major concern of rural population. Another setback for Afghan economy and agriculture is the rise in opium production. The southern province of Helmand has become a hub of opium trade and a source of strong financial support to Taliban. The government was unable to control opium production despite the deadly consequences. Fuel prices are unaffordable and 68 per cent of the Afghans cannot buy fuel for cooking or heating especially in winters.(57) Lack of electricity supply and clean water are other complaints along with high prices and lack of economic opportunities. Though there had been some progress in some areas like education, health, roads, etc, and in eradicating opium cultivation, only practical implementation of policies can get positive results. First and foremost, the highest officials need to have their own accountability; in 2008, for instance, Karzai himself pardoned five leading drug traffickers who were his acquaintances.(58) The inefficiency and ill-practices raise public concern and create doubts about the government.

Hence, in order to address the concerns and fears of the people, the elected government of Hamid Karzai has to go beyond mere verbal pledges. The international community as well has to seriously commit itself over the basic needs of Afghans because civilian assistance is as important as military aid. Even after delivering so much of assistance and resources in Afghanistan the basic Afghan concerns and challenges remain unchanged. That means serious reforms in delivering aid and assistance are required on the part of international donors. Short-term international commitments and the hasty US exit strategy will create further chaos and threaten the integrity of the Afghan state and society.

Significance of polls for Afghanistan &
world community: Security

The US, its allies and the government of Hamid Karzai are facing difficulty in winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan people. The presidential election mattered much to both Afghanistan and the international community. The protracted war has created disillusionment among the people on both sides — the Afghans as well as the general public in the countries involved. The governments of the allied states have lately come under immense pressure from their people for little progress and more casualties. The Dutch government lately came under so much public pressure that it was left with no choice but to resign.(59) The West is experiencing direct implications of the prolonged war in terms of numerous casualties and overburdened economy. Civilian casualties in NATO/ISAF airstrikes are major complaints from the Afghan side. They blame the foreign forces for their poor targeting whereas the Afghan government is blamed for its inability to provide protection to its people.

So to get support of the people both at home and abroad in favour of the new Obama strategy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan a legitimate and credible election was necessary. Most important was to have a credible Afghan partner having support of the majority of Afghans to shore up the NATO mission and the new US strategy in Afghanistan. The international community wants to win an edge over the Taliban and al-Qaeda insurgents. Previously there was an uncomfortable relationship between the US and Karzai government with both criticising each other. The rift emerged when the Afghan government raised objections over US air strikes causing numerous casualties in the country. The US tried vainly at several levels to find a replacement for Karzai but finally has resigned to relying on Karzai as a partner in Afghanistan. That is why this time around the US is providing assistance but with strict conditionalities so that checks and balances could be maintained over the aid and money delivered.(60)

The security situation in Afghanistan is worsening day by day. During the election time insecurity and Taliban threats were so alarming that even complete lists of polling centres were announced on the actual polling day. Areas where military and police felt threatened to go polling stations were ordered closed. It was reported that government ordered closing 440 polling stations on the election day.(61) That’s why on the election day the Afghan Election Commission reported that only 6,200 polling stations operated. According to the Interior Minister 12 out of 24 provinces of Afghanistan remained at high risk which meant there was either limited or no government presence at all which created doubts for over one-third of the country about participation in the elections.(62) An additional 30,000 foreign troops were deployed, the government hired 10,000 tribesmen for security measures in almost two-third of country’s provinces and 60,000 ISAF troops were ordered to help Afghan forces maintain security on election day.(63)

Despite such arrangements the government reported that 73 incidents of violence took place in 15 provinces and at least 26 people were killed.(64) The actual number of attacks that could not be reported because of the ban imposed on the media may be higher. However, ISAF reported 400 militant attacks on the election day making it the most violent day since 2001 while in Kandahar two men were said to be hanged by the insurgents for participating in elections. The capital itself witnessed five bomb blasts.(65) Hence, both sides gained some of their goals: the NATO and Afghan government managed to hold elections defying Taliban’s disruption threats, while the Taliban though failing in disrupting the election yet succeeded in intimidating voters, especially female voters, in many parts of the country. This resulted in low voter turnout particularly in the south. Still, to change the momentum of war the significance of holding elections and continuing with the democratic process in a war-stricken country have immense implications for future efforts. The success of future NATO/US mission in Afghanistan chiefly depends on an effective Afghan partner so that they can all have a safe exit from the present situation. However, the fact is that Afghanistan needs assistance for building up staying power. One important encouraging factor is that even though Afghans are not enthusiastic about their current political elites/rulers, a vast majority rejects Taliban’s return to power.

Policy implications of the polls: Afghanistan & the region

The presidential election of 2009 is not only significant for Afghanistan and the Western actors equally but also for the regional or neighbouring countries. Any political and security shift in Afghanistan impinges on its neighbour’s policies. Moreover, to stop Afghanistan from further fragmentation of the state and society it is important to realize the significance of the role and strength of the regional neighbours. Keeping in mind the possibility of a hasty exit strategy of the US and its allies from Afghanistan, it is essential to ensure stronger links and bonds between Afghanistan and its key neighbours. With the recent pressure on foreign interests and troops in the wake of Taliban resurgence the need for regional cooperation and neighbours’ presence has brought them in a limelight which cannot be ignored. The neighbouring countries are coming together for cooperating with Afghanistan and helping it sort out its troubles as they get directly affected by the situation. Afghanistan has to base its policies on future prospects and projections so when the allies leave it once again, it is not left at the mercy of a myriad of splinter groups. With the shift in the contemporary international scenario and domestic pressure for a viable solution, Karzai will have to play the regional cards with a cautious and sagacious approach. A vigilant policy is inevitable because of the pressures on Karzai from all sides. Moreover, to stop Afghanistan from becoming a battleground for Pakistan-India, Iran-US hostilities, and US-Russia tussle and not forgetting the irritant segments creating problems inside the country, it is all the more essential that Kabul proceed with sagacity.

