SPOTLIGHT
ON REGIONAL AFFAIRS
|
Vol. XXIX Nos. 1 & 2 |
January-February 2010 |
THE MAKERS, BREAKERS AND SPOILERS IN INDIA-PAKISTAN PEACE PROCESS
RIZWAN ZEB
Pakistan and India are engaged in a peace process since April 2003. Despite some setbacks, it has sustained a number of chances of stalemate and until recently was described by the leadership of both countries as irreversible.
Cynics, however, are of the view that this ‘irreversible’ peace process has its basis in the Indian belief that in the post-9/11 world, Pakistan is under tremendous pressure internally and externally and that it is perhaps the best time for a final settlement of the Kashmir issue on India’s terms as the power configuration at the national, regional and international levels favours India.
Optimists were of the view that this initiative had a greater chance of success than the earlier ones because it was not confined to the governmental level alone but also includes people-to-people contacts.
Although New Delhi might not acknowledge the fact that the core of Indo-Pakistan conflict is the issue of Kashmir, yet the recent reports about the developments: which the back channel was able to secure for the resolution of the problem clearly illustrates its significance. The second-most important issue between India and Pakistan is the issue of terrorism and it seems that it has finally been able to sink the boat of the peace process, at least for the time being.
However, the biggest hurdle for any possible success of the peace process from the beginning is the trust deficit between the two. Nothing illustrates this point better than the Mumbai terrorist attacks. Within hours of the tragic events New Delhi and the Indian media started accusing Islamabad. It seems that the India-Pakistan peace process is suffering from a classic spoiler problem.
Pranab Mukerjee once described Pakistan as a “nursery of global terrorism.”(1) Since the global war on terrorism started, Pakistan has played a very significant role in it. It is credited with the capturing of a number of al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders and foiling numerous deadly plots.(2) However, at the same time, Pakistan is alleged to be part of the problem as the west continues to blame that some elements in Pakistan continue to support the Taliban in Afghanistan. Despite playing a major role in the on-going war against terror, allegedly Pakistan remains a safe-haven for the Jehadis and al-Qaeda.
The tragic event of Mumbai, which started on 26 November 2008, resulted in at least 172 deaths. The Indian government and the Indian media chose to call it “India’s 9/11.” This attack was unique in a number of ways: the attackers were mobile, well-trained and fully motivated, armed with assault weapons, semi-automatic pistols, hand grenades, and simple improvised explosive devices, mobile phones, Black Berries, and GPS locators. Unlike the 1993 and 2006 terror attacks in Mumbai, they opted for a new target strategy that relied on surprise and creating confusion. This would not have been possible without detailed home work and internal support.
While the attack was tragic and resulted in the loss of innocent lives, it also revealed strong deficiencies in India’s internal security setup. It was clear that there was a great intelligence failure, lack of coordination between various forces that are corrupt and poorly trained and inadequately equipped, and there were delays in the response of NSG commandos.
If one goes by the logic of three Ws: What, When and Why, one can easily conclude that the most important aim of this attack was to derail the already faltering peace process between India and Pakistan which was almost non-existent since the Indian embassy blast in Kabul and create an atmosphere of revenge hysteria in India which would have resulted in a war between the two countries. Fortunately this never happened, yet the relationship is of muted hostility between the two neighbours.
The paper aims at understanding the concept of a peace process and its spoilers and then linking it with the peace process between India and Pakistan. The paper also attempts to .analyse the Mumbai terror attack and its impact on the peace process.
What exactly is a peace process? Defining the concept, Harold Saunders says: The peace process is more than conventional diplomacy and negotiation. It encompasses a full range of political, psychological, economic, diplomatic, and military actions woven together into a comprehensive effort to establish peace. Progress toward peace depends on breaking down the barriers to negotiation and reconciliation... if we ignore the politics of breaking down the barriers, the mediator and negotiator may never have a chance.(4)
Peace process, according to Dr. Moonis Ahmer, is: “...a mechanism or a set of negotiations where the parties involved attempt to avoid war or a war-like situation and wish to settle conflicts peacefully by using techniques such as diplomacy, bargaining, secret negotiations, open negotiations, tradeoffs, and mediation. It is an exercise where groups or countries with conflicting interests seek to avoid farther confrontation through a series of negotiations. Stretched over a period of months and years, a peace process requires substantial patience among the parties concerned before the results of the process can be achieved.(5)
According to a number of experts, a peace process is a time-consuming exercise based on the mutual desire of finding a peaceful solution to their conflict. Reciprocity is most important element of any peace process. It should largely be indigenous in nature, with possible external assistance if desired by the parties concerned.
A peace process cannot be launched unless some basic requirements are met. Although these requirements might differ from case to case, yet can be used without major modifications. Some of the essential requirements of a peace process are:(6)
· Willingness of the parties concerned to initiate the process of negotiations.
· Clear intentions of the leaders involved in a peace process.
· Application of patience and persistence.
· Consideration of the time factor.
· Political will to sustain the process of negotiations.
· Reduction of mutual mistrust, suspicion, and paranoia.
· Creating a conducive environment for negotiations.
· Identification of critical issues.
· Moving from less contentious to critical issues.
· Developing points of understanding.
· Striving for a win-win situation.
· Taking public opinion into confidence during the process of negotiations.
· Utilizing the services of a mediator, if necessary.
· Learning lessons from relevant cases, if necessary.
· Highlighting the positive aspects of negotiations and learning from past failures in negotiations.
· Engaging the media in building an environment of mutual confidence and trust.
· Cessation of propaganda warfare against the adversary.
· Controlling border tension.
· Maintaining better lines of communication between the policy-makers of the parties concerned.
There are a number of factors which play a very important role in the success or otherwise of any peace process. The most important of these factors is a strong yearning for peace both at the governmental and public levels. Time factor is also very important. A number of experts have argued that a peace process cannot be initiated unless the time is ripe for it. Time factor is also important because at times one or both parties might think that time is running out and that they have not achieved anything from the process.
External involvement and encouragement also plays a significant part because at times the parties involved get stuck in a stalemate and can get out only if there is an external involvement.
Dr. Moonis Ahmar has pointed out that a rigid stand adopted by any party involved in the peace process may block any effort for a breakthrough.(7)
At times one party loses interest in the continuation of the process owing to a number of reasons especially when it achieves some positive results. On the other hand, a party might distance itself from the process if it fails to show results to its domestic constituency.
