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Editor's Note: Scholars who have an interest in the regional affairs are invited to contribute to the journal.

Aarish U. Khan

Editor

Saleem Raza (Assistant)

Phone: 92 (051) 9204934, Ext. 104

Email: irseditor@yahoo.com

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**Institute of Regional Studies,
Islamabad**

House No. 12, Street. 84, Embassy Road, G-6/4,
Islamabad.

Phone: (051) 9204940, Fax: (051) 9204055

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THE UNITED STATES-PAKISTAN AID RELATIONSHIP: A GENUINE ALLIANCE OR A MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE?

MURAD ALI*, GLENN BANKS*, NIGEL PARSONS*

ہم کو اُن سے وفا کی ہے اُمید
جو نہیں جانتے وفا کیا ہے
We are hoping for fidelity from those
Who have no idea about fidelity

Introduction

While the US has been planning to reduce the number of its combatant forces in Afghanistan, the question is whether the US-Pakistan bilateral ties will remain intact and friendly as they were during most of the 'War on Terror' (WOT) period. During the last decade, though the alliance witnessed several ups and downs, the relationship never broke and the US continued to provide substantial economic and military assistance to its geo-strategically important South Asian ally. It is evident from Figure 1 to Figure 3, based on data obtained from United States Agency for International Development (USAID), that the US has allocated substantial economic and military aid to Pakistan at different points in time.¹ What have been the motives for this sustained US bilateral aid? To what extent have the US political, security and geo-strategic orientations determined the provision of the US aid to this only Muslim state with nuclear

* Dr Murad Ali, a Ph.D from Massey University (New Zealand), is currently Assistant Professor of Development Studies at University of Malakand, Pakistan.

* Glenn Banks is Associate Professor of Development Studies Programme at Massey University, New Zealand.

* Nigel Parsons is Senior Lecturer of Politics Programme at Massey University, New Zealand.

capabilities? The rest of the paper discusses this issue over a long period of time covering extremely significant events dating back from 1947.

Figure 1
US economic aid to Pakistan (Constant 2008 US\$)




Figure 2
The US military aid to Pakistan (Constant 2008 US\$)





Figure 3
A comparison of the US economic and military aid to Pakistan over time (Constant 2008 US\$)



Preliminary years of the Cold War and commencement of the US assistance

Most studies that have examined the US aid allocation criteria reveal that foreign policy goals of the US have played a key role in shaping its bilateral aid policies. The pioneering research on aid allocation not only examined the US aid programme but also British, French, and German foreign aid policies over the years 1960-70.² During these years and the continuing Cold War period, foreign assistance of major donors was driven by strategic and security concerns. The Cold War was a competition between two main rivals: the US and the Communist Bloc,³ each player was trying its best to enhance and expand its influence over those who were not an active part of the game, such as the new states that had won independence during the 1950s and 1960s in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. Throughout this period, “development aid was inextricably linked to the policies of the bi-polar world.”⁴ One superpower was vying to increase its sphere of influence, the other was trying to contain that of the former, and enhance its own influence through different means including foreign aid.

Regarding the US aid relationship with Pakistan, there have been different trends at different time periods. Pakistan along with some other strategically important countries has been considered to be one of the “pivotal state(s)”⁵ nations whose fate determines the survival and success of the surrounding region and ultimately the stability of the international system. Therefore, Pakistan has mostly, but not always and all the time, remained a very close ally of the US. In the early years of its creation, Pakistan was given considerable importance by the US after it became an independent country in 1947. In 1950, the visit of Pakistan’s first prime minister to the US was a clear signal that both countries were planning to lay the foundation of a lasting relationship. In his trip, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan showed interest in

Pakistan's willingness to align itself with the US and to secure US arms purchase.⁶ American policy-makers were also aware that due to its unique geo-strategic location, Pakistan could play a vital role to stop the spread of communism in the region.⁷ To this end, the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement (MDA) was signed between the two countries in May 1954.⁸ Elsewhere, particularly in Eastern Europe, the expansion of Soviet influence rang alarm bells throughout Western Europe, resulting in the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as a bulwark against a possible Soviet aggression. To this end, in 1954, the US also established the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), comprising Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines, with the military umbrella extended to Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam to prevent the swell of communism in the region.⁹ In 1955, the US-sponsored Baghdad Pact (in 1958 its name was changed to CENTO) was signed between Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan and Britain to contain Soviet influence. By means of these pacts and treaties in different parts of the world, US President Truman took practical steps to implement and accomplish George Kennan's theory of the containment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

There is no doubt that under MDA and other subsequent agreements, the US began to supply considerable military aid to Pakistan in the form of military weaponry and hardware as well as technical assistance (in the form of military training in the US and Pakistan). However, it must be noted that under the terms of agreement Pakistan had "agreed that the arms will not be used aggressively and has committed itself to cooperation with the United States" to contain Soviet influence.¹⁰ It is relevant to quote the actual wording mentioned in the MDA, the full text of which is given in Appendix IV. Article 2 of the MDA clearly states that:

The Government of Pakistan will use this assistance exclusively to maintain its internal security, its legitimate self-defence, or to permit it to participate in the defence of the area, or in United Nations collective security arrangements and measures, and Pakistan will not undertake any act of aggression against any other nation. The Government of Pakistan will not, without the prior agreement of the Government of the United States, devote such assistance to purposes other than those for which it was furnished.

It indicates that Pakistan was provided arms not to strengthen or show its military prowess *viz-à-viz* India but rather to safeguard the US interests in the region where the Soviet threat was looming. Whatever the conditions, the US started allocating substantial military assistance to Pakistan during these years (See Appendix I as well as Figure 1 to Figure 3 for US economic and military aid to Pakistan).

Along with military assistance, the US gave Pakistan substantial economic aid. It has been stated that nearly four-fifths of all the foreign aid Pakistan received during the years 1951-1960 came from the US.¹¹ More than 70 per cent of US aid was in the form of food aid comprising surplus agricultural

commodities. It is interesting to note that shipping of all US wheat aid to Pakistan in American ships cost \$26 per ton as against \$12-14 per ton in a foreign ship.¹² Most of this aid was tied and Pakistan had to use the US vessels for transportation of these commodities. Whatever conditionalities and strings attached to the US aid programme to Pakistan, the fact remains that Pakistan was one of the largest recipients of both US economic as well as military assistance during this period. However, some later developments, particularly Pakistan's ill-calculated military intervention for the liberation of Kashmir, dealt a serious blow to the US-Pakistan alliance and subsequently the US assistance was also the casualty. In view of this, it is appropriate to quote Muzaffar Ahmed, former chairman Planning Commission of Pakistan, who in a meeting with Ayub Khan stated that "our foreign policy and our economic requirements are not fully consistent."¹³

Indo-Pak wars and the US response: a dent in the alliance

While Pakistan and the US were enjoying quite warm bilateral ties, the Indian factor disturbed the honeymoon period of the alliance. The US-India arms deal and Pak-India wars of 1965 and 1971 really dealt a severe blow to the expectations Pakistan had from its powerful ally. Although the US neither helped India nor Pakistan in these testing times, the latter felt that being a close ally the US should not have let them down in both 1965 and 1971 wars with its powerful opponent India.¹⁴ Pakistan was deeply frustrated over the US arms embargo after the war. Although the US imposed sanctions on both Pakistan and India, Pakistan suffered more because it was relying on weapons imported from the US, unlike India which was importing huge arms from USSR. As a result of the US arms embargo, Pakistan also responded by closing military bases on its soil used by the US for the surveillance of the USSR in the region. In the same context, former prime minister late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto wrote that the US enforced an arms embargo on Pakistan at a time when the country was struggling for its survival against its arch rival that was five times its size.¹⁵ Whatever the repercussions of the war were for Pakistan itself as well as for the US-Pakistan alliance, later developments reveal that it was an ill-conceived strategy devised by Pakistan's military establishment. General Ayub's plan to liberate Kashmir from India by means of force through a covert military infiltration code-named Operation Gibraltar was not a calculated move as he failed to gauge the response of India. Pakistan's military strategists thought, quite naively, that the conflict would remain confined to Kashmir only and would not be stretched to Pakistan's borders.

However, to conclude that the US betrayed Pakistan and did not help it during this period is perhaps showing one side of the picture. The fact is that by sending Task Force-74 with the USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal during the 1971 crisis, US President Nixon sent a clear signal to India not to stretch the war to Pakistan's western borders and attack the mainland West Pakistan. Nonetheless it is a common perception in Pakistan that the US did not overtly oppose or stop India from dismembering Pakistan as the USS Enterprise did not

arrive in time to stop Indian aggression. In view of the kind of mutual ties between Islamabad and Washington during all these years, it is argued that the US could not offer enough help to Pakistan to save it from defeat at the hands of India. However, as mentioned above, although the US could not prevent India from cutting off the eastern wing of Pakistan to form the present-day Bangladesh, somehow the presence of US naval ship also deterred India from carrying out a full-fledged attack on Pakistan eastern borders. In his latest book, Small has narrated several instances where the US tried to convey to Pakistan that the former was trying to help the latter and save it from complete annihilation.¹⁶ The author claims that Nixon was clearly “titling towards Pakistan” and that Kissinger advised Bhutto (on 11 Dec 1971) that “we want to preserve you.”¹⁷ Moreover, there was even an implicit understanding between the US and China as Alexander Haig informed China’s ambassador to the US, Haung Hua on 23 November 1971 that India had left its northern border with China exposed. In order to abstain India from further aggression and protect Pakistan, Nixon even gave his assent for Kissinger (on 8 December 1971) to convey a note to Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai that if China wants to save Pakistan, “this is the time.”¹⁸ To sum it up, although the US did not play a more vital role Pakistan might have expected, to some extent the gestures given to India in the form of sending its naval fleet to the Bay of Bengal at least saved Pakistan from further humiliation and complete defeat at the hands of its arch rival.

In view of all this, the dominant perception in Pakistan was that it was let down by its close ally (US). As a result, security ties between the two countries did not remain as warm as these were during the previous decades. Consequently, these years witnessed a significant reduction in the US military assistance to Pakistan. Besides military aid, US economic aid also decreased considerably in these years. These trends in the allocation of the US aid to Pakistan are clearly visible in Figures 1-3. Despite these ups and downs, the US continued to provide significant aid to Pakistan in this period because of Pakistan’s instrumental role in the Sino-US rapprochement. Pakistan played a vital role as it facilitated a secret trip of Henry Kissinger to China and thus worked as a mediator between the two countries. Thus, if on the one hand Pakistan-India wars created some fissures in the US-Pakistan alliance during this period, the China factor and Pakistan’s role in the reconciliation of the US and China endeared Pakistan to US policymakers. However, after the military coup of General Zia in 1977, US economic aid shrank further and remained low until 1982, when Pakistan became an important geo-strategic ally against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. This is discussed in the next section.

The year 1979: a turning point in the US-Pakistan aid relationship

The year 1979 brought dramatic changes in US foreign aid policies towards Pakistan. The Islamic revolution in Iran deprived the US of one of its trusted allies — the pro-American Shah of Iran. The Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan and revolution in Iran greatly enhanced Pakistan's geo-strategic significance. One western commentator has appropriately stated that:

“Overnight, literally, the situation changed dramatically with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. President Carter and others saw...Pakistan, now a front-line state...an indispensable element of any strategy that sought to punish the Soviets for their action.”¹⁹

There was no doubt that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan dramatically transformed Pakistan's geopolitical significance for the US.²⁰ It is quite ironic to recall that due to factors like the trampling of democracy and human rights abuses by the military regime of General Zia and the country's pursuit for nuclear arms, Pakistan was a pariah state before 1979. To stop Pakistan from starting its nuclear development programme, US secretary of state Henry Kissinger visited Pakistan in August 1976 to persuade Islamabad to abandon its nuclear technology ambition. In a meeting with the then Prime Minister late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Henry Kissinger used both carrot and stick policy to persuade Pakistan to disband its nuclear technology programme. It has been stated that Kissinger threatened Bhutto that “we will make a horrible example of you,” and added ominously that “when the railroad is coming, you get out of the way.”²¹ When the US failed to dissuade Bhutto from its stance, Henry Kissinger visited Paris to stop it from supplying the required material for which it had already struck a deal with Pakistan.²² Under the US influence, France cancelled the deal in 1978 which was “a huge blow to Pakistan which, once again, complained that the West was singling it out.”²³ Besides this, the Carter administration imposed Symington Amendment in April 1979 on Pakistan, thus cutting off all economic and military aid.²⁴

However, the USSR invasion of Afghanistan later in 1979 compelled the US administration to overlook these factors and reverse policy decisions taken earlier about Pakistan. Now the US needed Pakistan's support to halt the march of Soviet forces within Afghanistan. Thus, Pakistan was viewed a front line state ally against Communism. In December 1979, within a few months of their imposition, Washington lifted all sanctions against Pakistan and offered it generous aid. By 1981, the US and Pakistan were discussing a US \$3.2 billion aid package.²⁵ By 1985, Pakistan became the fourth largest recipient of the US bilateral military assistance, behind Israel, Egypt and Turkey.²⁶ “With the approval of the \$4.02 billion military and economic aid package in 1987, Pakistan emerged as the second largest recipient of American aid, after Israel.”²⁷ Data in Appendix I shows that the US not only allocated substantial economic aid in these years but it also sanctioned huge military assistance and sold arms worth hundreds of millions of dollars. In 1981, Section 620E was added to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 that specifically dealt with the provision of the US economic and military aid to Pakistan during this period. The Act states that “assistance to Pakistan is intended to benefit the people of Pakistan by helping them meet the burdens imposed by the presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan and by promoting economic development.”²⁸ The US aid data in Appendix I

shows that economic assistance shot from US \$161 million in 1981 to US \$393 million and US \$525 million in 1982 and 1983 respectively, and it remained over US \$500 million a year throughout the 1980s. The case of military aid was similar; it was almost negligible in the entire 1970s, but it remained about US \$500 million a year throughout 1980s. It indicates that the US not only channelled huge military aid but also sanctioned massive economic assistance to further its foreign policy goals.