Pakistan

In the words of former Pentagon analyst Anthony Cordesman, “A valid Afghan strategy cannot be separated from what happens in Pakistan… At the same time, it is clear that Afghanistan’s future will play a critical role in defining Pakistan’s security.”(66) So whatever happens in Afghanistan has direct implications for Pakistan that is why Pakistan has always wanted a friendly regime in neighbouring Afghanistan. The flawed policies of the past US administrations have left behind a volcanic mess in Afghanistan which had trickled down into Pakistani territory. Pakistan, its people and national interests are all at stake, threatened by insecurity just like Afghanistan. To counter insurgency and ensure security Pakistan has been actively assisting the US and its Western allies in the war against terrorism. Keeping in mind Pakistan’s past connections with the Taliban and its current fight for the single cause of defeating insurgents, the outcome of the presidential election in Afghanistan and the proposed US exit plan, all these facts require that policy-makers in Islamabad focus on the aftermath of the present situation.

Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan would not be changed by new developments there. Pakistani government and army recently conveyed to the US their position on Afghanistan. Pakistan needs a peaceful, friendly and stable Afghanistan in terms of ensuring long-term security on its western border. Pakistan wants to see Afghanistan’s institutions of both army and police established in a manner that they do not threaten its strategic interests. In addition to this, it basically does not want any kind of antagonistic situation emerging there and that includes hostile Indian activities against Pakistan as well. Pakistan also rejects a hegemonic Indian role in the future Afghan and regional affairs.(67) As a non-NATO ally Pakistan has been making far greater contributions in fighting terrorism than realized by the international community. Tens of thousands of Pakistani troops are fighting well-trained and well-equipped Taliban and al-Qaeda guerrillas who launch attacks across the Afghan border on NATO-led international forces from Pakistan’s rugged north-western tribal region. It has suffered heavy civilian and military casualties on its soil in addition to the severe blows to its economy. Pakistan has lately launched offensive operations in its own tribal areas along the Afghan frontier against insurgents so that peace is restored on both sides of the border. It is in this context that German Chancellor Angela Merkel considers Pakistan a part of the solution not of the problem. She means that without improved regional cooperation, in particular between Afghanistan and Pakistan, there would be no peace in Afghanistan.(68) However, policies during his first presidential term of treating Pakistan coldly and blindly supporting the negative designs of India in creating trouble in Pakistan’s neglected regions led to distancing of Islamabad from Kabul. Consequently, in dealing with Karzai for future peace and pursuing operations against insurgents Pakistan does not want any irritant factors spoiling the possibilities of future cooperation. Though India’s developmental work in Afghanistan is not objectionable to Pakistan, its seriously harmful designs for destabilizing Pakistan are. The more hostility grows between Pakistan and India, the tenser regional environment emerges and Afghanistan becomes a theatre of proxy war.

Pakistan has so far been supportive of Karzai’s policies introduced in the interest of stabilizing Afghanistan. The regional cooperation proposed by Afghanistan has been openly received by Pakistan as is evident from the ongoing bilateral, trilateral and international meetings. During these meetings Pakistan has been playing a prominent role and the trilateral summit held in Islamabad included only the immediate neighbours of Afghanistan and was to specify publicly that only their cooperation was key to peace and resolving the Afghan and regional problems.(69) It is understandable as Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan generally share similar problems. Not just problems, the former two are capable of providing Afghans the logistical support as they share long borders with the land-locked country; also, there are ethnic, cultural, religious and trade ties that link them. Pakistan had been providing refuge to three million Afghans since the Soviet invasion. The relatively distant neighbour, India is not considered a part of the solution while the three states agreed on including Afghanistan’s other immediate neighbours — Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan — in the regional efforts for peace and stability in the war-ravaged country.(70) This development is a clear message for the West and India to check their meddling in the region. Though Pakistan also needs to be cautious over Russia’s increasing ties with different elements in Afghanistan and historical connections between India and Russia and together with Afghanistan.

Another significant development following the US exit plan and Karzai’s prompt approach towards reconciliation with the Taliban raises thoughts of mending fences with the Taliban. The proposition poses risks for Pakistan’s security, though. Militants are known for their unforgiving attitude so there are dangers of hardliners entering Pakistan once the moderates join the Afghan government. This will have major impacts on the counter-militancy efforts made by Pakistan in its territory. A careful approach is required to be worked out by Pakistan also because both Pakistan and the non-Pashtun communities in Afghanistan need to get closer and have a better mutual understanding. Nevertheless, bringing militants to the discussion table is also an important security measures. Therefore, Pakistan has been calling for a political way out of the mess and supports the proposal of talks with “good Taliban.” Pakistan Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi pointed out to the BBC that militant groups in Afghanistan represented a large number of Pashtuns who formed Afghanistan’s largest ethnic community that should not be ignored. He suggested that a line should be drawn between moderates and hardliners and then due share in power be given to the moderates to help stabilize the situation.(71) This swing in situation places Islamabad once again in a better position with a role in helping Afghanistan get out of its troubles and gives Pakistan a say in the international community.