Patience is also a very important factor in the success of a peace process because in essence a peace process is a very long and time-consuming exercise. If patience is missing, then incidents like an accident or a terror attack can derail the whole process.
Contrary to the popular belief, content of a peace process is also very important because as it has been very rightly pointed out the process is simply a mechanism for achieving the content. If the focus is allowed to shift away from the content it could distort priorities and have a negative impact on the peace process as a whole.(8)
If a party thinks that it is bargaining from a position of strength and that it can still achieve its desired outcome then the process is doomed to failure. A successful peace process should address the concerns of both or all parties. If one side — mostly the stronger side — monopolizes the agenda then the concerns of the weaker party are ignored and this adversely affects the peace process.
Ironically, to ensure that the peace process moves on the weaker party has to maintain the ability to impose a stalemate. Experts point out that “a party which has the ability to mar the interests of its adversary by stalling negotiations acquires greater control over the outcome.”(9)
How can peace be maintained between enemies? Or is there any way through which enemies can have peace? To do this they have to cooperate. The element of reciprocity is of most importance here, the cost of conflict and the benefits of peace or at least the benefits of absence of conflict also have a role to play as well as their intentions towards each other.
There are certain points which might stop two adversaries from establishing peace despite pressing reasons or a hurting stalemate.
If the peacemaking effort lacks public support then any attempt to change the situation will be taken as a sign of weakness. A very important element of peacemaking is that neither party should try to impose its preferred outcome unilaterally.
Another challenge is that in the absence of institutionalization of peace, the leadership of one or both parties will remain doubtful of the real intentions of the other party and whether they will remain the same over a period of time or not.
Another important issue is what both sides are getting out of it and how the gains are used. If party A is getting more than party B then the leadership of party B might like to change the situation because this will again make it doubt party A's intentions and that this gain might be used against it in any future conflict. Therefore, the chances of the party gaining less to back off will increase because that will get it thinking that it will be left nowhere if the other side, after getting whatever it wants, reneges and that these gains might be used against it in any future confrontation.
In short, making peace between adversaries is very tricky and can only be done if both sides seriously want it. Others can support them but if a party is in this for tactical reasons then this process is doomed to failure, however progressive and result-oriented it might look.
A person or a group opposed to the peace process and having the capability to derail it is called a spoiler. A leading expert on the subject, Stedman, defines a spoiler as “...leaders and parties who believe the emerging peace threaten their power, world view, and interests and who use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.”(11)
According to Stedman, four issues are important to understand the phenomenon of spoilers in a peace process: position, number, type, and locus. Position implies whether the spoiler is within or part of the peace process. For instance, Indian information minister during the Agra summit was part of the Indian team but her statement that Kashmir was not even mentioned in the meeting between the leaders of India and Pakistan is one such example. The second type is a spoiler who is outside the process. This type of spoilers rely on use of force and violence to derail the process. Jihadist elements and Hindu fundamentalists and elements within the Indian forces such as the serving colonel of the Indian army who facilitated the train bombing is a case in point. Number refers to the actual number of spoilers in a peace process.
The third issue is the exact type of the spoiler and its goals. First type is a limited spoiler. This type of spoilers has very limited objectives. Second, is a total spoiler. This type of spoiler would like to totally disrupt the peace process and would settle for nothing but what it wants. The third type is a greedy spoiler. This type of spoiler changes its position according to the situation and circumstances. Fourth is the power base and the following the spoiler group enjoys.
Spoilers are a twin of a peace process. Every peace process has a spoiler problem. For a peace process to succeed it is essential that the parties in a peace process should be able to identify the spoilers and then address the issue collectively. Identifying and categorizing various spoilers require detailed understanding of a number of related issues such as type of a spoiler, its membership, resources and power base and lifeline. Once this information is available only then can the problem be effectively addressed.
The Peace Process between India and
Pakistan began with what is now known as the Srinagar peace speech by the then
Indian prime minister Vajpayee. This dialogue speech was motivated by a number
of reasons(12) such as: 1) India failed to
achieve any of its objectives after a year-long stand-off that cost it 1,874
dead or wounded soldiers and almost Rs8,000 crore; 2) Despite formation
of a new government in the
Indian-held Kashmir, New Delhi realized that the actual problem still remained
unresolved; 3) The Indian business community's strong desire to have access to
the Pakistani market; 4) Indian energy deficiency as it badly needs energy for
the desired economic growth. Unless some understanding with Pakistan can be
ensured, that dream of development has to be delayed. But the real alarm hit New
Delhi when tens of thousands of foreigners including 60,000 Americans left
India. The US advice to its citizens asking them not to visit India added to
this alarm because this was likely to have adverse effects on the flow of
foreign investment.
This initiative also came in a changed international context in which the international community and particularly the Americans could not afford a new war in the region which could affect its own on-going war against terror. The dangerous and heightened military readiness in the region led to active crisis management diplomacy by the United States. US Senator Richard Lugar wrote that the “war was averted (between India and Pakistan), barely, thanks to intense, discreet diplomacy by the United States.”(13)
One can therefore conclude that nothing changed on ground as far as the Indo-Pakistan relations are concerned which could have prompted this policy shift. That is exactly why the Indian foreign minister in an interview given to V Sudarshan stated: “On May 16, 2003, Atal Behari was in Gangtok. There he said that he would have no talks with Pakistan until cross-border terrorism ends. Forty-eighty hours later, Vajpayee was in Srinagar and said ‘I want to extend the hand of friendship.’ What has happened in 48 hours?...”(14)
The Indian Prime Minister and the Pakistani President met during the SAARC summit and managed to issue a joint statement. According to the joint statement “the resumption of the dialogue will lead to peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides.”(15) Former Pakistani president Musharraf declared the event a victory of moderates of both countries and also praised Vajpayee's vision and statesmanship that made it possible.(16)
The change of guard in New Delhi and the subsequent statements especially from the National Security Adviser, the late Mr. J. N. Dixit, made a number of observers wonder whether this change would affect the process adversely. However, the general mood in Islamabad remained optimistic about the prospects of the process. A secret meeting between Tariq Aziz and J N Dixit in Amritsar(17) brought the process back on track. In September 2004, the foreign secretaries of both countries met to review the development in the process so far. Both sides agreed that the overall atmosphere had been positive and progress had been made on various issues.(18)
The then president of Pakistan and the Indian prime minister met in New York. The meeting was termed successful by both leaders. “A historic day and a new beginning,”(19) the talks “augured well for the future of Pakistan and India,” is how the Indian prime minister and the Pakistani president described them respectively.