By the end climax of the Cold War, staged as it was in the backyard of Pakistan, the US was no longer concerned with the lack of democracy, human rights violations and Pakistan's nuclear programme. As discussed earlier, Pakistan was under a military regime infamous for gross human right violations that continued throughout the rule of General Zia (1977-1988). An extract from the 1985 Amnesty International report depicts the following picture:

Amnesty International continued to be concerned about the detention of prisoners of conscience. It is also concerned that hundreds of other political prisoners were tried before military courts whose procedures fell short of internationally accepted standards for a fair trial ... The organization also received reports of the deaths of criminal suspects in police custody, allegedly due to torture.²⁹

Against this backdrop, the US pretended that "in authorizing assistance to Pakistan, it is the intent of Congress to promote the expeditious restoration of full civil liberties and representative government in Pakistan".³⁰ The reality is that the US support prolonged the military regime in Pakistan and bolstered "its military's praetorian ambitions."³¹ Regarding Pakistan's pursuit of nuclear technology, in 1985 the Pressler Amendment was added to Section 620E of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 dealing with the provision of US economic and military aid to Pakistan. The amendment stated that "no military assistance shall be furnished to Pakistan and no military equipment or technology shall be sold or transferred to Pakistan"³² unless the US president certifies in writing each financial year that Pakistan has not developed a nuclear explosive device. After the addition of the above amendment to Section 620E, from 1985 to 1989, the US president certified every year in which aid was approved that "Pakistan does not have a nuclear explosive device and that US assistance would reduce significantly the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device."³³ However, after the year 1989, the US president did not certify as a result of which the US economic and military assistance to Pakistan were abruptly suspended. Why did the US president suddenly refuse to certify that Pakistan did not have a nuclear device? This is discussed in the following section.

Collapse of the USSR and demise of another US-Pakistan alliance

After the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989, the US attitude changed towards some of its closest Cold War allies. Pakistan, a frontline US ally during the Cold War and especially during the Afghan War in

the 1980s, completely fell into disfavour on account of its nuclear programme. With the collapse of the USSR when Pakistan's assistance was no longer required, the US president would no longer certify that Pakistan had no nuclear explosive device. Consequently, the Pakistan-centred Pressler Amendment was swung into action in 1990 and sanctions were imposed on all kinds of aid to Pakistan.³⁴ With the imposition of the Pressler Amendment and accompanying sanctions, Pakistan was faced with a serious economic crisis. All the channels of US aid to Pakistan were shut down in a short time. It has been appropriately pointed out about USAID in Pakistan that "what had once been one of the largest US Agency for International Development (USAID) offices in the world, employing more than 1,000 staff around the country, shrank to almost nothing virtually overnight".³⁵ This was later regarded in hindsight, by no other but Robert Gates himself, former US Secretary of Defence, as a grave mistake driven by some well-intentioned but short-sighted US legislative and policy decisions.³⁶ Thus, the US-Pakistan bilateral relationship dived to the level of indifference and covert hostility in the post-Cold War period.

The 1998 nuclear tests and the 1999 military coup by General Musharraf further deteriorated bilateral relations and consequently the US aid flows reduced to the lowest level ever. It is clear from the data in Appendix I that US economic aid lowered from well above US \$500 million a year in the 1980s to less than US \$100 million a year in the post-Cold War years of the 1990s. The fate of military assistance was not different as it became almost nothing in these years. Overall, while the US sanctioned more than US \$500 million annually in economic aid to Pakistan in the 1980s, in the entire next decade the country received a total of US \$598 million in the US economic assistance (in constant 2008 US\$). This was because Pakistan no longer had any geo-strategic significance for the US in the post-Cold War decade. There could be few starker examples where donors' aid allocation policies have witnessed such dramatic shifts on account of changing geo-strategic compulsions. However, this was not the end of the US-Pakistan alliance for good. Another reunion of the old allies was forced by another pressing global issue: the war against terrorism.

US-Pakistan alliance in the 'War on Terror'

The events of September 11, 2001, and Washington's subsequent war against terrorism changed the entire political and security paradigm of the globe. In its so-called 'War on Terror', the US declared that either the nations of the world are with them or against them.³⁷ Based on this authoritative rhetoric of belligerent President Bush, the US started to define countries categorically in terms of whether a country (such as Pakistan) is with the terrorists or with the US. As a result, new alliances came into existence and former friendly states became adversaries. For instance to explain this point further, prior to 9/11, Pakistan was among the handful of countries (including Saudi Arabia and some other Gulf states) that had recognised the Taliban regime and had established diplomatic contacts with it. This was no longer the case after 9/11. Thus the 9/11 events "brought Pakistan to the centre stage of global politics"³⁸ as Musharraf "was given a clear choice between the devil and the deep sea by the United


States.”³⁹ Consequently, Pakistan made a complete U-turn on its Afghan policy and once again became a frontline US ally, this time in the campaign against terrorism. With the advent of the US-led ‘War on Terror’, terrorism filled the gap once occupied by communism as a grave threat to global peace and stability.

In the post-9/11 period, US foreign aid policies underwent some dramatic changes and from this perspective, the current US aid regime is a replay of the Cold War period, particularly in the context of Pakistan. The USAID data given in Appendix I and presented graphically in Figures 1-3 clearly shows that the US dramatically resumed substantial economic as well as military assistance to Pakistan in the post-9/11 period due to its alliance with the US in the ‘War on Terror’. The US not only restarted economic aid to Pakistan but it also resumed military assistance. It is interesting to note that in the entire 1990s, the US allocated only US \$598 million in economic aid, mostly in humanitarian assistance. Military aid was a mere US \$7 million over the ten years period (See Appendix I for the related years). In comparison to this, the US channelled US \$8,490 million in economic and US \$5,814 million in military aid between 2002 and 2014 after Pakistan agreed to play the role of a frontline ally against terrorism. This implies that, as in the case of the provision of military aid, the US has strictly linked the allocation of economic assistance to geo-strategic, security and political urgencies. When US geo-strategic interests are at stake (as in most of the Cold War period and in the 1980s Afghan War), the US is likely to allocate more aid irrespective of poverty needs and democracy and human rights performance of the aid recipients. Contrary to this, if a country is not deemed vital to safeguard and promote US interests, it is unlikely for it to obtain US aid, regardless of the fact that the country in question has a nascent democracy which needs to be strengthened rather than to be undermined (as in the 1990s in the case of Pakistan).

A Summary of US aid to Pakistan since 9/11

There is no doubt that the US has provided substantial economic and military aid to Pakistan over the last decade. Alongside bilateral economic and military aid, the US has also provided considerable aid in other forms. One of the key types of assistance in this category is Coalition Support Fund (CSF). With the advent of the ‘War on Terror’, at the request of Bush Administration, Congress started appropriating billions of dollars to reimburse close allies for their logistic and operational support to US-led counterterrorism actions. According to the US Department of Defence, CSF is a programme to reimburse allies for logistic, military and other expenses incurred in backing up US military operations in the ‘War on Terror’. The US Department of Defence has stated that “since October 2001, the United States has reimbursed Pakistan approximately US\$ 5.6 billion for operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.”⁴⁰ According to latest figures shown graphically in Figure IV below (Detailed annual data is given in Appendix II), since 2002 Pakistan has been reimbursed over US\$ 12,986 million in CSF.⁴¹ This amount equals roughly one-fifth to one-quarter of Pakistan’s total military expenditures during this period.⁴² Also, it has been stated that nearly all reimbursed funds have been for Pakistan

Army expenses while Pakistan Navy and Air Force expenses account for only about 2 per cent of claims received under the CSF head. According to the Department of Defence, CSF payments have been used to support a number of military operations undertaken by Pakistan armed forces in the country's restive tribal belt bordering Afghanistan. Thus, all this amount is besides economic and military assistance provided to Pakistan which has already been discussed. The reimbursement process of funds under CSF is quite rigorous as the Pakistan first spends this money for food, ammunition and transportation; all the expenses and bills are approved after due process of verification by the US Department of Defence.

Figure IV**Coalition Support Fund to Pakistan since 9/11**

Source: Author, based on data obtained from sources^{43, 44, 45}

Besides US bilateral economic and military aid as well as CSF, the US has played a vital role in convening and coordinating the Paris Club and Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium, a group of both bilateral and multilateral donors comprising Canada, Japan, Australia, Germany, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as well as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the European Union (EU). Formerly known as Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium and renamed as Pakistan Development Forum (PDF), the US played a major role in convincing bilateral donors to allocate aid funds to Pakistan in a more coordinated way to make it more effective in sustainable development. During most of the ‘War on Terror’ period, PDF was a key annual meeting between donors and Pakistan which gave an opportunity both to the Pakistan government and its partners to discuss the overall performance of the country’s economy and intended plans and strategies. At the forum, both sides used to communicate their priorities related to aid and its allocation to different sectors. Between 2001 and 2010, Pakistan has held eight PDFs with donors. Among all bilateral donors, the US was the largest bilateral aid donor to Pakistan, providing more than half of all bilateral commitments.

Similarly, to get an enhanced aid package for Pakistan, the US spearheaded another forum named Friends of Democratic Pakistan (FODP) which was launched in September 2008. Former Pakistani President Zardari and the top diplomats of the United Arab Emirates, Britain, and the United States were joined by foreign ministers from Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Turkey, and representatives of China, the European Union, and

the United Nations. Substantial commitments were made and all partners agreed to work jointly in close partnership with Pakistani government to combat religious extremism and develop a comprehensive strategy for economic and social development. In April 2009, 31 countries and 18 international institutions sent representatives to a FODP/Donors' Conference in Tokyo. During the conference, then US ambassador to Pakistan late Holbrooke announced the Obama administration's intent to provide a total of US\$1 billion in assistance to Pakistan over the 2009-2010 period, bringing the total to more than US\$5 billion offered by the international community in addition to the \$11.3 billion that the International Monetary Fund package first arranged in late 2008. In another FODP summit meeting in New York in September 2010 that was co-chaired by President Obama, former President of Pakistan Zardari, and former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, the forum reiterated its central goals concerning their continued support to Pakistan in the form of aid and policy reforms.

Similarly, it was because of US support that Pakistan entered into a debt rescheduling agreement for its entire stock of US\$ 12.5 billion owed to the Paris Club creditors in December 2001.⁴⁶ As a result, the country was able to obtain very generous terms for this rescheduling. This agreement granted a repayment period for 38 years (with 15 years as grace period), meaning that the first payment of the restructured amount will be made in May 2017 (end of the grace period). To sum it up, besides US bilateral aid to Pakistan, the US has played an important role to support Pakistan at the international level at various forums.

US accusations regarding Pakistan's double game in the 'War on Terror'

As this paper has illustrated, the US-Pakistan aid relationships have kept fluctuating during the course of history covering a period of more than six decades. In the 1980s and 90s, on account of Pakistan's perceived nuclear links with countries including Iran, Libya and North Korea, the country was in violation of US legislation on nuclear proliferation. Consequently, Pakistan was under US sanctions and ineligible for any kind of US economic and military assistance. Over the course of their current alliance since 2001, although the US has been allocating substantial aid in different forms, the two allies have not always had a smooth sailing as several issues severely threatened their ties. It is important to discuss those key issues as these are very relevant to the question of US aid to Pakistan. Among various ups and downs during the last decade, the key issue affecting the US-Pakistan alliance was accusations of double game and Pakistan's reluctance to target Afghan Taliban inside Pakistani territory. While these kinds of blames were heard from time to time during the course of their current alliance, these became louder following the killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in May 2011, and then reiterated by none other but the then Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen before a US Senate panel. These two events, along with the Salala incident (a Pakistani check post attacked by US helicopters in the border area), are discussed in some detail below, and illustrate that the US-Pakistan alliance is fraught with suspicions and mutual distrust.

The discovery and killing of Osama bin Laden in a compound in the garrison city of Abbottabad, hardly a couple of kilometres away from the country's prestigious Pakistan Military Academy (PMA), created a vast fissure between Washington and Islamabad. The relationship touched the lowest possible level since 9/11. Such was the level of mistrust between the two allies that the US did not share any kind of prior information with Pakistan concerning the midnight operation in which the Al-Qaeda chief was targeted. Following this, the Obama administration questioned the rationale behind the continuity of US aid to Pakistan. On the second day after the incident, several US senators raised the issue in a congressional session and asked that US aid to Pakistan be suspended immediately.⁴⁷ The US lawmakers, both Democrats and Republicans, questioned the willingness of Pakistan in the fight against Al-Qaeda and asked that no assistance should be given before Pakistan shows determination in the 'War on Terror'. For domestic public consumption, Pakistan also showed resentment that the US violated the country's sovereignty through the unilateral military action inside Pakistan's territory. Thus, there was much furor from both sides, but more so from the US who alleged that some elements within Pakistan's government machinery, particularly in the military, must have been aware of Bin Laden's presence. To build more pressure on Pakistan, a group of senators wrote a letter to the US Secretary of State and Defence Secretary to review aid to Pakistan.⁴⁸ All the threats were followed by a joint press conference by Robert Gates, then US Defence Secretary, and Mike Mullen, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They clearly stated that there was no evidence that Pakistan knew of Bin Laden and that US aid to Pakistan should continue as the US has considerable interests in that country.⁴⁹ This was followed by a visit to Pakistan by Mike Mullen and Hillary Clinton. Once again, the US officials asked Pakistan to renew its pledge and 'do more' in the fight against militants.