India

The fall of the Taliban regime in 2001 paved the way for other countries to develop relations with Afghanistan. India also came in to secure its strategic interests as Afghanistan having a significant geo-strategic location provides an access to the vast energy resources and attractive markets of the Central Asian region and beyond. While the Western powers sidelined Pakistan hindering its role in reconstruction and development of Afghanistan, some distant neighbours like India were provided with such projects. India promptly and fully used the opportunity to further its regional and strategic interests and became one of the biggest contributors in developing the socio-economic sector of Afghanistan. Indian public and private sectors have been actively pursuing reconstruction projects and India has earned the goodwill of the Afghans in general. Indians made maximum use of their connections with President Karzai and expanded their influence in Afghanistan through numerous projects and a number of consulates for pursuing covert activities. Consequently, President Karzai along with India started blaming Pakistan for all the insurgent activities and insecurity in Afghanistan.

This time around Karzai’s re-election has presented certain complications for India. The major issue for Indians throughout their presence in Afghanistan remains insecurity. Their reconstruction work has often been hindered by Taliban insurgents. President Karzai’s offer of peace dialogue with the insurgents and the move to reach out to the fighters is not a welcome development for India, which initially claimed that they would only deal with the legitimate government of Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan.(72) India had never accepted Taliban’s rule and rejects the concept of “good Taliban” and “bad Taliban” as for it all Taliban are insurgents targeting Indians and their interests in the country. Therefore, talks with Taliban create some serious implications for India. One significant implication of Karzai’s proposal for peace talks with the Taliban — whether it succeeds or not is another matter — is that it brings Pakistan once again in an important role. India had been pursuing covert operations against Pakistan behind its development projects in Afghanistan and through its consulates established along Pak-Afghan border. Even Karzai and the US were roped in to join Indian efforts to minimize the role of Pakistan in Afghanistan and to isolate it. Both Kabul and Washington chose to turn a blind eye to the trouble being stoked up by India in the Balochistan and FATA regions of Pakistan. The Indian conduct aimed at destabilizing Pakistan is openly discussed in foreign reports which also point out the growing Indian influence in the affairs of Afghanistan and its potential for exacerbating regional tensions. Christine Fair, a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, spoke in a fortnight manner at a New York roundtable in March 2009:

I think it would be a mistake to completely disregard Pakistan’s regional perceptions due to doubts about Indian competence in executing covert operations. That misses the point entirely. And I think it is unfair to dismiss the notion that Pakistan’s apprehensions about Afghanistan stem in part from its security competition with India. Having visited the Indian mission in Zahedan, Iran, I can assure you they are not issuing visas as the main activity! Moreover, India has run operations from its mission in Mazar (through which it supported the Northern Alliance) and is likely doing so from the other consulates it has reopened in Jalalabad and Qandahar along the border. Indian officials have told me privately that they are pumping money into Baluchistan. Kabul has encouraged India to engage in provocative activities such as using the Border Roads Organization to build sensitive parts of the Ring Road and use the Indo-Tibetan police force for security. It is also building schools on a sensitive part of the border in Kunar — across from Bajaur. Kabul’s motivations for encouraging these activities are as obvious as India’s interest in engaging in them…(73)

Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the American officer commanding the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), had also asked the US to scale down irrelevant Indian activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan which are actually hindering US and NATO efforts in Afghanistan.(74) The international community wants an end to instability in Afghanistan and has also showed willingness to have peace negotiations with the “good Taliban.” At the London conference, as stated above, they announced a $500 million fund for a reconciliation programme.(75) President Karzai has been pushing ahead with the initiative and on his request the United Nations recently dropped the names of five Taliban from its blacklist to facilitate reconciliation.(76) Therefore, India to have a global position and a role in Afghanistan needs to adjust to the new developments in Afghanistan as well as in the international community.

In the post-election Afghanistan India is concerned about the peace process which includes mediation by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Recognizing the importance of the role Afghanistan’s immediate neighbour Pakistan can play in ensuring stability in his country, President Karzai has showed willingness towards Pakistan’s assistance in the reconciliation process. Pakistan playing a role in this process is alarming for India which tends to view it as a zero-sum game. The new development observed in the closeness of Afghanistan’s immediate neighbours — Pakistan, Iran and Turkey — will also help strengthen regional ties.(77) At two significant summits India was not invited for assisting in resolving the Afghan crisis, one the trilateral summit held in Islamabad for discussing future roles of Afghanistan’s immediate neighbours, and two, the security conference on Afghanistan hosted by Turkey. This was sceptically viewed by India as it was left with no choice but to rethink its policies along with the shifting roles.(78)

India was averse to seeing Taliban sharing power in the country and it also lacked stronger ties with other Pashtun figures outside the Kabul government circle. However, the new developments have made Indian Foreign Minister S. M. Krishna accept the reality and say: “We’re willing to give it a try. If the Taliban meet the three conditions put forward — acceptance of the Afghan Constitution, severing ties with al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, and renunciation of violence — and they are accepted in the mainstream of Afghan politics and society, we could do business.”(79)

The onus presently lies on Indian diplomatic skills in addressing the challenging scenario.

Iran

The new developments in Afghanistan have also brought Iran in the focus. But Afghanistan needs to adopt a careful approach towards Iran because the Karzai government has to balance Iranian influence in Afghanistan with the growing US pressure on his government. For Afghanistan’s national interest strong relations with Iran are indispensable. Still, some segments of Afghans have a negative perception of growing Iranian role in parts of the country.