On 26-27 December 2004, foreign secretaries of both sides met for a two-day “evaluation of the peace process” at Islamabad. After the first day of talks the Indian camp announced that Pakistan’s senior citizens and children wishing to visit India would be given visa at Atari. Indian foreign secretary Shyam Saran rejected the idea of involving Kashmiris in the talks, claiming “Indians represent Kashmir.” He further said that “Pakistan must adhere to the commitment made in the statement by Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of 6 January 2004 in the US regarding stopping cross border terrorism.”(20) Reacting to this Pakistani foreign secretary, Riaz Khokhar, while talking to the media, categorically stated that “we are clear about having implemented the assurances given in the January 6 joint statement. Nothing is happening across the LoC, but regrettably human rights violations have increased in Kashmir.”(21)
The process of talking moved on, though at a slow pace in 2005. However, during his visit to the United States the Indian prime minister adopted a tougher approach regarding Pakistan and as a consequence the peace process. What was more alarming was that the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh threatened to suspend peace efforts if Pakistan did not curb militant infiltrations into the Indian zone of divided Kashmir. Speaking in an interview to CNN, he further added that he was worried that militants might seize Pakistan’s nukes. Pakistani Foreign Office termed such statements as unfortunate and misleading.
Perhaps it was the lack of result for both India and Pakistan, that made the New York meeting end without any breakthrough. It was Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh who chose to bring up the issue of terrorism in his address to the UN. “India has faced cross-border terrorism directed against its unity and territorial integrity. We shall never succumb to or compromise with terror, in Jammu and Kashmir or elsewhere,” Singh said. “We must not yield any space to terrorism. We must firmly reject any notion that there is any cause that justifies it. No cause could ever justify the indiscriminate killing of innocent men, women and children.” On his part, in his address to the General Assembly, President Musharraf reminded the Indians that UN resolutions on Kashmir still remained unimplemented.(22) Later, both sides agreed to continue the hard work and carry forward the peace process. President Musharraf expressed the hope that with flexibility, sincerity and boldness, the two sides would be able to take the peace process to its logical conclusion.(23) The Pakistani foreign minister said that the purpose of the peace process with India was to provide solace to the people of Indian-administrated Kashmir,(24) adding that two years had passed and people, particularly the Kashmiris, were asking many questions about it.(25)
It was believed before the Indian foreign minister’s visit to Islamabad in October 2005 that both sides were mentally prepared to move forward on the Siachen issue.(26) The visit was also aimed at putting the peace process back on track. The Indian media pointed out that the most important item on Singh’s agenda would be institutionalizing the dialogue process through the revival of the Joint Commission.(27)
At the end of this visit, India and Pakistan signed two agreements: on pre-notification of ballistic missile tests and establishment of a communication link between the Indian Coast Guard and Pakistan’s Maritime Security Agency.(28) However, the two sides failed to agree on Siachen and Sir Creek, but discussed ways to resolve them.(29) Both sides also agreed that the third round of talks would start in January.
According to the joint statement issued after two-day talks between the foreign ministers of India and Pakistan both sides agreed to undertake a joint survey of Sir Creek in the marshy land of Rann of Kutch off Gujarat coast and consider options for the delimitation of the maritime boundary.(30) India and Pakistan also revived the Joint Economic Commission for the first time in 16 years and its first meeting was held in Islamabad.(31)
Major differences in views once again were clearly visible in this round of talks. Indian foreign secretary addressing a press conference said: “While India is unable to countenance territorial changes (in Kashmir), it is ready to do whatever is possible short of this to address adverse humanitarian consequences on the Kashmiri people together with Pakistan.” He said India appreciated Pakistan's assurance of dismantling infiltration and terrorism but the ground realities should be seen. "Now we have to see if the terror infrastructure has finally been dismantled or not,”(32) he said, adding “infiltration has not come to an end.” “Some time it (the infiltration) increases and often it decreases”(33) and the peace process “…can be derailed if any major terrorist incident takes place.”(34)
As for the Pakistani side, the Pakistani foreign secretary categorically declared, “There is no cross-border terrorism taking place.”(35) Pakistani president and prime minister both made it clear to the visiting guests that there could be no progress without some development on the issue of Kashmir. President Pervez Musharraf while talking to the Indian foreign minister said that “Both countries should build on the improvement in relations and confidence that has evolved,” and emphasized the importance of addressing substantive issues, particularly Kashmir. He said both countries must achieve tangible progress during the third round of the composite dialogue.(36)
The then Pakistani premier, Shaukat Aziz, during his meeting with Indian foreign minister Natwar Singh told him that Pakistan would not encourage Indian traders until India showed positive signs of moving towards resolving Kashmir.(37)
The most significant achievements of the peace process till that time was the launching of the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service and the APHC leadership’s visit to Pakistan. APHC delegation head Mirwaiz Omer Farooq said: “It was a good visit and let me say this has lent credibility to the ongoing dialogue process as Kashmiris are being involved for the first time to find a solution to the Kashmir problem.”(38) However, the peace process failed to resolve major issues between the two parties. Kashmir, Siachen and Sir Creek remained unresolved.