In the post-Osama period, the cordiality of the US-Pakistan alliance swiftly diminished. Pakistan's premier spy agency arrested some of the informants working for the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), including a Pakistani Army major, who had assisted the US for months in carrying out the hunt for Osama.⁵⁰ While this move annoyed Washington, the US was further angered by Pakistan's expulsion of more than a hundred US military trainers and refusal of visas to new officers, primarily aimed at regaining the lost ego bruised by the Osama debacle. Consequently, in July 2011, the US suspended about US\$800 million in military aid, US \$300 million of which was to reimburse Pakistan for some of the costs incurred in carrying combat operation and the rest was for military training and hardware.⁵¹ Similarly, in May 2012, Dr. Shakil Afridi, a physician who had worked for the CIA to collect DNA samples near Bin Laden's compound in a fake vaccination campaign, was convicted by a Pakistani court of treason and jailed for 33 years. Again, several US Congress representatives reacted and strongly approved an amendment to the FY2013 State and Foreign Operations Appropriations bill that resulted in withholding US\$33 million (\$1 million for each year of the sentence) of the sanctioned US military aid to Pakistan.⁵² Also, several members of the Congress once again asked for a complete termination of all kinds of foreign assistance to Pakistan

until the charges are dropped and Afridi released. Due to these developments, the US-Pakistan relationship was constantly on decline.

Another serious blow to the alliance came in the wake of the statement by Mike Mullen regarding Pakistan's links with the Taliban. Hardly a week before his retirement on September 22, 2011, Admiral Mike Mullen, Joint Chiefs of Staff, accused Pakistan's premier intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of supporting the Haqqani Network in Afghanistan.⁵³ Appearing before the Senate panel, the senior-most US military officer alleged that Pakistan's spy agency had assisted the Haqqani group in carrying out the attack on the US embassy in Kabul earlier that month. Pakistan took a strong notice of Mullen's remarks and asked Washington to stop scapegoating Pakistan for its own failures in Afghanistan. Once again, the Senate panel voted for linking the provision of both US economic as well as military assistance to Pakistan's willingness to fight militants including the Haqqani Network. In response, then Prime Minister Gilani convened the All Parties Conference that issued a joint resolution and refuted all US allegations regarding the Haqqani Network and sought to revisit Pakistan's policy towards the 'War on Terror.'⁵⁴ Even former President Musharraf, the closest US ally, termed Mullen's statement as irresponsible and stated that the US was using Pakistan as a scapegoat for their failures in Afghanistan. A few days later, Siraj Haqqani, the leader of the Haqqani Network, told the BBC Pashto service that his network had no links with Pakistan's spy agency, the ISI.⁵⁵ He added that during the Soviet occupation of the 1980s, they had contacts with the intelligence agencies of Pakistan as well as other countries, but all these have ended with the US invasion. Whatever the facts are, all these instances illustrate that both the US and Pakistan have had unrealistic expectations from each other and both feel that one partner has been doing its best but not the other. However, from time to time, there have been serious allegations that Pakistan's military have links with a number of terrorist groups, although these terrorist groups have been banned by a resolution in the UN Security Council. It has been pointed out that in 2001-02, there were more than 60 religious political parties and over 20 well-armed military groups, largely known as '*jihadi*' groups with strong support base across the country.⁵⁶ Although many such groups were banned by Musharraf in 2002, a number of groups continued to operate either with their previous names or changed their names. According to Gul et al., these networks got enormous significance following the US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq as they skilfully exploited "Al Qaeda's anti-western jargon to recruit foot-soldiers and also enlist support within the society."⁵⁷ A list of various domestic and transnational terrorist outfits is given in Appendix III.⁵⁸

Another significant incident, known as Salala incident or Salala attack, took place in late 2011 and once again jolted the alliance. On Saturday November 26, 2011, US-led NATO forces fired two military check posts manned by Pakistani security forces. The US forces had intruded about 2 km into Pakistan's border area of Salala in Mohmand Agency at 2 a.m. local time from across the border in Afghanistan and opened fire at two border check-posts, killing up to 24 Pakistani soldiers and wounding 13 others.⁵⁹ Pakistan was

outraged by the attack and masses reacted with nationwide protests. While the US offered condolences over the loss of lives, Pakistan's demand for official apology was not granted. In response, Pakistan asked for the vacating of Shamsi Airfield and the closure of NATO supply routes passing through Pakistan. Besides, Pakistan also boycotted the Second Bonn Conference on Afghanistan. Once again, the US-Pakistan alliance touched the lowest point and the relations were at the brink of collapse. The NATO supply routes remained closed for seven months. Finally, when the Obama administration offered formal apology for the deaths of Pakistani troops, Pakistan reopened NATO supply lines. Also, it was reported that reopening of NATO supply lines would bring the country US\$ 365 million annually in additional transit fee.⁶⁰ This incident was once again a grim reminder that the US-Pakistan long-term strategic partnership and alliance was more a relationship of convenience motivated by short-term foreign-policy and geo-strategic goals.

Conclusion

The paper has given a thorough overview of the US-Pakistan aid relationship during three distinctive time periods that span over six decades. It sums up that the relationship between the two countries has always remained oscillated between engagement and estrangement. At times, Pakistan was the largest recipient of US economic assistance in the world (years during 1955-1968). However, there are intervals when the US attitude has been completely opposite as there have been negligible or no US aid to Pakistan. The US has always raised issues such as lack of democracy and nuclear programme of Pakistan when its geo-strategic significance had little worth for the US, as in the post-Cold War period of the 1990s. Contrary to this, the US has conveniently ignored these issues regarding Pakistan when the latter is required by the US for the safeguard and promotion of its foreign policy goals, as in the Cold War and post-9/11 period. To put it more candidly in the words of a Western academic: "Washington embraced Pakistan when it judged it useful and then, like a used tissue, discarded it when it no longer required its assistance."⁶¹ For example, to demonstrate its long-term development commitment to Pakistan, the US Senate's Foreign Relations Committee passed the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, known as the Kerry Lugar Bill (KLB), subsequently signed by President Obama into a law on October 15, 2009. Under the KLB, the US committed to provide Pakistan US\$ 1.5 billion annually in aid, a total of US\$ 7.5 billion from 2010 to 2014. It was aimed at building "mutual trust and confidence by actively and consistently pursuing a sustained, long-term, multifaceted relationship between the two countries, devoted to strengthening the mutual security, stability, and prosperity of both countries."⁶² Although a visible symbol of long-term US aid commitment, certain strings and conditionalities attached with the KLB such as Pakistan's role in the 'War on Terror' also marred its overall goodwill gesture.⁶³ Based on all this, if past is a guide to the future, one can expect a similar trend in US aid to Pakistan once US forces withdraw from Afghanistan and Pakistan's services are no longer required. However, any such move could

prove a serious long-term blow not only to economic and development interests of Pakistan but also to US foreign policy goals in the region.

It has been appropriately remarked about the US-Pakistan aid relationship that these cycles of unprecedented aid and abandonment as well as the manner in which aid was politicised had disastrous consequences.⁶⁴ The tortuous history of US bilateral aid to Pakistan has also contributed to the common Pakistanis' perception of the US as an unreliable ally. Keeping in view the empirical data from USAID and historical facts concerning the US-Pakistan aid relationships, it can be assumed that the US befriends Pakistan not because of some innate interests in the latter's development, but due to global political obligations and ulterior motives. Historically significant events such as the containment of communism during the Cold War and the US 'Global War on Terror' have proved this relationship nothing more than a 'marriage of convenience.' As discussed in the beginning of this paper, the US has started its withdrawal (at least partially) from Afghanistan. The question is whether US will abandon this strategically important nuclear power after the logical end of 'War on Terror' as it did in the post-Cold War years? History has shown that the abandonment of Pakistan in the post-Cold War period was a grave mistake, which harmed not only Pakistan politically and financially but also dealt serious blows to the US interests in the region (for example, the emergence and establishment of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the strengthening of Al-Qaeda, both extremely hostile to US interests). In Pakistan, the US post-Cold War policy attitude was regarded as a betrayal and stab in the back after the former was used in the Afghan war. Hence, perhaps the US has little alternative this time to repeat the mistake of the past. There is a need for greater engagement and collaboration not only in terms of military-to-military ties but in other fields like education, health, energy, business and infrastructure in order to have a lasting impact for the people of Pakistan.

Appendix I**US economic and military aid to Pakistan**

Year	Economic aid (constant 2008 \$, millions)	Military aid (constant 2008 \$, millions)
1948	0.76	0.00
1949	0.00	0.00
1950	0.00	0.00
1951	2.85	0.00
1952	73.18	0.00
1953	737.37	0.00
1954	154.69	0.00
1955	722.06	261.98
1956	1,049.23	1,069.75
1957	1,062.43	430.62
1958	952.64	524.55
1959	1,344.91	360.64
1960	1,662.15	226.61
1961	973	256.12
1962	2,295.30	539.77
1963	2,031.99	287.39
1964	2,185.20	184.38
1965	1,897.63	76.12
1966	802.81	8.26
1967	1,192.98	25.89
1968	1,476.12	25.54
1969	532.7	0.49
1970	951.28	0.85
1971	465.97	0.72
1972	680.84	0.41
1973	702.66	1.22
1974	375.01	0.94

1975	603.63	0.9
1976	632.72	1.26
1976TQ	194.26	0.3
1977	313.48	0.9
1978	211.13	1.49
1979	126.53	1.17
1980	135.17	0.00
1981	161.44	0.00
1982	393.96	1.18
1983	525.24	491.41
1984	558.57	546.62
1985	597.1	573.76
1986	613.06	536.63
1987	589.26	525.79
1988	756.99	423.89
1989	550.88	361.26
1990	539.24	278.87
1991	147.23	0.00
1992	26.74	7.09
1993	73.05	0.00
1994	67.35	0.00
1995	22.76	0.00
1996	22.43	0.00
1997	56.33	0.00
1998	35.8	0.00
1999	100.71	0.22
2000	45.06	0.00
2001	224.74	0.00
2002	921.41	347.63
2003	371.75	304.18
2004	399.32	95.65
2005	482.47	341.41

2006	681.94	324.72
2007	678.8	319.37
2008	605.36	358.09
2009	930.7	505.22
2010	1,068.5	964.23
2011	349.4	690.53
2012	919.7	849.23
2013	640.5	361.13
2014	440.4	353.27
Total	41,140.87	13,849.65

TQ: In 1976, the US government changed the fiscal year from July-June to October-September. The Transition Quarter (TQ) reports the 3-month adjustment period.

Source: US Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook).

Appendix II**Coalition Support Fund to Pakistan since 9/11**

Year	Amount (in US\$ millions)
2002	1,169
2003	1,247
2004	705
2005	964
2006	862
2007	731
2008	1,019
2009	685
2010	1,499
2011	1,118
2012	688
2013	1,438
2014	861
Total	12,986

Sources: Adopted from S. B Epstein and K. A. Kronstadt, Pakistan: US Foreign Assistance³⁹, Kronstadt, Direct Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations for and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-FY2016,⁴¹ and A. Ibrahim, US aid to Pakistan - US taxpayers have funded Pakistani corruption.⁴²

Appendix III**Terrorist Groups/Networks in Pakistan**

Domestic Organisations	Transnational Organisations
1. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	1. Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM)
2. Lashkar-e-Omar (LeO)	2. Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA, presently known as Harkat-ul-Mujahideen)
3. Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)	3. Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT)
4. Tehreek-e-Jaferia Pakistan (TJP)	4. Jaish-e-Mohammad Mujahideen E-Tanzeem (JeM)
5. Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM)	5. Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM, previously known as Harkat-ul-Ansar)
6. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)	6. Al Badr
7. Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP)	7. Jamait-ul-Mujahideen (JuM)
8. Jamaat-ul-Fuqra	8. Lashkar-e-Jabbar (LeJ)
9. Nadeem Commando	9. Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami (HUJI)
10. Popular Front for Armed Resistance	10. Muttahida Jehad Council (MJC)
11. Muslim United Army	11. Al Barq
12. Harkat-ul-Mujahideen Al-alami (HuMA)	12. Tehrik-ul-Mujahideen
	13. Al Jihad
	14. Jammu & Kashmir National Liberation Army
	15. People's League
	16. Muslim Janbaz Force
	17. Kashmir Jihad Force
	18. Al Jihad Force (combines Muslim Janbaz Force and Kashmir Jihad Force)
	19. Al Umar Mujahideen
	20. Mahaz-e-Azadi
	21. Jammu & Kashmir Students Liberation Front
	22. Ikhwan-ul-Mujahideen
	23. Islamic Students League
	24. Tehrik-e-Hurriyat-e-Kashmir
	25. Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqar Jafaria
	26. Al Mustafa Liberation Fighters
	27. Tehrik-e-Jehad-e-Islami
	28. Muslim Mujahideen
	29. Al Mujahid Force
	30. Tehrik-e-Jehad
	31. Islami Inquilabi Mahaz

Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal (2015).