Iran has been contributing a lot in the economic sphere of Afghanistan and its export market is huge. Iranian firms continue to assist actively in reconstruction and infrastructure building with several hundred million dollars investment to date. Iran’s non-oil exports to Afghanistan in 2008 were over half a billion dollars while Iranian aid totals more than US$280 million so far. It includes $220 million for road construction projects and $60 million for education, telecommunications, electricity, border security, higher education, health and sports. Trade volume between Iran and Afghanistan is more than $1.3 billion.(80) Iran is also spending 100 million dollars on building a university in Kabul. Iran’s presence in Afghanistan is more visible in the Herat province which owes its development to Iranian funding. Iran has also expanded its commercial links into the northern provinces of Afghanistan and has often expressed its commitment to linking regional economies and providing aid in other sectors. However, some sections of Afghans take a negative view of Iran’s role in the field of religious education. Also, the open support organized by Iranian organizations in Afghanistan for the causes of Palestine and Iraq might be problematic for Kabul.(81)

Iran highlights its chief interests in Afghanistan which include, drug flow from Afghanistan to Iran; shared historical, cultural and linguistic linkages; security for Iranian investment in Afghanistan; border security; and withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan.(82) At the political level both countries have maintained close ties and there have been exchanges of visits. The regional influence of Iran in Afghanistan is seen in the criticism over foreign troops and the US presence in Afghanistan. President Ahmadinejad of Iran says that extremism “in Afghanistan is a result of foreigners’ presence that are here for colonialist purpose and since these forces don’t belong to this region so Afghanistan’s problems better be left for regional solutions.”(83)

The Iranian interests once worked on properly are beneficial for Afghanistan as they converge with that of Afghanistan. Iran wants to work together in economic and socio-cultural sectors that includes development in all the civilian areas which are to the benefit of Afghanistan and highly helpful for national and regional growth. However, with active contribution to development in different sector Iran does use its influence against the West. It becomes noteworthy when it comes to the issue of foreign presence. The Afghan government needs to find a middle way to pursue its interests while balancing US-Iran hostility on its soil and US attitude towards Karzai himself. On the one hand Afghanistan needs continued support of both countries and their assistance, particularly that of the US, the main strategic partner, to sustain the country along with Iranian support and investment for Afghans, while on the other, the past uncomfortable relations with the US and the expression of a tougher stance towards Karzai by the new Obama administration has given Karzai an alternative of regional opening so that Afghanistan’s problems are sorted out through other ways as well instead of total reliance on US plans. Iran has welcomed Karzai’s decision and has keenly provided its support as an outlet to Afghanistan. This has been viewed suspiciously by the US and recently in a visit to Afghanistan US Defence Secretary Robert Gates accused Iran of playing a double game which led to similar counteraccusations from Iran.(84) Therefore, US-Iran animosity has a negative impact for the country.

With Karzai’s re-election both Kabul and Tehran have lately become too eager to close past gaps with the region. Iran has been actively hosting and participating in several summits organized for getting together the three crucial regional states of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran itself. These are aimed at boosting political and economic ties at bilateral, trilateral and international levels. Many significant issues have been discussed between high officials of the three states which include ways to curb extremism and terrorism, military interventions, regional security and reconstruction of Afghanistan etc.(85) Though Iran is supportive of Karzai’s new policies for combating extremism, yet it opposes the process of reintegration of the insurgents introduced by the US and actively pursued by Karzai. Iran had never recognized the legitimacy of Taliban rule and is not enthusiastic about working with them. As for the contentious matter of Iranian influence in Afghanistan there is the issue of insurgent activities that needs to be checked by the Afghan government. It is believed in Afghanistan that Iran also continues to support insurgent activities in Afghanistan through supplying arms to Afghan insurgents. Recently the commander of Afghanistan’s 205 Army Corps, General Zazai, reported recovering Iranian-made weapons during the operation in the Marjah district of Helmand.(86) A Kabul newspaper also reported that militant groups active in western Afghanistan maintained training camps in Iran’s Khorasan and Kerman provinces. Concerns over insurgents coming from Iran were raised when Afghan security officials arrested an Iranian suicide bomber in the Helmand province.(87) Actually, Iran might be backing insurgent activities to undermine the US/NATO mission in Afghanistan. Perhaps due to socio-economic reasons the Afghan government refrained from raising such issues in the past but circumstances have changed and Karzai needs to reform past policies so that such kind of activities could be restrained.

Another issue between the two neighbours that puts pressure on the Afghan government is the refugee crisis. Afghans are one of the world’s largest refugee groups since the Soviet invasion in 1979 and the US war against the Taliban regime since 2001. Initially, Iran welcomed these migrants but soon afterward started the repatriation process. Iran hosts about 900,000 legalized Afghan refugees while an unknown number of illegal refugees also resides in Iran. Since 2002, however, both legal and illegal Afghan refugees are subject to repatriation. The Iranian government has reportedly deported at least one million refugees over the past years and continues to repatriate at the rate of about 500 per day. Iran has also imposed restrictions on legal Afghan refugees as well and the matter remains a point of friction between the two countries.(88) The United Nations Children’s Fund reported that Iran deported over 1,000 extremely impoverished child refugees to Herat in 2008. In spite of a signed agreement between Kabul and Tehran that Tehran would not expel Afghan refugees until March 2009, it did.(89) Afghanistan being a poor country with unemployment levels alarmingly high, seeks employment and better societal opportunities for its refugees in Iran. Iran’s policy of deporting refugees creates further domestic burden on Afghanistan. That needs to be settled amicably and reasonably through bilateral negotiations.