The slow pace of the peace process was further affected by the internal developments in Pakistan and India. First the judicial crisis in Pakistan and then the national elections and the transition to civilian rule slowed down the process. One notable exception was the video conference of the President of Pakistan, in which he stated that he was willing to consider a ‘no first use’ policy for nuclear weapons. He further stated: “I don’t feel threatened by India and India shouldn’t feel threatened by us.”(39)
However, during this period, the bomb blast at the Indian embassy in Kabul dominated the peace process. On 7 July the Indian embassy compound was hit by a powerful blast. The blast killed 54 people including two senior Indian officials. Afghan President Hamid Karzai was quick to blame Pakistan for the attack. He stated that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) had a hand in it.(40) Indian national security adviser M K Narayanan on 14 July said: “we do not suspect but have fair amount of intelligence” on the involvement of ISI of Pakistan… We have made this point whenever we have had a chance through interlocutors across the world… There might have been some tactical restraint for some time; obviously that restraint is no longer present.”(41)
In the wake of this bomb explosion the fifth round of the composite dialogue got under way with the foreign secretary-level talks on 21 July. However, no schedule for meetings on the various subjects that it covered was announced. Indian Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon observed: “Unfortunately, there have been several issues in the recent past which have vitiated the atmosphere and the composite dialogue process is under stress.”(42) Pakistan Foreign Secretary Salman Bashir assured his Indian counterpart that his country was ready to address India’s “misgivings” if its shared evidence and intelligence in its possession. “It is worrisome to point fingers at Pakistan in absence of any truth and credible information.” He also added that Islamabad was not bound to prove its credentials as, according to him, “Pakistan is not on probation. We don’t have to prove our credentials to anybody.(43)
The Kabul blast also topped the agenda during the first meeting between the prime ministers of both countries. Under immense American diplomatic pressure and persuasion both met on the sidelines of the SAARC summit in Colombo on 2 August 2008. Manmohan Singh stated that the Pakistan’s involvement in the Indian embassy bomb blast had put the entire peace process under question. Next came the blockade of the Chenab waters by India in August-September 2008 in violation of the Indus Waters Treaty. In short, the peace process was marred with difficulties and pitfalls mainly because of the difference in approaches of the two sides engaged in the peace process. While Pakistan was following the conflict resolution approach, India was following conflict management approach.
The Kabul blast brought the issue of terrorism to the fore and unfortunately for Pakistan, India got sympathetic ears around the world in its allegation that Pakistan was involved in the bombing. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in his address to the nation on 15 August said that the peace process with Pakistan was in danger of failing because of attacks like the bombing of New Delhi’s mission in Kabul. He stated: “If this issue of terrorism is not addressed, all good intentions that we have for our two peoples to live in peace and harmony will be negated. We will not be able to pursue the peace initiatives we want to take.”
To sum up in Christopher Snedden’s words: “The ‘trust deficit’ is therefore the most serious ongoing problem that confronts India-Pakistan relations. Until the initiation of the current composite dialogue, both nations have had differing views on how to approach and overcome their significant differences and difficulties.”
On 26 November 2008, the biggest blow to the peace process came in the shape of a series of terror attacks in Mumbai. Terrorist who were later identified as operatives of Lashkar-e-Tayiba (LeT) struck at different high-value targets killing at least 172 people. The targets included India's two luxury hotels and other landmarks across the city. It occurred at a time when Pakistan Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi was on a visit to India to discuss important issues relating to the ongoing dialogue process including Kashmir, the Chenab River water dispute and trade ties.
Although the attack, which lasted for several days, was extremely tragic yet New Delhi committed the cardinal sin as regard to a peace process when its media and officials started blaming its planning on Islamabad within the first few hours of the assault. The incident implied utter intelligence failure. No one — the police, intelligence services, RAW or ATS or CBI — had the slightest inkling of what was afoot. All systems failed. The Navy chief, Admiral Sureesh Mehta, admitted that it was a “systemic failure.” Ironically, no action was taken to pre-empt the attack despite the fact that the US passed on credible intelligence to India on 18 November that a terrorist assault was likely from the sea, and two five-star hotels were to be targeted.(45)
P. R. Chari opined that these attacks clearly indicated the “inadequacy of India’s counter-terrorism strategy… The element of surprise was complete, intelligence was not properly assessed or acted upon, maritime security was lax, and the forces deployed to neutralize the attackers, though brave, were inept... The result was a 60-hour drama played out before the TV channels and world media highlighting India’s operational weaknesses.
Immediately after the Mumbai incident, India put dialogue with Pakistan on the hold and handed it a list of 20 people allegedly involved in the terror incidents in India. India did not accuse Pakistan’s civilian government of any involvement but named LeT for perpetrating the attacks. In a televised address, on 27 November, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh blamed militant groups “based in India’s neighbours,” a thinly veiled reference to Pakistan, for the act. He warned: India will take up “strongly with our neighbours that the use of their territory for launching attacks on us will not be tolerated and that there would be a cost if suitable measures are not taken by them.”(46) Reacting to the incident, India also postponed secretary-level talks on trade and Sir Creek and called off a planned cricket tour of Pakistan. The meeting of India-Pakistan Joint Commission on Environment was also called off. Other meetings put indefinitely on the hold were those between the defence secretaries on Siachen and the water secretaries, commerce secretaries and the culture secretaries. India tightened visa procedures for Pakistani nationals with processing time for visa applications increased from 15 to 30 days.
Blaming the Pakistan-based LeT India urged crackdown on the militant groups allegedly operating out of Pakistan. Even before the security forces operation was over, on 28 November, the Maharashtra police investigators stated they had evidence that operatives of the “LeT carried out the fidayeen-squad attacks” in Mumbai.(47) On 9 December 2008, the Mumbai police released the names, hometowns and identifications of nine terrorists involved in the attacks — all belonging to Pakistan.
On 1 December India handed over two demarches to Pakistan. The first one was issued to Pakistan’s High Commissioner in New Delhi, Shahid Malik, by the Indian External Affairs Ministry, while the second one was delivered by Indian High Commissioner Satyabrata Pal at the Foreign Office in Islamabad. In the first demarche, India accused “elements from Pakistan” of carrying out the terrorist attack in Mumbai and said it expected Islamabad to “match its sentiments with deeds by taking stern action against the groups that could have been involved in the attack.”(48) The second demarche was more specific and sought the extradition of three wanted people — Maulana Masood Azhar, Tiger Memon and Dawood Ibrahim. It also urged action against the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD).(49)
India upped the diplomatic ante arguing that the attacks be treated as part of the global war on terrorism which required global response. India put in a formal request to the UN Security Council (UNSC) seeking a ban on the JuD. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in a speech in parliament on 12 December called Pakistan “the epicentre of terrorism” and said the international community must deal with the problem. On 16 December, foreign minister Pranab Mukherjee said Pakistan should honour its commitment on not allowing its territory being used for terrorist activities against India. He said India wanted the assurances, given twice in the past at the highest level, to be fulfilled with the “terrorist infrastructure dismantled.” He added, “words must be followed by action.”(50) On 17 December, he asked Pakistan to implement in letter and spirit the UN Security Council resolution, imposing sanctions on the Jamaat-ud-Dawaa, and declaring its four top leaders terrorists.(51)
Simultaneously, New Delhi heightened its war preparedness asserting that it was keeping all options open. Ironically, India did not even bother to officially respond to the two specific proposals made by Pakistan to set up a joint commission co-chaired by the national security advisers of the two countries to assist investigation of the Mumbai attacks and to send a high-level political delegation to New Delhi to defuse the tension.(52)
A day before the arrival of US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher in Islamabad, the Indian government upped the ante against Pakistan. On 4 January, Manmohan Singh addressing a press conference in Shillong demanded that terrorists responsible for the Mumbai attacks should be handed over to India for trial. Singh, however, made it clear that “war is no solution” to the problems between India and Pakistan and urged that Islamabad listen to the demand of the “civilized” countries for bringing the perpetrators of the “horrible acts” to justice.