Appendix IV**US-Pakistan Mutual Defence Agreement, 19 May 1954**

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Pakistan:

Desiring to foster international peace and security within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations through measures which will further the ability of nations dedicated to the purposes and principles of the Charter to participate effectively in arrangements for individual and collective self-defence in support of those purposes and principles;

Reaffirming their determination to give their full co-operation to the efforts to provide the United Nations with armed forces as contemplated by the Charter and to participate in United Nations collective defence arrangements and measures, and to obtain agreement on universal regulation and reduction of armaments under adequate guarantee against violation or evasion;

Taking into consideration the support which the Government of the United States has brought to these principles by enacting the Mutual Defence Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, and the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended;

Desiring to set forth the conditions which will govern the furnishing of such assistance;

Have agreed:

ARTICLE I

1. The Government of the United States will make available to the Government of Pakistan such equipment, materials, services or other assistance as the Government of the United States may authorize in accordance with such terms and conditions as may be agreed. The furnishing and use of such assistance shall be consistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

Such assistance as may be made available by the Government of the United States pursuant to this Agreement will be furnished under the provisions and subject to all the terms, conditions and termination provisions of the Mutual Defence Assistance Act of 1949 and the Mutual Security Act of 1951, acts amendatory or supplementary thereto, appropriation acts thereunder, or any other applicable legislative provisions. The two Governments will, from time to time, negotiate detailed arrangements necessary to carry out the provisions of this paragraph.

2. The Government of Pakistan will use this assistance exclusively to maintain its internal security, its legitimate self-defence, or to permit it to participate in the defence of the area, or in United Nations collective security arrangements and measures, and Pakistan will not undertake any act of aggression against any other nation. The Government of Pakistan will not, without the prior agreement of the Government of the

United States, devote such assistance to purposes other than those for which it was furnished.

3. Arrangements will be entered into under which equipment and materials furnished pursuant to the Agreement and no longer required or used exclusively for the purposes for which originally made available will be offered for return to the Government of the United States.
4. The Government of Pakistan will not transfer to any person not an officer or agent of that Government, or to any other nation, title to or possession of any equipment, materials, property, information, or services received under this Agreement, without the prior consent of the Government of the United States.
5. The Government of Pakistan will take such security measures as may be agreed in each case between the two Governments in order to prevent the disclosure or compromise of classified military articles, services or information furnished pursuant to this Agreement.
6. Each Government will take appropriate measures consistent with security to keep the public informed of operations under this Agreement.
7. The two Governments will establish procedures whereby the Government of Pakistan will so deposit, segregate or assure title to all funds allocated to or derived from any programme of assistance undertaken by the Government of the United States so, that such funds shall not, except as may otherwise be mutually agreed, be subject to garnishment, attachment, seizure or other legal process by any person, firm, agency, corporation, organization or government.

ARTICLE II

The two Governments will, upon request of either of them, negotiate appropriate arrangements between them relating to the exchange of patent rights and technical information for defence which will expedite such exchanges and at the same time protect private interests and maintain necessary security safeguards.

ARTICLE III

1. The Government of Pakistan will make available to the Government of the United States rupees for the use of the latter Government for its administrative and operating expenditures in connection with carrying out the purposes of this Agreement. The two Governments will forthwith initiate discussions with a view to determining the amount of such rupees and to agreeing upon arrangements for the furnishing of such funds.
2. The Government of Pakistan will, except as may otherwise be mutually agreed, grant duty-free treatment on importation or exportation and exemption from internal taxation upon products, property, materials or equipment imported into its territory in connection with this Agreement or any similar Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of any other country receiving military assistance.

3. Tax relief will be accorded to all expenditures in Pakistan by or on behalf of, the Government of the United States for the common defence effort, including expenditures for any foreign aid programme of the United States. The Government of Pakistan will establish procedures satisfactory to both Governments so that such expenditures will be net of taxes.

ARTICLE IV

1. The Government of Pakistan will receive personnel of the Government of the United States who will discharge in its territory the responsibilities of the Government of the United States under this Agreement and who will be accorded facilities and authority to observe the progress of the assistance furnished pursuant to this Agreement. Such personnel who are United States nationals, including personnel temporarily assigned, will, in their relations with the Government of Pakistan, operate as part of the Embassy of the United States of America under the direction and control of the Chief of the Diplomatic Mission, and will have the same privileges and immunities as are accorded other personnel with corresponding rank of the Embassy of the United States who are United States nationals. Upon appropriate notification by the Government of the United States the Government of Pakistan will grant full diplomatic status to the senior military member assigned under this Article and the senior Army, Navy and Air Force officers and their respective immediate deputies.
2. The Government of Pakistan will grant exemption from import and export duties on personal property imported for the personal use of such personnel or of their families and will take reasonable administrative measures to facilitate and expedite the importation and exportation of the personal property of such personnel and their families.

ARTICLE V

1. The Government of Pakistan will:
 - (a) join in promoting international understanding and good will, and maintaining world peace;
 - (b) take such action as may be mutually agreed upon to eliminate causes of international tension;
 - (c) make, consistent with its political and economic stability, the full contribution permitted by its man-power, resources, facilities and general economic condition to the development and maintenance of its own defensive strength and the defensive strength of the free world;
 - (d) take all reasonable measures which may be needed to develop its defence capacities; and
 - (e) take appropriate steps to insure the effective utilisation of the economic and military assistance provided by the United States.

- 2.(a) The Government of Pakistan will, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, furnish to the Government of the United States, or to such other governments as the Parties hereto may in each case agree upon, such equipment, materials, services or other assistance as may be agreed upon in order to increase their capacity for individual and collective self-defence and to facilitate their effective participation in the United Nations system for collective security.
- (b) In conformity with the principle of mutual aid, the Government of Pakistan will facilitate the production and transfer to the Government of the United States, for such period of time, in such quantities and upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon, of raw and semi-processed materials required by the United States as a result of deficiencies or potential deficiencies in its own resources, and which may be available in Pakistan. Arrangements for such transfers shall give due regard to reasonable requirements of Pakistan for domestic use and commercial export.

ARTICLE VI

In the interest of their mutual security of the Government of Pakistan will co-operate with the Government of the United States in taking measures designed to control trade with nations which threaten the maintenance of world peace.

ARTICLE VII

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of signature and will continue in force until one year after the receipt by either party of written notice of the intention of the other party to terminate it, except that the provisions of Article I, paragraphs 2 and 4, and arrangements entered into under Article 1, paragraphs, 3, 5 and 7, and under Article II, shall remain in force unless otherwise agreed by the two Governments.
2. The two Governments will, upon the request of either of them, consult regarding any matter relating to the application or amendment of this Agreement.
3. This Agreement shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations.

Done in two copies at Karachi the 19th day of May one thousand nine hundred and fifty four.

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THE DYNAMICS OF INDIAN GRAND STRATEGY: READING THE SYMBOLIC DISCOURSE OF INDIA'S STRATEGIC CULTURE

DR. RAJA MUHAMMAD KHAN*

Introduction

Most studies of grand strategies invariably commence with an attempt at defining the term “grand strategy”, and then proceed to ask whether a certain country even has a grand strategy; from there, the analysis often meanders into the past to locate the historical influences on the construction of a particular strategic thought and finally takes account of the prevalent strategic environment or the existing realities that temper the thought into strategic behaviour. This is a reasonable scheme, although fraught with the complication that grand strategy being a “social construct” is subject to differing interpretations depending on the level and nature of “socialization” of the interpreter with its various dimensions.

Just to give a demonstration of the first point, here is how a prominent historian tackles the issue: “*We might begin our examination of the issues involved in grand strategy with an effort to describe what we mean by the term.*”¹ Professor Murray concludes that a clear and satisfactory definition of grand strategy is difficult to formulate due to the complexity and uncertainty of historical dynamics involved in its making. And more importantly, it also requires an appreciation of the present — besides a deep understanding of the past — and a willingness to think about the future in terms of the objectives of the political unit being examined.² Barry Posen has tried to simplify the matter by defining it in terms of “means and ends” which is the general perspective that goes with the term “strategy,” i.e. by defining it as a “*collection of military, economic, and political means and ends with which a state attempts to achieve*

* Dr Raja Muhammad Khan is the Head of Department of International Relations at National Defence University, Islamabad.

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security”.³ And more concisely: “A grand strategy is a nation-state’s theory about how to produce security for itself.”⁴ Similarly, the editors of a recent book on India’s grand strategy start by defining the grand strategy as “the combination of national resources and capabilities — military, diplomatic, political, economic, cultural and moral — that are deployed in the service of national security.”⁵ This, one may note, is quite similar to Posen’s conception of grand strategy and only a slight variation on Basil Liddel Hart’s original definition that uses the term war instead of national security. Nonetheless, the point is that whether a theory, a concept or a positive guide for action, grand strategy is a social construct which means that it is more prudent to attempt to observe it in terms of its effects rather than trying to trace its origins to some centralized document. Although sometimes it is equated with national security strategy, and sometimes the grandeur of the term imposes restraint on modest analysts,⁶ the concept, as Professor Murray has explained above, remains esoteric.

This is also one of the reasons why the second step as described in the beginning is often necessitated. Whether or not a country has a grand strategy at all is often a subject of intense debate even in case of superpowers like the United States. Consider for example, Robert D. Kaplan lamenting the absence of long-term thinking in American foreign policy. Drawing comparisons with the grand strategy of the Roman Empire, Kaplan writes: “America must, therefore, contemplate a grand strategy that seeks to restore its position from something akin to Rome’s third system to its second; or to its first.”⁷ Similar doubts over the existence of grand strategy have been raised in the case of China as well with proliferation of titles like “China’s Quest for Grand Strategy”⁸ or “Is China a Status Quo Power?”⁹ In the case of India, misgivings also abound, with entire volumes dedicated to attempts at resolution of the mystery.¹⁰

Strategic culture and a variety of its interpretations

The difficulty of multiple interpretations forces one to ask the following question: what exactly is one interpreting when analysing the grand strategy. Certainly, there is some empirical evidence to consider like military modernization, analysis of the strategic environment, statements of the leaders, doctrinal declarations etc. But these, one may argue, may only reflect a response to the immediate strategic environment or components of the operational strategy rather than a reflection of a long-term ideational commitment rooted in past experience. This brings to the fore the question of strategic culture, strategic thought or strategic predisposition in consideration of grand strategy. Alastair Iain Johnston has investigated the link between strategic culture and strategic behaviour. Johnston argues that contrary to the conventional view, the strategic culture approach is not incompatible with limited forms of rationality that inform strategic choice by narrowing down the strategic options through invocation of historical choices and analogies. However, the approach does not support the instrumental rationality embedded in neorealism which relies on a historical and non-cultural methods of rational choice theory and ignore the burden imposed by the past in favour of utility maximization.¹¹

And as already discussed above, grand strategy is not about instrumental rationality, but it is also not just about the strategic culture or the ideas derived from a consideration of the past. Johnston cautions that a symbolic discourse (strategic culture) may or may not have any causal implication on strategic choice or operational doctrine. Johnston further argues that strategic culture is an ideational variable or a “*system of symbols (argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious.*”¹² Strategic culture, according to Johnston, consists of two parts: the first deals with larger questions of a more philosophical kind that help define strategic environment through deep engagement with historical sources. These inquiries may be pursued to obtain answer to questions like the role of war in human affairs, the gradation that can help distinguish different adversaries (enemy, rival, foe etc.) and the utility associated with the use of force as deduced from historical experiences. This is the “central paradigm” or “symbolic discourse” of the strategic culture and its modes of inquiry, one may note, can only be pursued by the actors who are socialized in the key precepts of the symbolic discourse. The second part or the “operational discourse” flows from the central paradigm and deals with “ranked strategic options” at the operational level. The above range of ranked strategic preferences can be *realpolitik* oriented, i.e. offensive and dealing with zero-sum threats at the higher end of the three variables of central paradigm or these could be *ideapolitik* at the accommodationist end (see fig 1).¹³ Thus here Johnston links the symbolic set with the strategic behaviour and provides a holistic definition of grand strategy as interpreted through the lens of strategic culture.

This brings us to the problem at hand and also the central premise of this paper. What Johnston has not discussed is that grand strategy or rather the interpretation of it elicits response, especially from those who are a feature of its centralizing discourse, i.e. the adversaries who are the objects of these ranked strategic preferences and who are the part of the strategic environment being interpreted. These actors are socialized in a different set of cultural assumptions, which form the main theoretical framework for the interpretation of the opponent’s strategic culture. And as Karl Popper has argued, observations are made under a “horizon of expectations” which acts as a frame of reference, and attains meaning only within this (theoretical) setting.¹⁴ Same can be argued for interpretations that they are made under a previously formed frame of reference. And if that is the case, then a symbolic discourse will be interpreted differently by a different set of actors in a different society based on their own set of strategic cultural assumptions.