On the issues of drug smuggling and border security both governments can work out solutions mutually. Iran serves as transhipment point for drugs trafficking through Asia and Europe. That’s why Iran has been partly sealing its eastern border with Afghanistan to address the refugee and drug problems. Iranian government is interested in curbing narcotics trade and is actively working along with Pakistan and Afghanistan. Iran reportedly seized 1,000 tons of illicit narcotics going through its territory in 2008.(90) Afghanistan can learn and work with Iran in curbing its opium production and illegal trade flow. Hence, Karzai needs to be sagacious and careful in dealing with Iran as a regional partner and make sure that Afghanistan does not become a battlefield for the conflicting interests of its allies. So far, Iran is eager to address the common problems between the two neighbours. This will be helpful also in breaking the regional isolation inflicted on Iran by the West. Most important is to give practical shape to the commitments made by each other at different platforms and occasions so that it not only serves Afghanistan’s national agendas but brings regional progress as well. Afghanistan’s stability ensures that regional stability needs are realized.

China

Throughout the 20^th century China showed little interest in Afghanistan with a narrowly defined policy. That contrasts with the growing relations that are seen lately. With an increase in the Afghan openness towards exploration of its natural resources and foreign investments China also seeks to fulfil its potential demands. China has noteworthy economic interests in Afghanistan similar to Afghanistan’s interests in Chinese investments — one way of looking for prospective partners away from the West within the region. The reasons behind China-Afghanistan bilateral relations are their converging interests. China has a fast growing economy and requires natural resources like fuel, copper, oil and gas, and Afghanistan wants these natural resources to be utilized for a structured economy. In 2008 China’s Jiangxi Copper Company and China Metallurgical Group Corporation made a joint investment of $3.5 billion and earned full mining rights for developing Afghanistan’s Aynak copper field. This copper field is estimated to be the world’s largest undeveloped field, untouched since the Soviet invasion in 1979. The contract is China’s triumph and has been so far the highest investment made in Afghanistan’s history. Along with mining it also involves the construction of a $500 million power plant and a railway link from Tajikistan to Pakistan. To Afghanistan’s benefit the contract brings 10,000 employments for Afghans, while $400 million of royalties will be given annually to the Afghan government.(91)

China’s commercial interests led its companies ZTE and Huawei, partnered with the Afghan Ministry of Communications, into a digital telephone project. China also took part in the Parwan irrigation project for restoring water supply in Parwan province and the reconstruction of the public hospitals in Kabul and Kandahar. Furthermore, the European Union hired Chinese firms for numerous construction projects in Afghanistan including road restoration work.(92)

China’s policy on Afghanistan generally remained focused on financial assistance for the UN mission, protection of Chinese investments and personnel in the region along with maintaining strong ties with Pakistan. Beijing provided Kabul approximately $130 million aid and assistance for reconstruction and has promised $75 million more.(93) However, this is going to increase as recently President Karzai visited China to re-establish their relations and both countries pledged to cooperate in promoting regional security for peaceful reconstruction of Afghanistan through combating terrorism and extremism and cross-border crimes. They signed a series of trade and economic agreements and ensured deeper political ties in future. China encouraged Afghanistan to play a greater role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as well which would bring the key regional states closer to each other leading to stability of Afghanistan and the region as a whole.(94) More Chinese engagements are expected in the future as Afghanistan has vast resources of oil and gas in its northern parts. The US Geological Survey estimated Afghan oil reserves at a mean of 1.596 million barrels and natural gas reserves standing at a mean of 15.687 trillion cubic feet.(95) Tapped effectively, it will benefit both Afghanistan and China.

Another crucial interest shared by the two states is combating terrorism, extremism and separatism. For China, these three threats are located in its Xinjiang province which shares a 76-km long border with Afghanistan. There are cross-border activities involving training and supporting separatist and terrorist activities by al-Qaeda and Taliban insurgents. Moreover, there is also drug trafficking going on from Afghanistan into Chinese territory. Therefore securing the border and stabilizing Afghanistan is the highest priority as it is pivotal to all the other interests and development efforts in Afghanistan.

With a stable Afghanistan regional and strategic interests can be promoted as well. China also being an Asian power wants to expand its influence and the geo-strategic layout offers huge potentials for China. China has been constructing railway links from the Aynak copper mines to the Gwadar Port and another from Gwadar to China’s western lines in the Xinjiang province.(96) These strategic linkages connect regional interests and for this regional stability and security is a chief requirement in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

At present due to limited involvement of China there are debates within China regarding its future policies. A section of Chinese analysts argues that China must realize that its growing power brings more responsibilities and it should have greater role in the entire Middle Eastern and South Asian regions for stabilizing its neighbours with the use of both hard and soft power. For them, it is extremely important that China should send its troops to Afghanistan for protecting Chinese economic interests, its global image and strategic frontiers. They want China to own its responsibilities in Afghanistan as security for the Aynak copper mines is provided by the American and Afghan forces. This section wants to secure Chinese position in Afghanistan once the US withdraws and counter US and western expansion in the region.(97)

Another group of observers seeks a middle path where they argue that China should consider sending peacekeeping forces under the UN flag, or police or civilian security forces to Afghanistan for providing protection to those key infrastructure and reconstruction sites where Chinese interests lie, though with the approval of the Kabul government. A third section, which comprises a majority of Chinese observers and analysts, favours the continuation of China’s expansion in its economic development and humanitarian efforts in both Afghanistan and Pakistan under the aegis of UN or other international or multilateral agencies like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.(98)

Thus, at present Chinese policies towards Afghanistan are of a limited nature but with significant non-combat policies of assistance. In dealing with Afghan insurgents so far China has been carefully pursuing policies of non-interference in the war-ravaged country. China resisted sending troops or providing logistical support facilities to the US/NATO military mission and refrained from fighting terrorists in Afghanistan directly to avoid risking its own Muslim ethnic minorities located mainly in the Xinjian autonomous region.