On 5 January India handed over to Pakistan what it termed evidence of the Mumbai terror attacks. The “information dossier” was handed over to Pakistan’s High Commissioner Shahid Malik by Indian Secretary for External Affairs Shivshankar Menon in New Delhi and the Indian high commissioner to the Pakistan foreign secretary in Islamabad. India’s high officials issued an array of statements ahead of US special envoy Richard Holbrooke’s visit to South Asia so as to keep the heat on Pakistan by accusing it of being an “epicentre of global terrorism.” India also deftly succeeded in keeping the Kashmir issue out of the purview of the US special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The 11,280-page chargesheet in the 26/11 case was filed against the perpetrators of the Mumbai attack on 25 February. It indicated that a conspiracy was hatched in Pakistan and masterminded by the Lashkar-e-Tayiba to hit select targets in Mumbai. The mass of evidence that India gathered to set out an unassailable case included satellite phone intercepts, GPS data, transcripts of telephone conversations, statements from over 2000 witnesses, SIM cards and — of course — the confession of the lone surviving terrorist, Mohammed Ajmal Amir Kasab. Significantly, the chargesheet did not make any reference to the ISI or suggest that a section of the Pakistan establishment was involved in any way in the attack.
President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani condemned the Mumbai terrorist attacks in strongest possible terms. Zardari described it as a “detestable act” while Gilani termed them “heinous acts of terrorism.”(53) In their separate condolence messages addressed to their Indian counterparts, they expressed shock and grief over the loss of lives. Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi, while in New Delhi, expressed grief and described the attacks as a “horrendous tragedy.” He, however, cautioned India not to “jump to the conclusion” and avoid “knee-jerk” articulations. He cited the Samjhota Express case when, too, Pakistan was accused while investigation revealed that a serving officer of the Indian Army, Lt Colonel P.S. Prohet, was involved in the carnage.(54) Pakistan offered full cooperation to India in tracking down the Mumbai culprits. Addressing the media in Chandigarh, India, Qureshi offered a direct hotline between the intelligence chiefs of the two countries so they could share information and cooperate with each other in a more effective manner and stressed the need for strengthening the joint anti-terror mechanism to combat the menace. Islamabad also offered that a joint commission investigate the incident. Briefing envoys in Islamabad on 3 December, Qureshi again offered to set up a “joint investigating mechanism” which could be headed by the national security advisers of both countries.
In an interview to Karan Thapar for “The Devils Advocate” programme President Zardari said “if evidence points to any group in my country, I shall take the strictest action.”(55) On 1 December, he again offered unconditional cooperation to New Delhi in investigating the Mumbai attacks after the Indian government formally accused elements in Pakistan of being involved in the incident. The Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) that met on 9 December reiterated Pakistan’s resolve not to allow its soil to be used for any kind of terrorist activity anywhere in the region or the world. It also renewed the offer of full cooperation to India, including intelligence sharing and assistance in investigation as well as setting up of a joint investigation commission.
Pakistan maintained that the Mumbai attackers were non-state actors who had no links with Pakistan’s external intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). President Zardari in his interview with Karan Thapar said: “We need to look at it as [an] action of non-state actors.” In another interview with Newsweek on 14 December he asserted that the ISI had no links with the banned Lashkar-e-Tayiba accused of the attacks.(56) This position was maintained by top political leadership and high officials of Pakistan.
Pakistan urged India to provide solid evidence before levelling any baseless allegations against Pakistan. On 9 December, the Indian high commission in Islamabad was told the government had launched investigations into claims that Pakistan was “involved” in the Mumbai terror attacks. Foreign Secretary Salman Bashir underscored that to push the probe forward, “we require detailed information and evidence.” He reiterated a suggestion for joint investigations and proposed that a high-level delegation from Pakistan visit New Delhi as soon as possible.(57) The Director of Interpol also stated that like Pakistan, he too had received no evidence from the Indians about the involvement of Pakistani elements in the Mumbai attack.
On 9 December, Pakistan security forces launched a raid on Lashkar-e-Tayiba banned in the country and arrested its senior leader Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi besides 12 other activists. On 10 December, a United Nations Al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee, taking action under UN Security Council Resolution 1267, banned Jamaat-ud-Daawa, al-Rashid Trust and al-Akhtar Trust. On 12 December, in the wake of UNSC resolution Pakistan launched a countrywide crackdown on the JuD. Police shut down its offices throughout the country and arrested scores of operatives. Its head, Hafiz Saeed, was put under house arrest.
Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani said Pakistan would abide by the UN resolution, fulfilling its international obligations.
Pakistan, however, asserted its right to protect its territorial integrity and respond to any Indian threat. On 3 December, a joint resolution of the All Parties Conference (APC), talked of the defence of Pakistan’s honour and dignity, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and expressed support for the armed forces in defending the country’s security. The resolution condemned “unsubstantiated” allegations against Pakistan and said it wanted good relations with India “on the basis of settlement of all outstanding disputes.”(58)
Responding to Indian threats, on 22 December, Pakistani political and military leadership made it clear that they were alive to the threat and had the right to defence. Shah Mehmood Qureshi told reporters that Pakistani government and armed forces were fully alive to the situation and had the capability and the right to defend the country and counter aggression, if war was imposed. However, he stressed the futility of war and called for defusing tensions instead of escalating the situation. He said: “It is easy to talk emotionally, but at this time, the whole region needs to act with wisdom and not passion.” He pointed out that “wise people in India believe that the two countries should not suffer the agony of war because of few unwise elements”… “War cannot offer any solution and the future of both countries cannot be put at stake due to such elements.”(59) On 23 December, the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, apprised the president of the operational preparedness of the armed forces. He observed: “the armed forces are fully prepared to meet any eventuality, as my men are ready to sacrifice [their lives] for their country.” He also warned that Pakistan armed forces would give a matching response within a few minutes if India resorted to any surgical strike inside Pakistan.