Fig-1: The Central Paradigm of a Strategic Culture [from Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," *International Security* 19, no. 4 (1995): 47]

Double reading the Indian symbolic discourse

Based on the above premise, this paper asks the question that how India's strategic culture or strategic predispositions are interpreted by Pakistan? To answer the question, it will attempt to examine the dominant symbolic discourse of India's strategic culture as interpreted by Pakistan under its own set of dominant strategic cultural assumptions. This will be done through deconstruction of the discourse by double reading, once under the Indian assumptions and the second time under the Pakistani assumptions. Double reading is a post-structural textual strategy in which the first reading is a faithful reproduction of the dominant discourse through its original set of argumentation to see how it has achieved stabilization. The text or discourse, Jaques Derrida argues, can never achieve full coherence as it has always and invariably resorted to cover-ups and exclusions which are the target of the second reading. The aim is to understand how the discourse is put together and always threatened with its undoing, not to reach any conclusion about its veracity or accuracy. Both versions of the discourse exist simultaneously and in perpetual tension.¹⁵

I –The Grotian roots of Indian strategic thought

This paper focuses on the “central paradigm” or the “symbolic discourse” of the dominant Indian strategic culture and will not concern itself with the “ranked strategic preferences” which in essence do not form part of the discourse. It will not attempt to construct the discourse through consideration of historical cultural artefacts, but will restrict itself to identifying the dominant strategic culture from among the multiplicity of coexisting Indian cultures that form part of the main Indian strategic discourse; as Johnston has identified, a number of cultures can coexist though “*there is usually one dominant culture whose holders are interested in preserving the status quo.*”¹⁶ Thus the main problem here is to identify the dominant culture, and the only judgement that will be made about a particular culture will be whether it is on the *realpolitik* or the *idealpolitik* end of Johnston’s continuum.

Does India have a strategic culture?

First though, one may like to run through with the argument on whether India has a discernible tradition of strategic thought or not, as many observers have leaned towards the latter view. George Tanham argues that India due to the lack of political unity over the greater part of its history, the Hindu conception of eternal time that divests it of its importance and a fatalist view of life has been unable to forge a tradition or culture of coherent strategic thought. Maurya and Gupta empires provided the only instances of indigenous political unity and they too failed to congeal India into a modern nation state. The individual Indian states have never formed a collective stance towards foreign invaders, implying that there has never been a sense of the Indian subcontinent as a single political entity. The British developed a strategy for defence of India over the years but Indians were not part of that strategic process. Indians consider Hinduism as the primary basis of political unity but cultural unity cannot substitute for political unity.¹⁷

One could argue over these assertions a little further and through a longer gaze at history to ascertain how valid are Tanham’s arguments. The dissimilar trajectory of political evolution of China and India is often a subject of much historical debate with China emerging as a unified empire at the end of the Spring and the Autumn (770-476 BC), and the Warring States (476-221 BC) periods. China’s political evolution as a unified empire so early in its history is often cited as the main reason for its rich strategic tradition which implies that state formation and state building or in aggregate the evolution of the political order in a society plays a major role in the development of its political thought. Or one may sum up the relation between political order and grand strategy as: “how a state is formed is how it theorizes about its security”.

Francis Fukuyama argues that the political order is constituted of three main institutions that include the *state*, the *rule of law* and the *accountable government* and that a successful modern liberal democracy combines all three in a stable balance.¹⁸ Comparing the case of China and India, Fukuyama further argues that both China and India evolved from tribal to state level societies at around the same time, but around twenty-five hundred years ago, the Indian

trajectory deviated from that of China due to the rise of the Brahmanic religion which limited the power of the political community and was in a sense responsible for modern Indian democracy. Religion, Fukuyama has consistently argued, is the major source of the evolution of the institution of the rule of law.¹⁹ In its development from tribal to state level society, India did not pass through a five-hundred-year period of sustained and intense warfare as China did. Indian states did fight with each other but not to the bitter end as in the case of China, and thus there was not an intense pressure to develop modern state level institutions. The Mauryas united the subcontinent to a large extent but could not fully consolidate their rule over core areas, and thus lasted only 136 years. The Mauryan feat was replicated again only at the birth of modern India in 1947.²⁰

Thus the birth of China in warfare and the birth of modern India through a political struggle is the point and the counterpoint to historian Charles Tilly's observation: "how war made states and how states made war."²¹ Fukuyama further points out that the effect of Brahmanic dominance in India during its formative and later years was such that unlike China, the elites became custodians of ritual and social power instead of economic and coercive power, thus putting a check on the limits of political power of the political elite, subordinating the warrior class such as the Kshatriyas to the Brahmins and effectively putting an institutional constraint on their war-making proclivities.²² Without further belabouring the point, here one can decisively disagree with Tanham and argue that strategic culture is not just derived from the institution of state but from the entire gamut of political order that is to say the *rule of law* and the *accountable government*, in addition to state formation. In this sense, India does have a strategic culture though it is rooted less in the institution of warfare and more in the institution of the rule of law. And this is what explains the dominance of a strategic culture and identifying most closely with this line of thinking is *Nehruvianism*.

Six schools of thought and three traditions of international theory

One can argue like Johnston has done that a multiplicity of strategic cultures can coexist in a society along the continuum of *realpolitik* to *idealpolitik*. And although Johnston has not indicated it, yet arguably the thought is more elaborately expressed in the work of Martin Wight. Wight, taking a sweeping view of the international relations theory, argued that the principal ideas could be categorized under the three philosophical traditions, i.e. *Realists*, *Rationalists* and *Revolutionists* and these three traditions could be related to three political conditions such as that of anarchy, international institutionalization among the sovereign states (international society as understood today), and a commonwealth of nations or a world society.²³ Wight further contends that the three traditions are not mutually exclusive as they influence, change and affect each other, and as they interact losing their pure inner identity. And thus there has been over the past two centuries, tendencies like the erosion of rationalism by revolutionism, of rationalism by realism and of realism by revolutionism. One can say that there has been a confluence or convergence of the three traditions with overlapping concepts from one

infiltrating the other.²⁴ This is a useful analytical framework, especially in case of multicultural, heterogeneous and pluralist polities like India where multiple perspectives are more likely to coexist than in more homogeneous or authoritarian polities. Nonetheless, even through this interaction, convergence and confluence, one should be able to identify the dominant strain or proclivity.

Before discussing the six identified schools of Indian strategic thought, one may note a glaring tendency among the Indian writers who explicate on strategic matters. And that is the consistent short shrift given to Kautilya's work *Arthashastra* in contradiction to the (erroneous) belief that it is somehow a central paradigm of Indian strategic thought. Bajpai et al. feel that *Arthashastra* does not have the status of canonical bible in Indian strategic thought that is perceived to be.²⁵ This matter will be taken up during the *second reading*. For now, one may focus on the six schools identified in the same volume referred above, and try to locate the rationalist origins of the predominant discourse that is *Nehruvianism*.

Bajpai et al contend that in Modern India, there are three major and three minor schools that reflect the Indian grand strategic thought with certain differences and certain similarities on foreign policy issues. The three major schools are Nehruvianism, Neoliberalism and Hyperrealism while the minor schools include Marxism, Hindutva and Gandhianism. Nehruvianism is focused on the importance of communication and negotiation to tackle security issues while Neoliberalism concerns itself with exploration of free trade and market economy as a means of dealing with the external world. Hyperrealists view the world through the lens of power and believe in mediating external rivalries through the use and threat of use of the military instrument. Of the three minor schools, Hindutva is the most important as it has lately aligned with the hyperrealists in adopting a hard line approach to external relations. But what is of more concern, more so for India than the external powers, is its similar stance towards the cultural and religious diversity which forms the core of Indian national narrative. Gandhianism remains a useful but not very powerful influence in the foreign policy domain; nonetheless its founding and core principles are substantially aligned with Nehruvianism though they have not formed part of the external dynamics being of a revolutionist nature. Marxism also remains a peripheral influence in external relations.²⁶

Casting these schools of strategic thought in terms of Wight's distinction, one may note that Hyperrealists are clearly Hobbesians (realists) while Marxists and Gandhians are clearly revolutionists. Hindutva is a universalizing ideology thus having revolutionist strains but with a significant infiltration of Hobbesian component. Neoliberals have a major revolutionist strain which is somewhat moderated by rationalism, while Nehruvians are mainly rationalists (in the Groatian sense) with strands of revolutionism as well as realism. Nehruvianism is the founding tradition of India and though substantially diluted over the years due to changing strategic environment, it has nonetheless retained its influence in the strategic discourse to the extent that it serves as a referent for the deviants. And despite Hindutva's claims to the centralizing power of Hinduism in forging political unity, it can be argued as

Fukuyama has demonstrated that Hinduism has never exercised that power. And in fact the weight of history, as far as Brahmanic institutional influence in forging a strong tradition of the *rule of law* is concerned, is also in favour of Nehruvianism. Thus it represents the middle ground in Indian grand strategic thinking and remains the most influential strategic culture despite quite forceful argumentation in recent years against its core precepts.

First reading - the rationalist discourse of Nehruvianism

As already explained, this paper is concerned only with the symbolic discourse or the central paradigm of the dominant Indian strategic culture, not its operational set. Therefore, no doctrinal aspects will be discussed here. Only the key elements of the centralizing discourse that is the triad indicated by Johnston that includes the *place of warfare in human affairs*, the *nature of enemy* and the *efficacy of violence* will be faithfully reproduced as required by the strategy of deconstruction and contextualized against the claims of rationalism made above in this paper.

Fortunately the task is made simpler since the first part of the analysis has been adequately handled by Kanti Bajpai in his 2003 essay, "Indian Strategic Culture".²⁷ Bajpai argues that Nehruvians believe in the possibility of peace among states through communication and better understanding, however, the prospects of war in an anarchic international realm remain a possibility in certain cases which obliges the states to remain prepared for such eventualities. The effects of anarchy may be attenuated through effective recourse to the precepts of international law, international institutions, exercising restraint, diplomacy, interaction among societies and solidarity with citizens of other societies. Nehruvians display little faith in the institution of the balance of power feeling that it is bound to break down, as well as resort to overt militarism due to the futility and debilitating effects of arms races on the material well being of societies.²⁸

As regards the questions pertaining to the central paradigm of the Nehruvian strategic culture, Bajpai contends that for Nehruvians, war is a reluctant choice, one that is and will be made as an action of last resort. Violence exists in the minds and it is from minds that it has to be eradicated. Even when it occurs, Nehruvians believe, it can be limited and the best way to avoid its occurrence is through inter-state dialogue. As to the question of the nature of enemy, Nehruvians respond that enmity is not permanent but rather a result of ideological moorings to which the adversarial leadership attaches itself in order to justify their claim to leadership. Adversary elites actively engage in propaganda and rhetoric to delude the ordinary masses who are otherwise not interested in continuing relationships of hatred. Thus communication, people-to-people contact and friendship at the societal level can help eradicate many misgivings that are usually cultivated by the elites who are interested only in perpetuating their own privileged position in society.²⁹

Nonetheless, government-to-government contacts are also a vital part of the communication paradigm that Nehruvians recommend, as they help reduce misunderstandings. Another way of reducing tensions among adversaries

and enhancing cooperation among friends is through the use of the good offices of international organizations as that helps promote understanding through the institutional mechanisms of the international society. To the question of utility of the use of force, Nehruvians are convinced that extensive use or threat of use of force is counterproductive in the settlement of inter-state disputes and rivalries, which must be settled through negotiations and institutions as a first resort. Thus maintaining large forces is, in the end, not to anyone's interest as they sap vital resources which can otherwise be employed for the welfare of people.³⁰

How faithfully does the Nehruvian discourse follow the rationalist tradition of international relations? Wight describes rationalists as those who value the import of international intercourse under the condition of anarchy. Clearly, Nehruvians meet this fundamental condition. This is opposed to the revolutionists who believe in the primacy of an international moral community or a world society (as opposed to the international society of the rationalists that advocates adherence to its norms and values) such that it takes precedence over motives of individual states. Thus the rationalists as well as the Nehruvians are internationalists as opposed to the revolutionists who are cosmopolitans. Another important difference is that the rationalists do not have universalist pretensions whereas the revolutionists intend to overcome the international anarchy through adherence to a uniform moral code. Clearly again, on that count as well Nehruvians are rationalists rather than idealists as often they have been accused of. The rationalism of the Rationalist doctrine is not contextualized in terms of the instrumental rationality which focuses on maximizing expected utility, but it rather reflects the epistemological compromise over Cartesian rationalism that privileged pure reason as a source of knowledge without recourse to sensory experience, Lockean and Humean empiricism that accords primacy to the sensory experience and the Grotian understanding of international law that accepts both the principles of natural law as well as the customary law (as found in custom and treaty). Thus they truly represent a middle ground between the Hobbesians and the revolutionists. On this count as well, the Nehruvian discourse with its emphasis on international institutions and treaties is quite close to the rationalist tradition. Wight argues that figures like Grotius, Locke and the founding fathers of the American revolution were all rationalists in the sense that he has described the term, as were Tocqueville, Abraham Lincoln and the United Nations.³¹ Nehruvianism, on most accounts, can also be thus identified with the rationalist tradition lying between the *realpolitik* and *idealpolitik* extremes of the Johnstonian continuum.