Russia

In seeking other means of assistance and efforts to engage regional powers in Afghanistan for brighter prospects, President Karzai turned to Russia, too. American criticism of his incompetence also pushed Karzai and other Afghan officials closer to Russia for resuming ties. Karzai repeatedly tried to use the Russian option while dealing with the US/NATO. On the other hand the Russian Federation was one of the first foreign states to welcome both presidential and provincial council election results in 2009. Russia even welcomed the returning of Karzai to power as a stabilizing factor for the political development of Afghanistan.(99) With the approval of the Karzai government Russia is interested in furthering cooperation at all levels of political, economic, and humanitarian areas as well as anti-terror fight.(100) Moscow went to the extent of writing off 93 per cent of Afghanistan’s Soviet-era debts to strengthen relations.(101) The revival of bilateral ties is observed in frequent visits especially from the Afghan side. Moscow welcomed the three-day official visit of former Afghan foreign minister Rangeen Dadfar Spanta, meeting between Russian and Afghan deputy foreign ministers in Moscow over political issues prior to the London conference, meeting between the speakers of Afghanistan’s Upper House and Russian Lower House soon after Karzai’s victory in the 2009 elections, and the visit by a delegation of Afghanistan’s Lower House of Parliament to St. Petersburg and Moscow.(102) Basically, since 2007 Russia’s intelligence apparatus also reactivated their relations with the Northern Alliance members and warlords, though it might disturb a balanced process of re-establishing the relationship. Moscow re-opened its consulate in Mazar-i-Sharif. All these growing connections indicate the height of interest shown by both governments in rebuilding their ties.(103)

The Russian government has shown its readiness to help rebuild Afghanistan. They are especially involved in reconstructing the 142 facilities built by the Soviet Union in the country with the international community financing the projects.(104) This includes the reconstruction of the strategic 2.7-km long Salang tunnel built by the Soviet Union in 1964 and destroyed in 1998 that links the central part of the country with the north.(105) On humanitarian side, Russia supplied 18,000 tons of good-quality flour since January 2009 while another 23,000 tons of flour along with vehicles were scheduled to be supplied later.(106)

Russia is also eager to resume cooperation in military and military-technical aid. In the wake of Taliban/al-Qaeda resurgence the Karzai government requested that Moscow resume military equipment supplies. Russia’s arms exporter agency Rosoboronexport announced its readiness to cooperate in military technical area.(107) The NATO secretary general during his visit to Moscow to seek aid for the fight in Afghanistan asked for hundreds of thousands of Kalashnikov AK-47 assault rifles, mortars, pistols, armoured personnel carriers, field artillery, AN-32 cargo aircraft and helicopters.(108) US Defence Secretary Robert Gates conveyed US expectations of Russia sending troops for stabilizing Afghanistan and assisting the coalition forces. Russia so far has opposed using force for solving the Afghan problem and refused sending its troops there.(109)

Russians are highly concerned over the threats emanating from drug trafficking every year despite the presence of international coalition forces in Afghanistan. For Russia drug trafficking poses the largest national security concern. According to UN estimates, Russia has more than 200,000 heroin and morphine addicts and 30,000 were dying from addiction annually.(110) That is why bilateral agreements have been signed to help check illegal transport and sale of narcotics, psychotropic substances and other drugs. The head of Afghan Counter-Narcotics Ministry, Gen Khodaidad, spoke highly of the operation code-named Kanal carried out by the Russians to put an end to drug trafficking.(111) Afghanistan’s police officers would be given anti-drugs training by Russia. The course, organized by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), will be attended by a group of 11 Afghan police officers.(112) There is divergence of views between the NATO and Russians over stamping out opium production in Afghanistan. Russian ambassador to the UN clearly expressed concern over NATO plans to give up on destroying poppy fields. NATO argues that it does not want to have a situation where the only source of livelihood for the poor Afghans is taken away from them.(113)

Resurgence in insurgency and fears of international coalition forces facing defeat in Afghanistan compelled NATO to mend fences with Russia. (Their relations were suspended after Russia’s war with Georgia.) Besides, the NATO urgently seeks new supply routes for the alliance troops in Afghanistan as the existing routes through Pakistan are becoming insecure. Russians don’t want to see the re-emergence of Taliban and its spillover effects in the already vulnerable Central Asian region so they allowed NATO access to Russian lines.(114) However, the US presence in Central Asia is resented by Russia as it considers it to be its traditional sphere of influence. The closure of the vital Manas air base for the US by Kyrgyzstan in return for the $2 billion loan promise by Russia to Kyrgyzstan and transit of NATO supplies through Russia instead speak clearly of Russian policies of restricting US role in Central Asia.(115) Russia wants to help the US and Afghanistan as part of the international community but on its own terms as stated by Dmitri Rogozin, Russian envoy to NATO, that they “negotiate from a position of strength” on Afghanistan.(116) Bringing Russia back in Afghanistan to provide training and equipment for the security forces and reconstruction efforts gives leverage to Russia over the US and other Western powers.