On 24 December 2008 Pakistan’s National Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution condemning the Mumbai attacks and urged India to “stop hostile propaganda against Pakistan that seeks to cover their intelligence failures” and to end “activities [that] do not serve the cause of peace in the region.” In the Senate, debate on national security saw members across party lines expressing support for the government and the country’s armed forces against “any kind of aggression” by India.
Foreign Minister Makhdoom Shah Mehmood Qureshi expressed the hope that India would not commit the mistake of carrying out surgical strikes. But “if war is imposed, we will respond to it like a brave nation.” … “We will be compelled to respond if it happens.”
Shah Mahmood Qureshi stated that “Indian politicians have fallen prey to the Mumbai [attacks]”.... “If we have to get to the bottom, we have to cooperate and have to keep the communication channels open.” He said Pakistan has offered India cooperation in bringing the perpetrators to justice. “How can we cooperate when we start pointing fingers.”
On 7 January, President Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani gave assurances to carry out a credible investigation on the basis of the information provided by India on Mumbai attacks.
Pakistan set up a three-member FIA investigation team to scrutinise the Indian dossier. The Federal Investigation Agency team was tasked with conducting an investigation on the basis of the Indian dossier on the attacks and given 10 days to report back with its findings.
On 13 February, Pakistan in its first detailed response to the India dossier acknowledged that the Mumbai attacks were partly planned in Pakistan and that it had arrested six suspects, including the “main operator.” Pakistan said criminal cases had been registered against nine suspects on charges of “abetting, conspiracy and facilitation” of a terrorist act.
Pakistan outrightly rejected Indian demand for extradition of suspects linked to Mumbai attacks. On 3 January 2009 Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi rejected India’s demand pointing out the fact that there was no extradition treaty between the two countries. “We are keen on rebuilding our internal institutions. So if we engage in these issues, it will be harmful for Pakistan.” On 5 January, he again turned down India’s demand for extradition of the suspects saying: “We have a treaty with the US; we do not have an extradition treaty with India. Please do not compare, every situation is not identical.”
Pakistan also took international community into confidence on the issue of investigations. A briefing for the 80 ambassadors of different countries including the United States, European nations as well as Asian and African states based in Islamabad was held in the Foreign Office on 20 January. The briefing was arranged to inform the ambassadors about measures taken by Pakistan to investigate the Mumbai attacks.
The Mumbai terror events created renewed fear in the American and European policy circles of a new crisis erupting in South Asia. The US, UK, China and other world players remained in constant touch with Islamabad and New Delhi to avert any possible confrontation between the nuclear neighbours.
The Bush administration sent its senior officials — Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Affairs Richard Boucher, and Chairman of US Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen — to the region urging India to exercise restraint and counselling Pakistan to cooperate with India in investigations. The US officials maintained that there was no evidence that Pakistan’s government had a hand in the operation, “but there’s very little doubt that LeT is responsible.” At the same time they urged both sides to exercise restraint. In her visit to New Delhi on 3 December, Condoleezza Rice offered India full cooperation and promised to persuade Pakistan to take “very direct and tough action.” She assured India that the US would work “very closely” to bring the perpetrators of the attack to justice and prevent further strikes of this kind. Even if non-state actors were involved, it was Pakistan’s responsibility to take action if the terrorists were based on its territory. However, she wanted Indian response to be “limited to arresting the culprits and ensuring that no further attack took place.” In response to a question whether the terror attacks warranted Indian military strikes, she wanted New Delhi’s response to be judged by its effectiveness which avoids “unintended consequences.”
During her visit to Islamabad, on 4 December 2008, Condoleezza Rice urged the Pakistani leadership to take “robust” and “quick” action against those involved in terrorism. She also urged Pakistan to take a hard line on terrorism. “The global threat of extremism and terrorism has to be met by all states, taking a very tough and hard line,” adding “there is irrefutable evidence” of involvement of elements in the country in the Mumbai attacks and that it needed to act urgently and effectively to avert a strong international response.
On 12 December, US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte while supporting Pakistan’s war on terror policies conveyed assurance that India would not indulge in any military adventurism as long as Pakistan maintained verifiable commitment in action against proscribed groups that could have been involved in subversive activities in India. On 26 December Islamabad had cancelled leave for operational armed forces personnel and redeployed troops along the Indian border. US National Security Council spokesman Gordon Johndroe told reporters at the White House: “We hope that both sides will avoid taking steps that will unnecessarily raise tensions during these already tense times.”... “We continue to be in close contact with both countries to urge closer cooperation in investigating the Mumbai attacks and in fighting terrorism generally.” US intelligence officials, meanwhile, dismissed the possibility of yet another India-Pakistan war. They told reporters they had not noticed any major troop deployment on either side of the border.
Britain too came forward to help defuse the crisis. Prime Minister Gordon Brown visited Pakistan on 14 December and urged Islamabad to take action against terrorists, as three quarters of the most serious terror plots investigated by British authorities had links to al-Qaeda in Pakistan. President Zardari assured him that the Pakistan government would take action against those found involved in the Mumbai attacks. Brown said his government would work with Pakistan to make sure that terrorists were denied safe havens in Pakistan. In this connection he announced a £6 million programme to tackle the causes of radicalisation and to strengthen the democratic institutions of Pakistan.
Since April 2003, Pakistan and India are engaged in a peace process. Unlike the popular belief, this paper has demonstrated that the peace process started due to a number of internal and external compulsions for India and also due to the mindset which made New Delhi view Islamabad, in the post-9/11 world, under tremendous pressure internally and externally and thus offering India perhaps the best time for a final settlement of all issues.
The biggest problem and a spoiling factor for the peace process from the very beginning is the trust deficit between the two. It is evident from the very beginning that both sides don’t trust each other. What else can explain the reason of Pranab Mukherjee saying “what if we withdraw from Siachen and they (Pakistani forces) occupy it?” However, nothing illustrates this point more than the Mumbai terrorist attacks. Within hours the tragic events started to unfold, New Delhi began implicating Islamabad. It seems that the India and Pakistan peace process is suffering from a classic spoiler problem.