II –Reinterpreting Indian strategic thought

This section will look at the rationalist discourse of Nehruvianism through the lens of previously formed expectations of another actor, which in essence implies a double interpretation, or an interpretation of the meaning accorded to the term by the first interpreter. It will look at how Pakistan interprets the discourse of Indian strategic culture, in this case Nehruvianism, under the burden of its own past.

Context and early origins of Pakistan's strategic culture

Perhaps nothing captures the Pakistani dilemma better than Thucydides writing of the Athenian ambassadors' address to the Lacedaemonians: "overcome by three of the greatest things, honour, fear, and profit, we have both accepted the dominion delivered us and refuse again to surrender it, we have therein done nothing to be wondered at, nor beside the manner of men. Nor have we been the first in this kind, but it hath been ever a thing fixed for the weaker to be kept under by the stronger."³² For Pakistan, this could be Indians pontificating about the realities of power.

Ali Ahmed, writing on the Pakistan dimension of Indian strategic culture, argues that the Indian discourse has leaned towards the *realpolitik* end of Johnston's continuum over the last four decades, thus exacerbating Pakistan's security dilemma. This gives legitimacy to Pakistan's actions rooted in the logic of Hobbesian fear.³³ Ahmed is clearly arguing from the operational level of Johnston's paradigm but at the same time he attributes the adoption of this realist posture to a shift in symbolic discourse from the left (espoused by Nehruvianism or even Marxists) to the political right due to the rise of cultural nationalism and its alignment with the realists.³⁴ Ahmed also believes that the early dominance of Nehruvianism has gradually given way to the realist discourse through the rising influence of Hindutva Philosophy, and before that to some extent through "Indira Doctrine."³⁵ Ahmed's prescription for India is to revert to the moderating discourse of Nehruvianism in order to deprive Pakistan's influential military of its domination of the political discourse legitimized through stoking of the Indian problem.³⁶

The analysis above leads to two important conclusions. First, Ahmed's use of Nehruvianism as a point of reference and comparison for all other schools of thought confirms the pride of place Nehruvianism enjoys within the spectrum of Indian strategic culture – a point earlier raised in this essay. And second, arguments such as above are always based on an underlying presumption: that Pakistan's strategic culture is unmistakably Hobbesian. Similar arguments pointing to the Indian origins of Pakistan's realist discourse are also frequently deployed by numerous Pakistani scholars. For instance Hasan-Askari Rizvi, writing on the subject of Pakistan's strategic culture, argues that Pakistan's security policy is dominated by concerns over Indian agenda for regional dominance and that Pakistani policymakers believe that an Indo-centric South Asian security model is detrimental for regional peace which is one of the most important pillars of Pakistan's security policy to accord the highest priority to defence needs.³⁷

One can broadly agree with both Ali Ahmed and Rizvi's conclusions though with an important caveat. And that caveat relates to the presumed context and origins of Pakistan's Hobbesian discourse to be lying in India's turn to realism and quest for regional dominance. One can argue that these could be valid observations that may have served to reinforce the original discourse but do not form the basis of Pakistan's *realpolitik* strategic culture. Pakistan's case in fact offers minimal challenge to any analyst tasked with determining the weight of history in evolution of its strategic culture, because Pakistan made a

deliberate choice to be unburdened by the long history of the Indian subcontinent. Pakistan was thus born an ideal type *self help unit* of the Waltzian world, a *tabula rasa* (though one with a DNA) waiting to be written on by its experience in the world of anarchy.

The question of DNA may be resolved by turning once again to Ali Ahmed who has argued that in case of India, “Hindutva” philosophy has influenced its strategic culture through “*creation of an out-group in the form of an external other, namely, Pakistan.*”³⁸ Without disputing this conclusion, one can argue that Pakistan’s founding philosophy in its divorce of history and its consistent use by its military in legitimating its dominant position in policymaking, has deeply impacted the symbolic discourse of its strategic culture through the creation of an out-group, namely, Hindus (and by extension India), while India’s later turn to realism has only exacerbated this original proclivity.

The privileged position enjoyed by the military in Pakistan’s external policymaking (and many would argue its society as well) has, in aggregate, led to an institutional imbalance of a kind that has gradually turned the state into what Samuel P. Huntington calls a praetorian polity. Huntington has argued that a praetorian polity is one in which the level of political participation is far in excess of its institutional capacity to handle it due to weak institutionalization and where “patterns of political participation oscillate violently between the two extremes of *democracy and dictatorship*”.³⁹ Huntington contends that in terms of institutionalization, India was possibly the best prepared for self-government among those states that attained independence after the Second World War. While in countries like Pakistan and Sudan, the military had strong incentive to fill in the vacuum caused by the gap between the relatively high institutional capacity of the military (and civil) bureaucracy and the poorly equipped political parties.⁴⁰ Thus one may contend that this militarist strain in the Pakistani DNA was always prone to push it towards the Hobbesian end of the cultural continuum, and arguably this has played some part, however small it may be, in diluting Nehruvianism in India.

Second reading: Looking at Nehruvianism through the Kautilyan Glasses

Having established Pakistan’s Hobbesian credentials in their original context, one may now turn to interpret Nehruvianism through its assumptions. The central narrative of Pakistan’s strategic culture is relatively easy to formulate in terms of its three framing queries that is the *frequency of conflict in human affairs*, the *nature of enemy* and the *utility of violence* in the resolution of conflicts. An acceptance of the unpleasant nature of the world and the acknowledgment especially after some harrowing experiences, like for instance in 1971, that life is indeed “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short”, Pakistan is not averse to violent conflict in pursuit of what its policymakers describe as *survival in the face of daunting challenges*. It does not shy away from initiating the conflict as in 1948, 1965 and 1999 and more importantly, does not rule out any possible means, for instance irregular forces or lately nuclear weapons, in

pursuit of the above indicated objective. Similarly, the nature of enemy is not in question as the Pakistani DNA makes it a zero sum equation. India is and will continue to remain for Pakistan the *sum of all its fears*. And violence as well as balance of power remain the prime arbiters of Pakistan's dealings with its "Other".

Nehruvianism, from this perspective, is merely a ruse, and the Kautilyan perspective that many Indian writers assiduously ignore, although it assumes the pride of place in Pakistan's interpretation of Indian strategic culture. Kautilya's six-fold policy comprising several common sense realist maxims on administration of an empire and conditions of peace and war, and especially the *Double Policy* that advocates avoiding too many enemies by *making peace with one and waging war with another*, is an evidence of India's duplicity. Interestingly, though Pakistan's alliance making with China and the use of asymmetric tactics are more reflective of this Chankyan maxim. "Bharat Karnad has described the Pak-China alliance to be reflective of certain Chankyan proclivities on the part of Pakistan. For instance, he argues that Pakistan's 1963 border agreement with China — where both countries demarcated boundary lines in mutual recognition — to be well in line with "Adistra Sandhi" (or trading for peace)".⁴¹ Andrew Small instead has provided a more accurate representation, "the settlement announced was on terms clearly favourable to Pakistan. China would transfer 1,942 square kilometres that it controlled to Pakistan. Although its nominal concessions were substantial, Pakistan transferred none of the territory under its control."⁴²In the same way, A.G. Norrani in his article has corroborated this account by noting that, "During the Raj, people in Hunza would cross the Shimshal Pass with their flocks for grazing. A high Pakistani source informed this writer that the change to an agreed draft was readily agreed to by the then prime minister Zhou Enlai in a midnight meeting, once he was assured that there were no second thoughts on the agreed text."⁴³

Kautilya's foreign policy theory emphasizes on augmentation of power, obliteration of the enemy, prudence over emotion, enlisting the help of friends, preference of peace over war and just behaviour in victory as well as in defeat.⁴⁴ The six methods of foreign policy include: *Samdhi* or making peace through concluding treaties; *Vigraha* or undertaking hostilities; *Yana* or preparing for war; *Asana* or staying quiet; *Samsaraya* or seeking protection of a stronger king that can be compared favourably with band wagoning; and *Dvaidhibhava* or pursuing peace with one neighbour to pursue rivalry with another in a way that is similar to balancing.⁴⁵

Looked at through this lens, the Nehruvian perspective on the question of *frequency of war* or war being an instrument of last resort is either *Yana* or *Asana* in preparation for *Vigraha*. And the Nehruvian assumption regarding the impermanence of enmity is either *Samsarya* or *Dvaidhibhava*. On the matter of the utility of the use of force, Nehruvians advocate that extensive use or threat of use of force is counterproductive in the settlement of inter-state disputes and rivalries, which must be settled through negotiations and institutions as a first resort. Through the Kautilyan glasses this is nothing but *Samdhi* especially at a

time of weakness, and biding time in this manner whereas the real objective remains the obliteration of Pakistan through use of alternate strategies.

Conclusion

This essay has attempted to articulate the respective central paradigms of dominant Indian and Pakistani strategic cultures within the theoretical framework given by Alastair Iain Johnston. It does so, however, through an alternate perspective based on the post-structural premise that the symbolic discourse of a strategic culture is open to a variety of interpretations. The aim was to uncover the underlying exclusions and tensions in the dominant Indian grand strategic premise by subjecting it to a rival interpretation. It has been seen how the weight of history shapes the interpretive perspective of respective actors in imparting meaning to the discourse of culture. And although the essay is not intended to offer a prescriptive framework for either India or Pakistan, yet in the end one may digress from this general framework ever so slightly to contend that in case of Pakistan, removing the Kautilyan glasses can go a long way in securing a more durable and peaceful security order in South Asia.

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THE US SMART POWER STRATEGY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN'S SECURITY

DR. NAZIR HUSSAIN* AND BILAL ZUBAIR*

On the day of assuming charge, the US Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton unveiled her administration's foreign policy agenda based on 'Smart Power'. Shifting away from President Bush's unilateral military driven foreign policy, the Obama Administration tried to pursue a more balanced approach in the US foreign policy. The 'Smart Power' is an integrated approach that combines the components of 'hard power' or coercive means such as military and economic tools with 'soft power' or non-coercive tools such as public diplomacy, political ideals, cultural and legal aspects of the US power, and transforms them into a successful strategy. Applying a combination of these tools or any tool according to situational requirement is the cardinal feature of 'Smart Power' based foreign policy approach. The 'Smart Power' strategy is an outcome of the realization that the global influence of US military driven foreign policy is shrinking, leading to a rupture in US relations with its key allies. Military power alone cannot maintain the US influence in the world; therefore, the United States should value the international institutions and also make new partners to address the emerging global challenges. The Obama Administration is focused to restore the US global leadership role without losing its vital security objectives and the 'Smart Power' strategy would be the instrument in this regard.

An important aspect in the US 'Smart Power' strategy is its relationship with Pakistan. Pakistan is arguably the litmus test to evaluate if the US strategy is moving in the right direction. The US has been leading the Global War on Terror (GWOT) in Afghanistan since October 2001 and AfPak, as enunciated by

* Dr. Nazir Hussain is Associate Professor at the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.

* Mr. Zubair Bilal is a visiting faculty, NUST Business School, National University of Science and Technology, Islamabad.

President Obama, is pivotal in fighting global terrorism. The term AfPak, reflects that the war zone is not only confined to Afghanistan. For the US, Pakistan is the key partner in fighting GWOT particularly in its western tribal areas bordering Afghanistan that allegedly harbour key al-Qaeda and Taliban figures. Pakistan is, therefore, crucial in the US strategy to win war in Afghanistan.

However, the US Smart Power based policies have raised concerns in Pakistan. Applying the defence, diplomacy and development as the US foreign policy strategy in Pakistan to this point has not been a trouble free path. The use of hard power has aroused anti-American public sentiments while reducing the favourable US image despite increased aid and development projects in Pakistan. Similarly, Pakistan-US relations have witnessed various setbacks due to increased focus on hard power and diverging interests on key issues such as the end-game in Afghanistan, Indo-US nexus, Pakistan's approach towards domestic insurgency etc.

The US 'Smart Power' approach has numerous security related implications for Pakistan's state and society due to adverse effects of hard power elements in the US policy vis-à-vis Pakistan. Obama's AfPak speech on December 1, 2009 on the way forward in Afghanistan articulated the future course in relations with Pakistan. The unprecedented surge in drone attacks, Osama Bin Ladin operation (May 2011), Salala check-post incident (November 2011) and CIA covert activities including Raymond Davis incident (January 2011) inside Pakistani territory, explain the current nature of the US engagement in Pakistan. In the presidential debate of 2012, both President Obama and his Republican opponent Mitt Romney were convinced that the drone attacks and other military measures should continue as vital component in the US approach towards Pakistan. In a unilateral world, the only super power extending its military muscles in Pakistan has serious security implications for Pakistan. Therefore, this paper endeavours to analyze the US Smart Power Strategy in Pakistan and its impact on Pakistan's national security by discussing hard and soft power elements employed by the US over the years.