Afghanistan expressed its openness to be a part of regional organizations to gain maximum assistance possible from the platforms of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Russia has also welcomed the engagement of SCO for providing stability and rebuilding of Afghanistan. In March 2009, the SCO held a special conference on Afghanistan in Moscow which was attended by China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, NATO representatives, Group of Eight-member nations, European Union and the United Nations. The conference aimed at establishing the SCO as an important stakeholder or investor in the security and stability of Afghanistan.(117) Russia has been promoting CSTO-SCO cooperation as well which other than providing Afghanistan assistance also points to Russian interest in limiting the growing Chinese influence in Central Asia. All this Russian involvement balances the US influence though for Afghanistan a cautious approach is also needed in encouraging Russian influence once again in the country.

Conclusion

Afghanistan is in the grip of numerous troubles with an unending fundamental security problem causing deterioration of the state and society. Reconstruction and development tasks in Afghanistan have become so questionable that under any circumstances it raises scepticism about the future of the country and its effects on the region. The incompetence and reckless approach of the previous US administration in Afghanistan has created an utterly uncontrollable mess for not only the present Obama administration but for the regional states as well. In the nine years since 2001 the seeds of chaos and disorder have been sown so deep and wide in Afghanistan by the past corrupt government of President Karzai and his cronies that no matter how many constructive measures and heavily armed forces are installed the results are dissatisfactory for everyone. Both the Afghan government and its international partners failed in delivering a stable mechanism to Afghans who are today more unprotected and poorer than before. The country is still under the control of private militias, warlords and drug mafias who go around unchallenged and unchecked as many of them were accommodated by the government officials. Lack of food supplies, particularly in the South, the growing number of displaced families, insufficient health and education facilities and the rising number of civilian casualties reaching a new high every year are testing Afghans’ patience. To overcome such misery the new policy shift decided by the US and Afghanistan reflects optimism, though only if it is worked out practically with full commitment by all the three parties — the Karzai government, regional players and international partners.

The timing for holding the presidential election in Afghanistan was crucial for the future efforts in the country and that’s why so much attention and resources were devoted for the purpose. Both the Karzai government and the international community bear the responsibility for the outcome of election as many known irresponsible power holders remained associated with the Karzai camp and protected by international patrons. However, despite dissatisfaction expressed by the majority in Afghanistan, the US choice of Karzai as partner was achieved. The flawed elections marred the legitimacy of the electoral process at a crucial moment and exposed the inadequate and corrupt records of the Karzai government. Therefore, while the election process cannot be redone it is still possible for Kabul to repair the reputation and show performance by fully committing itself to the crucial policy agenda introduced by President Karzai and the international actors. There is a dire need for focusing on capacity-building of leadership and civilian sectors rather than having only a military approach.

Counterinsurgency measures can only work in Afghanistan if the societal structure is understood properly. A viable legitimate government is needed which links itself at the local level so that popular support is built up. This is possible but needs really hard work on the part of President Karzai and his government. In Afghanistan the political system is basically local with a strong tribal structure. Taliban insurgents are well aware of their political basis and one reason behind their re-emergence is the use of local politics by manipulating the grievances of the poor Afghans against the central government. That is why the insurgency in Afghanistan does not recruit only former warlords, former military and political commanders motivated to establish an Islamic system but also local disillusioned villagers who get paid from the militants for carrying out destructive tasks. The international community needs to understand the importance of the local nature of tribal politics while reaching out to Afghans for support.

Therefore, more attention must be paid to creating a workable government with a blend of Afghans cultural values as against making democracy the focal point, so that local people could relate themselves to the central system. Afghanistan being steeped in tradition is still too young to get infused with democratic values effectively. A gradual approach in this direction could be pragmatic. Moreover, in having a workable democratic system the vital role of political parties and political pluralism cannot be ignored. There is no democracy without political parties and a closer look at the elections showed that only 16 per cent candidates belonged to political parties. Most of those running for presidency were independent, including Karzai himself who neither belonged to a political party nor intends to form one.

As for improvement in governance, any anti-corruption mechanism must have practical implementation. And confining it just to the central government level is not enough; a top-down approach is essential. Decentralization approach has been neglected by Karzai; that needs reconsideration so that governance and rule of law can reach all over the country. Eradication of corruption in any form and at all levels is imperative for Afghanistan. The US, its international allies and the Afghans are not willing to accept any corrupt leader or partner. The Obama administration has already put conditions on aid and assistance so that transparency is ensured and their aid does not get wasted. Therefore, if Karzai wants to salvage Afghanistan from the war and disorder he will have to show it through deeds and not just words. The practical need is to prioritize objectives and allocate resources accordingly to get desired results. An important task that has been ignored so far by Karzai in his new agenda is to bring reforms in the crucial police and judicial systems. To think of Afghanistan with its power-holders completely clean of corruption, and an opium-free society with a booming economy is a very idealistic approach. So to weaken the trouble-makers and then getting hold of them for better security and accountability, effective police and judiciary is essential. Afghanistan police is not trained and only adding to its numbers would not work unless they are properly trained, respectably paid so that they don’t join the insurgents. If both the army and police are partnered with NATO that would ensure they are more trained speedily.