It will not take a rocket scientist to conclude that the terrorist aimed at derailing the already faltering peace process. This could be termed their basic objective. They also wanted the situation to deteriorate to a level that both sides go to war or at least mobilize, as a result of which Islamabad will be compelled to concentrate on its eastern border. While the terrorists successfully achieved their basic aim, both India and Pakistan abstained from taking extreme measures. Cynics would consider this as an outcome of the back-channel American diplomacy.
Peace process, as it has been elaborated in this paper, requires patience from all parties involved. It has been pointed out that a peace process is a time-consuming exercise based on a mutual desire of finding a peaceful solution to the conflict. This objective can’t be achieved if either party starts blaming the other or refuses to trust it. Another point is that a party might lose interest in the peace process when it achieves some positive results or might distance itself from the process if it fails to show results to its domestic constituency. This apparently is the case with India: while it can’t achieve much from Pakistan, the Indian public is also angry over the issue of terrorism. These are the two major dilemmas for any party in a peace process: Not to lose interest and engage its citizens so that they continue to support the process. To address these dilemmas, results are important. And results cannot be achieved without showing patience and consistency. Hence, any peace process depends on a number of factors; most important of them is patience.
At times, in a peace process, a party, normally the stronger one, starts thinking that it can bargain from a position of strength and yet it can achieve its desired results. This makes the peace process a failure. This is a major issue with the India and Pakistan peace process. India is not willing to give any concessions to Pakistan. Ironically, in such a situation, the weaker party is left with no other option but to maintain the ability to impose a stalemate.
Spoilers are a twin of a peace process. Every peace process has the spoiler problem. For a peace process to succeed it is essential that the parties in a peace process should be able to identify the spoilers and then address the issue collectively. The terrorists in India-Pakistan case are a spoiler. Both India and Pakistan need to address this problem jointly if they are serious in establishing peace in South Asia.
The Mumbai terror attacks took place when Pakistan Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi was on a visit to India to discuss important issues relating to the ongoing dialogue process including Kashmir, the Chenab River water dispute and trade ties. Instead of engaging him, India committed the cardinal sin as regard to a peace process and blamed Islamabad for planning the attack within the first few hours of the terror attacks. Next, it put dialogue with Pakistan on the hold and handed over a list of 20 people to Pakistan allegedly involved in terror incidents in India. This is unique in the history of peace processes. This shows how significant and serious the problem of trust deficit between India and Pakistan is despite their talking and agreeing to a number of confidence-building measures. While terrorists/Islamists/jehadists are a total spoiler in the Pakistan-India peace process as a successful peace process is a threat to their existence, India, although being a party in the peace process is also a greedy spoiler. While it is engaged in a peace process with Pakistan, it is changing its positions and stances and is basically just talking at least for the time being and is not willing to concede anything to Pakistan. This was clearly indicated in the recent meeting between the prime ministers of the two countries at Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt. Indian prime minister reverted back to New Delhi’s position of no talks until terrorism ends after agreeing to resuming the process and addressing the terrorism problem jointly with Pakistan. Till the time this mindset prevails, peace between India and Pakistan will remain elusive.
Notes and References
1. “India accuses Pakistan of being ‘nursery of global terrorism’”, Daily Times, Lahore, available at <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/ default.asp?page=2006\09\27\story_27-9-2006_pg7_40>.
2. Islamabad’s contribution to the war on terror (WoT) is well documented and the allies have praised its role. According to a report published at the time of the US President’s visit to South Asia: “Pakistan has to date arrested more than 700 members of Al-Qaeda and killed a further 850 of them. Pakistan’s security forces, meanwhile, have suffered a loss of 350-400 personnel, with injuries to another 760 in this war. Some of the high-profile terrorists arrested include Abu Zubayda (March 2002), Ramzi bin Alshibh (September 2002), Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (March 2003), Mustafa Ahmed Al-Hawsawi (March 2003), Mohammad Omar Abdel-Rahman (March 2003) and Abu Faraj al-Libbi (May 2005). Pakistan has also helped in freezing bank accounts of Al-Qaeda and its affiliated welfare organisations, such as the Al-Rasheed Trust and the Rabeta Trust.” For a detailed and comprehensive account of Pakistani contribution to the WoT see; Ghani Jafar and Rizwan Zeb, Pakistan: Countering Global Terrorism, Institute of Regional Studies (IRS), Islamabad, 2006; also see, “General Musharraf is still riding high, (editorial), Daily Times available at <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/ default.asp?page=2006\10\12\story_12-10-2006_pg3_1>, Al Qaeda caught and killed: Tally highest in Pakistan: Cheney, Daily Times, 19 October 2006, available at <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/print.asp? page=2006\10\19\story_19-10-2006_pg1_2>.
3. This section, which has been taken from an earlier paper by the author, “Peace Process & The News Media: A Closer Look at the Agra Summit,” Regional Studies, vol.XXI, No.2, Spring 2003, draws heavily from the Section: “The Conceptual Framework” of Moonis Ahmar (ed.), The Arab-Israeli Peace Process: Lessons for India and Pakistan, (Karachi: Oxford University Press).
4. Ibid., (ref 3), p.46.
5. Moonis Ahmer, “The Concept of a Peace Process,” in Moonis Ahmar, ed., The Arab-Isreali Peace Process: Lessons for India and Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001) p.19.
6. Ibid., p.24-25.
7. Ibid., p.28.
8. Dr. Talat Wizarat, “Peace Processes: A Comparative Study,” in Moonis Ahmar, ibid., p 42.
9. Ibid., p.49.
10. For the most comprehensive discussion on the subject see, Virginia P. Fortna, Peace Time Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace, (New Jersey: PUP, 2004).
11. For details see Stephen J. Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes”, International Security, Vol. 22 (2): 5-53, 1997; also see, “Dealing with Spoilers in Peace Processes”, International Workshop, 26-27 September 2006, Bonn, Germany. Proceedings available at <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/OCHA-7HXC7U/$file/ FinENT-Sep2006.pdf?openelement> and Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," in Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman, eds. International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War), Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2000).
12. Rizwan Zeb, “The Ball is in India’s Court Now,” <http://www.weeklyindependent.com/opinion4.htm>.
13. Rizwan Zeb, “US Interests in South Asia in Post 9/11 Era: Effects on Pakistan”, Margalla Papers 2004, (Islamabad: National Defence College), pp.73-89.
14. V. Sudarshan, Interview of India’s External Affairs Minister to Outlook New Delhi, (7 June 2004 issue), <http://meaindia.nic.in/inhome.htm> <http://www.ipripak.org/factfiles/ff55.shtmlTBF>.