Conceptual framework

The concept of power forms the basis of political relations between states and is a central feature of political theory.¹ Generally, power is seen as an individual, society or state's ability to exert influence on the other by intimidating or penalizing mainly by the use of force.² According to the most celebrated definition of power by Robert Dahl, power as the potential ability is such that "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do."³ In this context, Smart Power is no exception; Smart power is also a foreign policy tool that provides the ability to influence another state, if used judiciously. The conceptual framework of Smart Power has two aspects. The first aspect is its theoretical basis that is derived from the Two-Dimensional View of Power Theory, which stands as a critique of behavioural focus by Bachrach and Baratz.⁴

- Observable (overt or covert) conflict
- Hard Power: *A* uses force/reward to truncate *B*'s agenda (whether *B* likes it or not).
- Soft Power: *A* uses attraction or institutions so that *B* sees the agenda as legitimate.⁵

In the first sense, power is seen as a tool to seek compliance from the opponent either through the threat of sanction or through coercive use of force. This type of power entails coercion, authority and manipulation. The second perspective of power deals with 'influence' that differs from coercion or forceful compliance. Influence is a state in which *B* is convinced that *A*'s command is not detrimental to *B*'s interests rather is mutually beneficial because it has sanction of legitimacy and reasonability. Here complier may not be aware of the intrinsic value of demands placed upon him.⁶ This typology of power now merits an understanding of the coercion and influence that is employed in soft power, hard power and in the amalgamation of both, i.e. smart power.

The second aspect of Smart Power is the operational aspect and the application that incorporates the judicious use of power tools at a state's disposal according to the requirement of a given situation. This aspect entails Rational Choice theory that is mainly an economic theory but now widely used in the field of international relations. Rational Choice is "application of an economic model of human action to the political sphere."⁷ The operational aspect of Smart Power explains rational application of power resources to one's own advantage.

These two aspects: the Rational Choice Theory and the Two-Dimensional Approach of Power underpin the third aspect i.e. the Smart Power Approach by providing a theoretical and logical framework. States are primarily presumed to be rational actors. Their activities are governed by cost-benefit analysis aiming towards maximization of profits during particular interactions or actions. Relative power among states is evaluated in terms of various power tools at a state's disposal known as their capabilities. States can employ these power tools according to their ability and situational requirement. In this context, the Smart Power Approach, a synthesis of hard and soft power components, could be vital power resources at a state's disposal. Joseph Nye's Smart Power is a reflection of Bachrach and Baratz Two-Dimensional view of power that explains that if actor *A* wants to influence the actor *B* then coercion and influence are primarily two methods of securing *A*'s compliance over *B*. The Smart Power, hence, increases the spectrum of choices at state *A*'s disposal giving it unconventional power tools alongside conventional power tools to seek greater leverage over state *B* during their interaction. This conception is reinforced by the contemporary reality of complex interdependence; the soft power brings in the element of consensus during power based interactions by the means of persuasion or charm. This increased diversity of choices augments the utility of Smart Power approach when discreetly employed into action.

The US Smart Power in Pakistan

Pakistan-US cooperation before and after the 9/11 incident projects variation in the US dealings with Pakistan. Before 9/11, Pakistan was mainly a target of the US hard power in the form of sanctions; and after 9/11, the US incorporated both hard and soft power for its short-term policy objectives in Pakistan.⁸ However, the US approach witnessed a paradigm shift in the post-9/11 scenario particularly after 2007. Presently, the smart power strategy guides the US policy objectives in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

President Barack Obama's speech, 'Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan,' delivered on December 09, 2009 at West Point (New York) provides the essence of US approach towards both the countries. The so-called AfPak strategy reaffirmed the narrowly defined US goals in Pakistan, i.e. 'to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten US allies in the future.'⁹ Pakistan would be instrumental in the US strategy; however, the economic and military assistance to Pakistan would be subject to its performance against the terrorist groups operating within its territory, particularly in its tribal areas with Afghanistan.¹⁰ The calculus of relations thus trickles down to the US pursuing its policy objectives vis-à-vis Pakistan while employing all available power resources including military, economic, diplomatic and political for the stated policy objectives.

The core of this strategy has been the renewed focus towards eliminating al-Qaeda and its allies, an ambitious nation-building plan, and an integrated military and economic approach of counter-insurgency.¹¹ The US special representative to the region, Richard Halbrooke testified before the Congress in May 2009 that the new strategy is a shift from counter-terrorism to counterinsurgency in the AfPak as part of an integrated 'Smart Power' Strategy.¹² In view of his AfPak strategy, President Obama explained that the solutions to Afghanistan's problems lie across the Durand Line.¹³ President Obama declared in December 2008 that "...we need a strategic partnership with all the parties in the region, Pakistan and India and the Afghan government, to stamp out the kind of militant, violent, terrorist extremists that have set up base camps and that are operating in ways that threaten the security of everybody in the international community. And, as I've said before, we can't continue to look at Afghanistan in isolation."¹⁴

The US AfPak strategy explains the linkage of both the countries in the US counter-terrorism strategy. The White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on the US Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan states that "the ability of extremists in Pakistan to undermine Afghanistan is proven, while insurgency in Afghanistan feeds instability in Pakistan. The threat that al Qaeda poses to the United States and our allies in Pakistan - including the possibility of extremists obtaining fissile material - is all too real. Without more effective action against these groups in Pakistan, Afghanistan will face continuing instability."¹⁵

President Obama's decision for a troop surge in Afghanistan that topped with 110,000 troops in 2011 brought renewed commitment of the US strategic interests in the region. President Bush's deviation from an unfinished

agenda in Afghanistan to the new conflict in the Middle East, and the 'Transformational Diplomacy' initiated by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had left the War on Terror in a limbo. For President Obama, the war in Iraq was a 'war of choice' whereas the war in Afghanistan was a 'war of necessity'.¹⁶ The request of General Stanley McChrystal, commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for 40,000 additional troops was based on a military solution of the Afghan problem. The Obama administration duly entertained McChrystal's request with an aim to bring military backed political solution to the Afghan war before the planned 2014 withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan.¹⁷

The US Hard Power in Pakistan

On Pakistan's front, President Obama has toughened his stance as evident from the US policies towards Pakistan. President Obama categorically supported the US drone strikes inside Pakistani tribal areas during his Presidential debate with Republican candidate John McCain.¹⁸ By declaring Pakistan-based Haqqani Network as a terrorist organization and increasing military activities in Pakistan and the bordering areas of Pakistan inside Afghanistan, the US demonstrated a renewed focus on the military option. Pakistan has frequently been alleged to harbour key al-Qaeda affiliates such as the Haqqani network in the North Waziristan area of FATA. The US believes that the Pakistani Taliban have been providing sanctuaries to al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups that are involved in the killing of NATO and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) inside Afghanistan. The US insensitivity to Pakistan's strategic and security interests and frequent attacks on Pakistani troops demonstrate the US approach to tackle Pakistan. The attack on Salala post by NATO forces on November 26, 2012 that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers inside Pakistani border exacerbated the already tense relations and resulted in the blockade of NATO's southern logistics tributary crossing through Pakistan's territory.

Similarly, the CIA cover agents have been operating in Pakistan since 2002 after Pakistan joined hands in GWoT. Jeremy Schill, author of the book 'Black Water', wrote that "from a covert forward operating base run by the US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) in the Pakistani port city of Karachi, members of an elite division of Black Water are at the centre of a secret program in which they plan targeted assassinations of suspected Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives, "snatch and grabs" of high-value targets and other sensitive action inside and outside Pakistan."¹⁹

The US aid to Pakistan is subject to various conditionalities and the US has repeatedly placed cuts on aid to Pakistan. Currently, there are two US laws that make aid to Pakistan subject to conditions – the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (EPPA) of 2009, and Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012. The Consolidated Appropriations Act 2012 has a set of provisions specific to Pakistan. The conditionality is mainly focused on Pakistan's efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation, Pakistan's military counterterrorism measures against al-Qaeda and Taliban especially the Haqqani network and Pakistan military's

apolitical track record. The aid requires a mandatory certification by the US Secretary of State for its disbursement.²⁰

These legislation-related conditionalities, however, are not limited to the US aid. In December 2013, the US Congress passed a defence authorization bill for 2014 containing a clause to suspend \$1.5 billion reimbursements to Pakistan if the NATO supplies to Afghanistan are interrupted amid growing protests against the US drone attacks in Pakistan.²¹ The legislation links Pakistan performance to demonstrable actions against al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, such as the disruption of cross border attacks against the US led coalition forces and the ANSF, countering IEDs and the prevention of persecution of ethnic and religious minorities with certification from the US Defense Secretary.²² Such legal aspects of hard power aim at influencing Pakistan's behaviour to seek certain actions according to the US interests.

The US Soft Power in Pakistan

On the other hand, the US also seems committed to strengthen Pakistan's military counterinsurgency (COIN) capability and enhance the civilian government capacity. The US financial and material support during the 2010 floods, as well as the various financial assistance programs of the USAID and Enhanced Partnership Act (EPPA) of 2009 are some important aspects of US support to Pakistani people and government. These are the soft power components in the US Smart power strategy. The US realizes the importance of diplomacy, public outreach, cultural exchanges and the expansion of bilateral trade with Pakistan as a balancing tool through soft power. It is becoming harder for the US to reap the fruits of its soft power amid growing anti-US public sentiments.

The devastating earthquake of October 2005 left thousands dead and millions internally displaced in Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and various parts in Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Alongside spending \$700 million in humanitarian aid, the US also provided air logistics, military personnel and aid workers to help the affected population. Similarly, the US financial help during the seasonal floods of 2010 and 2011 was substantial. These floods displaced nearly 4.8 million people killed hundreds and cost billions to the economy. This was a big challenge for the government. By the end of September 2012, the State Department and USAID humanitarian assistance totalled \$134.6 million. The US flood-relief provided to Pakistan in FY2010 and FY2011 totalled more than \$600 million in funds and in-kind aid and services.²³

The scholarships for the US universities and cultural activities in partner states have been cornerstone of soft power Strategy. The US has invested heavily in this diplomatic tool of soft power in Pakistan. It has enabled the US to create people to people contacts and establish connections with local NGOs and other cultural institution.²⁴ The US Fulbright Scholars, the International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP), U.S.-Pakistan Professional Partnership Program under the USEFP for Public Administrators-Seeking Women participants and the Kennedy-Lugar Youth Exchange and Study (YES)

Program along with many other programs have played an instrumental role in projecting a positive US image in Pakistan.

Likewise, the USAID is arguably the most effective component of the US soft power in Pakistan. With an aim towards enduring relationship with Pakistani people in collaboration with the civilian government, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and private sector, the USAID programs are focused on five priority areas – energy, economic growth, stabilization, education and health.²⁵ Under the USAID, more than \$3 billion have been spent on various projects in three years from 2010 to 2013. Under the Roshan Pakistan Scheme, various projects have been launched to inject life into the critical energy sector, such as the 17MW Satpara Multipurpose dam, 480MW Gomalzam Multipurpose dam, Guddu thermal power plant, Muzaffargarh thermal power station etc.²⁶ The completion and restoration of these projects will provide about 1,000MW of electricity to the national grid.

Alongside electricity, the education sector has also received generous grants, and since 2009, more than 12,000 scholarships have been provided to the university students from all provinces of Pakistan.²⁷ Similarly, maternal and child care health is a primary focus of the USAID. Under the “Pakistan Initiative for Mothers and Newborns (PAIMAN) project, more than 6,500 lives were spared and newborn deaths were decreased by 23 percent in 26 targeted districts of Pakistan.”²⁸ Along with these projects, various other projects manifest the imperatives of the development aspect of soft power in the US strategy in Pakistan.

Implications for Pakistan’s Security

The US ‘Smart Power’ strategy has multifaceted implications for the state and society in Pakistan varying from security, sovereignty, economic and political challenges. There is continuous threat to Pakistani sovereignty by the US in its counterterrorism approach. The use of arms against other state, irrespective of legal or illegal pretexts, comes under the domain of International Humanitarian Law (IHL).²⁹ On May 1, 2011 the US Special Forces operation in an Abbottabad compound against al-Qaeda leader, Osama bin Ladin, triggered serious debate on the issues of territorial sovereignty and consequences of such attacks on the future of Pakistan-US relations. Pakistan Army Chief General Kiani stated that Pakistan would reconsider its relation with the US on the reoccurrence of Abbottabad like incident.³⁰ The Abbottabad attack shows the ability of a super power in violating the territorial sovereignty of another state and it is widely accepted as a global geopolitical norm. Such tactics by the US is a demonstration of its “global reach” and forms a cardinal feature of how the ‘War on Terror’ is fought across borders.³¹ Later, the Salala incident of September 2011, in which 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed by US gunships at the Pakistan-Afghan border and the Raymond Davis incident of January 2011 in which a CIA contractor shot dead two Pakistani civilians in Lahore, not only strained Pakistan-US relations but also showed various fronts where Pakistan has to restore its sovereignty.

Likewise, Pakistan has witnessed increased hostility across the Afghan border that has compelled Pakistan to deploy additional troops on its western frontiers. In 2004, Pakistan deployed 80,000 of its military personnel on Afghan border and the figure climbed up to 120,000 by 2009 due to the high percentage of infiltration and the US military operations along the Pakistan's western borders.³² By comparison, since 2009 after the elections of President Obama all indicators that indicate an ongoing conflict on the western front have witnessed a spike. According to the yearly data compiled by the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, a visible contrast can be observed in cross border attacks from the Afghan border by the militants, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and the ISAF during and before the incumbent US administration.³³ In addition, the lethal drone strikes increased, applying more pressure on Pakistan for augmenting cooperation in the War on Terror.