The present judicial system is too weak and tainted with corruption. One way to improve the legal system keeping in mind the literacy rate of Afghans and the dominant status of tribal elders, is to employ the services of seasoned elders or public servants who have a positive image in their communities. Besides this, assistance of Afghan law students, at home and abroad, and international legal experts can also be taken to improve the judicial system.

Regarding the re-integration plan for the insurgents renouncing violence, the Afghan government in collaboration with the global actors can work out rehabilitation projects and supportive programmes with different communities in the country. Arrangements can be made to keep hardcore elements from creating disturbance in trouble-prone areas the way the Shinwari tribe has done. Moreover, local militias need to be curbed so they do not operate outside their community boundaries and accept government’s supervision.

Keeping in mind the poverty crisis of Afghans and lack of socio-economic development what international donors can do is to initiate their assistance according to the needs of the people in different parts of the country. International reconstructive and humanitarian projects must be need-oriented so resources are utilized best where they are needed most. Also, rather than having similar multiple projects in one area coordination needs to be built among the planners. The skills of Afghans must be utilized in all these development projects instead of resorting to subcontracting and allowing foreign workforce into Afghanistan. This way unemployment can also be addressed to some extent.

Regional actors

A sound approach has been adopted by President Karzai in realizing the importance of regional actors. However, cautious steps are needed in tackling regional complexities. All the vital regional players have divergent national interests and apprehensions in Afghanistan. Since there are no easy ways to fix the problems in Afghanistan, regional assistance could be helpful in solving them. For a solution-based approach it is essential to evolve a convergence of interests among regional players. Otherwise it could touch off a blame game as seen in the past. One important factor in involving the regional actors is the wholehearted support of the US as well; while it has been observed that the US and its Western allies sometimes choose to put pressure on Pakistan and Iran, and that creates difficulties. The uneasy relationship between the regional states continues to hamper regional efforts. In many ways these regional countries have mainly caused problems for each other. However, new developments have presented new opportunities for making up with each other and working jointly for resolving bilateral and regional issues. As Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said regional issues could be resolved with regional solutions.(118) In Afghanistan the involvement and presence of international community is also viewed sceptically. The majority support for the US that was seen during the removal of Taliban has declined and US is now viewed unfavourably.

A policy of neutrality if pursued by Afghanistan in dealing with the neighbours would be more helpful rather than sticking with the previous biased attitude. Afghanistan in appeasing the US and India sought to isolate Pakistan, a non-NATO ally in the war against insurgency and immediate neighbour of Afghanistan. The past policy mistakes only further isolated Karzai and created regional complexities for Afghanistan. However, with the new shift in US attitude Pakistan is not seen as a troublemaker but an important part of the solution. As Pakistan is also fighting an insurgency, greater engagements between Pakistan and Afghanistan would lead to solutions. With the resurgence in insurgency, both the US and Afghanistan have realized the constructive role Pakistan can play in peace initiatives. Although India is still regarded a friend, yet with Pakistan playing a leading role Indian position in Afghanistan gets affected.

Despite regional challenges Pakistan, Iran, India, China and Russia all these neighbours of Afghanistan are full of potential and resources needed for Afghanistan’s reconstruction. However, India-Pakistan rivalry with unconstructive US meddling have negative effects in Afghanistan. Other negative factors are the Iran-US tussle over Iranian nuclear projects, suspicions between the US and Russia, China-Russia competition for a leading status in Central Asia, and instability in Central Asian states. But one single concern shared by all the regional states is to see an end to US/NATO presence and expansion in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Therefore, if the US wants to see peace and stability in Afghanistan and the region then it has to put behind its bilateral issues with the regional countries whose role is crucial in ensuring peace and stability in the region.

Hence, all the efforts can be fruitful only if the international actors and Afghan government have a unified approach to work on both civilian and military sides and proceed in a balanced manner. Any hasty exit of the US and its Western allies in order to save themselves may lead to the collapse of the already vulnerable Afghan state and society. It might also lead to more violence in the country if left on its own. A stronger integration of approach and shared responsibilities among regional states would also help ensure sustainability in the war-ravaged country.

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25. Sabrina Tavernise and Mark Landler. “Allies Press Karzai to Accept Election Audit Results”, The New York Times, 17 October 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/18/ world/asia/18afghan.html>.

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INDIA: TOWARDS ACHIEVING MDGs IN EDUCATION

Introduction

Related literature

About educational goals:
Global commitment

Achieving Educational Goals:
India’s commitment

Operation Blackboard

Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan

National Programme for Education of Girls
at Elementary Level (NPEGEL)

The KGBV Scheme

Mahila Samakhya

Midday Meal Scheme

Conclusion

AFGHAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGION

Democratic process in Afghanistan

Main argument

Political developments since 2001

2009: Karzai’s second term

Political participation and election process

Individual versus political parties

Karzai’s victory

Future administration

Public response: Hopes, concerns and criticism

Significance of polls for Afghanistan &
world community: Security

Policy implications of the polls: Afghanistan & the region

Pakistan

India

Iran

China

Russia

Conclusion

Regional actors

Main argument

Political developments since 2001

2009: Karzai’s second term

Political participation and election process

Individual versus political parties

Karzai’s victory

Future administration

Public response: Hopes, concerns and criticism

Significance of polls for Afghanistan & world community: Security

Policy implications of the polls: Afghanistan & the region

Pakistan

India

Iran

China

Russia

Conclusion

Regional actors

Significance of polls for Afghanistan &
world community: Security