15. Rizwan Zeb, “From War to Peace: Will it Last?” <http://www.ipcs.org/newKashmirLevel2.jsp?action=showView&Value=1303&subCatID=null&mod=null>.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid, p.48.
19. Ibid, p.49.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Anwar Iqbal and Masood Haider,” Indian premier to visit Pakistan next month: Kashmir solution to satisfaction of ‘both sides’ urged,” Dawn, 16 September 2005.
23. K J M Varma, “Coercive diplomacy can no longer work: Musharraf”, 29 September 2005, <http://www.rediff.com/news/2005/ sep/29mush.htm>.
24. Agreement on a ‘certain process’ for Kashmir, says Kasuri , Dawn, 30 September 2005.
25. Ibid.
26. Rana Qaisar “Kasuri and Natwar meet today: Progress on Siachen pullout likely,” <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=story_3-10-2005_pg1_5>; Qudssia Akhlaque, “Guarded optimism ahead of talks: Pakistan, India to discuss Siachen, Sir Creek,” Dawn, <http://www.dawn.com/2005/10/03/top1.htm>.
27. Sushant Sareen, “Natwar's Pakistan visit: Peace may get a boost,” The Rediff Special 30 September 2005 <http://in.rediff.com/news/2005/sep/ 30spec1.htm>.
28. Pakistan, India ink two accords, <http://www.geo.tv/ main_files/pick_prog.cfm?page=pakistan.aspx&id=90295>; Qudssia Akhlaque, “Pakistan, India sign two deals: Missile testing, coastal information,” <http://www.dawn.com/2005/10/ 04/top1.htm>, see also <http://in.rediff.com/news/2005/oct/03natwar.htm>, “Pact on missile tests, MoU on hotline” <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/ default.asp?page=story_4-10-2005_pg1_2>; Mariana Baabar, “Pakistan, India sign missile, hotline deals,” <http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/index.html>. B. Muralidhar Reddy, “India, Pakistan sign accord on pre-notification of missile tests,” <http://www.thehindu.com/2005/10/04/stories/ 2005100420160100.htm>.
29. “No agreement on Siachen, Sir Creek,” <http://www.dailytimes. com.pk/default.asp?page=story_4-10-2005_pg1_1>.
30. Ajay Kaul, “India, Pak ‘understanding’ on Siachen by January,” 4 October 2005. <http://in.rediff.com/news/2005/oct/04natwar.htm>.
31. Rana Qaisar, “Indo-Pak economic commission revived after 16 years,” <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_5-10-2005_pg1_1>.
32. “Every step except territorial changes possible: Shyam Saran,” <http://www.geo.tv/main_files/pick_prog.cfm?page=pakistan.aspx&id=90301>.
33. Naveed Ahmad, “Infiltration has not ended, says Saran,” <http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/index.html>.
34. “Violence can derail peace process: India,” 3 October 2005. <http://www.rediff.com/news/2005/oct/03saran.htm>.
35. “Kashmir issue not on backburner: Pak,” <http://in.rediff.com/news/ 2005/oct/04jk.htm>.
36. Shahzad Raza, “Kashmir key to ties: PM”; “Musharraf says Kashmir should be resolved with sincerity”, <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/ default.asp?page=story_5-10-2005_pg1_2>.
37. Ibid.
38. “Hurriyat leaders return from Pak, PoK visit,” Onkar Singh and Mukhtar Ahmad in Srinagar, 16 and 17 June 2005, <http://in.rediff.com/news/2005/jun/16bus.htm>.
39. For details see Regional Brief prepared by the Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, July-August and September-October 2009 issues.
40. Ibid.
41. The statement was widely quoted in the regional and international media.
42. IRS Regional Brief, July-August 2008.
43. Ibid.
44. This section is based on the data collected from IRS Regional Brief, and Pakistani, Indian newspapers. A few reports on the attack which were prepared in the West have also been consulted.
45. For details regarding the attacks, see: “Group from outside behind Mumbai blasts: PM”, The Indian Express, New Delhi, 28 November 2008; “Attack on India: Pakistan is wholly to blame”, The Tribune, Chandigarh, 29 November 2008; “India suspends cross-LoC trade”, Daily Times, Lahore, 3 December 2008; Praveen Swami, “Three Lashkar fidayeen captured”, The Hindu, New Delhi, 28 November 2008; The Times of India, New Delhi, 10 December 2008; Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Pakistan’s response to India’s demarche likely in a couple of days,” Dawn, Islamabad, 8 December 2008; Ramesh Ramachandran, “Pak envoy gets a stiff warning, The Asian Age, New Delhi, 2 December 2008, “More needs to be done: Singh”, The News, Islamabad/Rawalpindi, 12 December 2008; Ehsan Fazili, “Pranab Mukherjee tells Pakistan: Fulfil assurances on terror”, The Tribune, Chandigarh, 17 December 2008, Ashok Tuteja, “Pranab to Pak: Implement UNSC resolution”, The Tribune, Chandigarh, 18 December 2008; “India to consider all options, warns Pranab”, The News, 20 December 2008; “We are obliged to consider full range of options: Pranab”, The Tribune, 20 December 2008; “Enough proof for Islamabad to act: Pranab”, The Tribune, 22 December 2008; Shujaat Bukhari, “India capable of giving fitting reply: Sonia”, The Hindu, 22 December 2008; Qudssia Akhlaque “Aggressive Indian postures undermine fledgling peace process”, The News, 22 December 2008; “Terrorists came from Karachi via sea to Mumbai”, The Indian Express, 28 November 2008.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. However, sanity prevailed and New Delhi chose not to repeat the earlier pattern and did not snap communications with Pakistan by withdrawing its high commissioner from Islamabad, reducing the consular staff, and stopping road, rail and air traffic between the two countries. Another positive step was that both India and Pakistan swapped the list of nuclear installations on 1 January 2009 in accordance with Article-II of the Agreement on Prohibition of Attacks against Nuclear Installations and Facilities between Pakistan and India 1988.
53. “Zardari, Gilani condemn”, The News, 28 November 28, 2008.
54. “Let’s stop blaming each other, suggests Pak FM”, The Kashmir Times, Jammu, 28 November 2008.
55. “Zardari: If evidence points to any group in my country, I shall take the strictest action”, The Hindu, 30 November 2008.