As a result, Pakistan has faced growing militancy that has spilled over from tribal areas to the urban centres. According to data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal, by the year 2013, a total of 49,921 people had lost their lives in this war.³⁴ The attacks on Pakistan General Headquarters on October 10, 2009, the Mehran Base attack on May 22, 2011 and numerous attacks on security installations reflect growing terrorist activities in urban areas. One underlying factor behind the increased terrorist activities in Pakistan has been the troops surge in Afghanistan in early 2010 and the expansion of operation against the Afghan Taliban in Halmand, Kunner and Kandhar provinces bordering Pakistan.³⁵ Resultantly, many Afghanistan based Taliban had crossed the borders into Pakistan, supported by like-minded in Pakistani tribal areas.

Alongside the human loss, Pakistan's economy has tremendously suffered as a result of the War on terror. Pakistan has roughly faced a staggering loss of \$67.93 billion in economy and infrastructure since its participation in the War on Terror. The delays in reimbursements and conditional financial assistance eliminate any real gains to Pakistan's fragile economy, especially is measured against the heavy loss of lives both military and civilian.³⁶ Due to the prevailing security environment, the western countries have imposed bans for their citizens on travel to Pakistan. Such measures have adversely affected the economy in terms of foreign investments, the outcome of which has marginalized economic activity, devalued Pakistani rupee, slowed the privatization process, reduced tax collection, and nearly destroyed tourism industry.³⁷ According to the figures circulated by Pakistan's Ministry of Finance: "Pakistan's investment-to-GDP ratio has nosedived from 22.5 percent in 2006-07 to 13.4 percent in 2010-11 with serious consequences for the job creating ability of the economy. Going forward, Pakistan needs enormous resources to enhance the productive capacity of the economy. The security situation will be the key determinant of the future flow of the investment. Pakistan's economy needs an early end to this war."³⁸

Revisiting the US Smart Power Strategy

In the prevalent scenario, the US strategy in Pakistan requires a prudent review aiming towards recalibrating the existing relationship. With the

scheduled withdrawal of ISAF from Afghanistan, the US ought to focus on policy review vis-à-vis its “Big Stick” Policy to ensure long term engagement with Pakistan.³⁹ Such an approach requires thoughtful consideration to Pakistan’s security interests, providing space for conflict resolution, and prioritizing the development related activities. This approach should be based upon the realization that investment in Pakistan’s political and economic wellbeing is in fact investment in the future US security interests in the region.⁴⁰ A review in the US strategy would then require a careful reassessment of its objectives that should be thoroughly accomplished without adverse repercussions for Pakistan.

The future of US relations with Pakistan depends upon enhancing the spectrum of engagement to a strategic level. The US Department of Defense and the State Department should carefully analyze and address lapses in the current nature of relations. Dialogue is the best option to probe into common challenges, to explore areas of cooperation and to address the regional complexities. Pakistan’s commitment to fight al-Qaeda and Taliban in the FATA and the urban areas through counterinsurgency is beyond doubt, especially in the context of the ongoing operation *Zarb-e-Azb* in North Waziristan. The nation has alone rendered more sacrifices than any other nation in this fight. Therefore, apart from eliminating violent extremism, the US should also focus on other important areas of cooperation such as the nuclear stability and socio economic prosperity in South Asia as a strategic priority on regional fronts.⁴¹

On the domestic front, political stability and economic uplift should be the primary aim of Pakistan-US engagement. According to a former Pakistan’s Ambassador to the US, Sherry Rehman, the long term solution to problems of Pakistan “Lies in enhanced trade not aid. It will spur economic activity, generate employment, give the country’s enormous youth cohort an avenue to earn a living, and above all, give ordinary Pakistanis a stake in an enduring Pakistan-U.S. relationship. The U.S. Congress has a leading role to play in this effort.”⁴²

On the tactical level, the US needs to review its drone policy in Pakistan. Various studies on drone warfare have revealed the negative fallouts of such campaigns. Pakistan’s apprehensions on drone attacks stems from various reasons. Firstly, the collateral damage and civilian deaths caused by drone strikes have been enormous. In its recent report “*Will I be Next*” *US Drone Strikes in Pakistan*, the Amnesty International has seriously criticized the US for civilian deaths in drone strikes killing up to 400-600 civilians.⁴³ Drone strikes are the biggest cause of anti-Americanism in the recent years.

Secondly, another troubling aspect associated with drone operation are suicide attacks which the terrorists believe is the way to avenge their partners killed in drone strikes. Different terrorist organizations find a common purpose to coalesce under the banner of TTP in 2007, following the unprecedented increase in drone attacks. Amid this situation, the violence is likely to prevail in Pakistan unless a comprehensive conflict resolution mechanism is not being channelized with TTP supported by the US. It is rather confusing to understand that if the US seeks Pakistan’s help to end conflict in Afghanistan, why

Pakistan's endeavour to bring an end to conflict inside Pakistan has not been encouraged by the US.

Thirdly, although *Zarb-e-Azb* military operation has been launched in North Waziristan, Nawaz Sharif's government wanted to bring Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on the negotiation table but the continuity in drone attacks sabotaged the peace efforts between the Government of Pakistan and TTP. In one such event on November 1, 2013, the TTP Chief Hakim Ullah Mehsud was killed in a drone attack in North Waziristan.⁴⁴ The drones are thus one of the biggest hurdles in making tangible gains towards conflict resolution in war against terrorism, and they need to be ceased for improvement of bilateral relations.

On the other hand, the US should increasingly focus to enhance Pakistan's capability and capacity to fight an unconventional war by focusing on essential training and military tools that would address any shortcomings of counterinsurgency initiatives. Pakistan has also been seeking joint operations of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) for better counterinsurgency operations and intelligence sharing. Likewise, protected mobility vehicles, fire-support helicopters, and anti-IED technology training should also be provided to Pakistani military. Defense cooperation should include the establishment of trilateral forums where the US, Pakistan and Afghan commanders could share their experience from COIN operations. In addition, joint military exercises and training program could be developed for swift COIN operations. The US military needs to work closely with Pakistan's ISI and Military Intelligence (MI) to develop better intelligence sharing mechanism for converging goals that mutually benefit COIN patterns between the US and Pakistan.⁴⁵

The US also remains focused towards investing in the mega energy generating projects such as dams, solar and coal. Likewise, roads carrying the NATO supplies from Chaman and Torkhum borders need repair and refurbishment. The Karachi Port facility harbouring the movement of thousands of NATO containers also requires up-gradation. The US financial and technical support in these areas could be instrumental in improving the US image in Pakistan.

Energy Projects

The shambling energy sector in Pakistan requires immediate attention. It is quite understandable that the US cannot address all the energy requirements – however, it can finance some important mega energy projects such as the Diamer-Bhasha dam for cheap energy provision in Pakistan. The US ambassador to Pakistan, Richard Olson has announced to finance the feasibility study for the Diamer-Bhasha dam and the USAID has agreed to pool \$20 million for the feasibility study.⁴⁶ The US could also provide consultancy in the better management of energy reservoirs and distribution networks in addition to patronizing renewable energy reservoirs that offer great prospects. Relinquishing opposition to the Iran-Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline could also reduce Pakistan's dependency on limited gas reservoirs and help in economic integration of the region. With the US-Iran rapprochement on Iranian Nuclear

Program making headways, the US opposition to Iran-Pakistan could gradually recede.

The US-Pakistan Energy Working Group, which culminated as part of the Strategic Dialogue Framework bolstered during Secretary of State John Kerry's August 2013 visit to Pakistan, has been working along the lines to inject lifeline in Pakistani energy sector. The US and Pakistan are in the process of negotiating a \$95 million loan to build a 50MW wind power plant in southeastern Pakistan's Gharo-Keti Bandar Wind Corridor in the Sindh province where Pakistan has huge potential.⁴⁷ According to Pakistan Renewable Energy Society (PRES), Pakistan's 1000km coastline has huge wind energy generation capacity. The Pakistan wind map developed by the United States National Renewable Energy Labs (NREL) has identified 340,000MW of wind production ability and wind (from good to excellent speed) available in many parts of the country. According to this estimate, the Gharo-Keti Bandar Wind corridor has a potential of contributing about 50,000MW to the national grid.⁴⁸

As part of the US commitment towards Pakistan's quenching energy needs, 1,200 megawatt under the USAID will become a part of national grid by the end of 2014 under Kaitu Weir Hydroelectric and Irrigation Project in North Waziristan producing 18.4 megawatts of electricity and irrigating 16,400 acres of land. Since 2009, the US has added 1,000 megawatts in Pakistan's national grid.⁴⁹ The US has also helped Pakistan to diversify its energy supply through the development of domestic natural gas and renewable energy resources, as well as through the import of liquefied natural gas. Meanwhile, the US funding has been instrumental in the construction and rehabilitation of Gomalzam Dam, Satpara Dam, Mangla Dam, and Tarbela Dam and the modernization of Guddu, Jamshoro, and Muzaffargarh power plants.⁵⁰ In avenues of regional energy integration, the US has been advocating the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI); however, this initiative requires peace and stability in Afghanistan. Under the terms of the TAPI project, Pakistan and India will both get 1.365 billion cubic feet of gas per day (bcfd) each and Afghanistan will get 0.5 bcfd.⁵¹ The Roshan Pakistan Initiative telecasted on various TV channels is a projection of USAID efforts in addressing Pakistani energy needs.

Roads, Ports and Borders

According to National Highway Authority (NHA), the damage inflicted on Pakistani roads carrying NATO supplies surpasses Rs.100 billion and Pakistan is yet to receive compensation. Likewise, the 2010 floods that wreaked havoc in the KPK province had severely damaged miles of roads and bridges.⁵² Refurbishing these roads is mutually beneficial and signals the US interests in development projects in Pakistan. According to a study conducted by USAID "Pakistan Trade Project Dwell Time Study", the poor and single road links mainly near the Pakistan-Afghan border have been the primary contributors of logistical delays from Pakistan to Afghanistan. The roads are unsuited for heavily loaded vehicles amid acute security situation.⁵³

Meanwhile, the US has helped the government of Pakistan in developing basic infrastructure like building schools, colleges and hospitals in

militancy affected areas and the USAID has been providing vital support. So far, the United States has invested in the construction and up-gradation of more than 900 kilometres of roads, including the four major trade routes between Pakistan and Afghanistan. As part of this effort, on October 14, 2013, the USAID signed a \$90 million agreement with Pakistan's National Highway Authority to rehabilitate 247 kilometres of Kalat-Quetta-Chaman road.⁵⁴ The USAID funded projects contributed \$260 million in building roads and other infrastructure projects in FATA by mid-2012.⁵⁵ These projects have also helped the Pakistan army in counterinsurgency operations in Pakistani tribal areas.

The roads are not the only important area requiring immediate attention. The Karachi Port has been facilitating NATO containers for Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) for over a decade. The US could help in refurbishing these ports in terms of capacity building, development of multipurpose terminal building, provision of specialized cargo handling machinery and supplying tugging and piloting services and setting up of a floating jetty for molasses export handling.⁵⁶ As the time for NATO withdrawal is approaching, some up-gradation works should be immediately undertaken on Karachi Port as an effort to show the US commitment in infrastructure development in Pakistan.

The Pakistan-Afghanistan border lack basic facilities like weighbridges and scanner for expedited clearance and verification of consignment. Likewise, the communication and infrastructure related facilities at Pakistani dry ports at Chamman and Tourkham are indeed very poor.⁵⁷ The standard custom procedures for clearance of goods at ports are outdated that need to be modified on modern lines. On the security perspective, the border crossing points are commonly shared between pedestrians and vehicles often causing security related problems.⁵⁸ On an average, the transit time from Karachi to Chaman border is 23 day, whereas, it takes 22 days to reach goods via Torkham into Afghanistan showing the depleted situation of roads carrying logistics. The USAID Pakistan Trade Project Dwell Time Study stressed the need of building two complexes at Chaman and Torkham for avoiding logger jams and handling the cargo facilities.⁵⁹

Trade Activities

Pakistan-US bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), talks have not been concluded but this treaty could pave the way for more Pakistani goods in the US markets. Bilateral Trade Agreements could be followed by Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA) beneficial for the businesses in both countries. Pakistan has been unable to upgrade the quality of its textile from the existing level as per the directives of World Trade Organization (WTO). Therefore, Pakistani products have lost demands in the US markets. Thus the barrier remains on low quality Pakistani products. In this regard, Pakistan can seek the US assistance in upgrading its textile industry for production of value added goods as per the US requirements. On BIT, Pakistan and the US can eradicate legal issues because the treaty could be instrumental in creating jobs and business opportunities in Pakistan. The US recognizes the

importance of engaging with Pakistan's private sector for job creation. For instance, the US has been devising Pakistan Private Investment Initiative PPII scheme.⁶⁰ Under the PPII scheme, the US will be providing capital to small and medium business enterprises with an aim to encourage an investment model for sustainable development. The plan is still seeking partner and when launched will be providing \$76 million under the USAID.⁶¹

In the debate above, friction between the two countries at various levels needs to be addressed immediately. The present course of engagement reflects the existing wide gap of interests between the two countries. This gap could only be bridged by balancing the element of hard power with soft power in the US Smart power Strategy. On the part of the US, it requires structural changes in policy formulation and understanding the interest of smaller partner. There is indeed ample room for cooperation between the two countries. As the US engagement in Afghanistan is much likely to continue even after 2014, the US must address the increasing antagonism towards US actions in Pakistan. A variety of areas have been identified starting from reviewing the drone program, ending the special operations and various visible areas where the US can invest to demonstrate long term engagement in Pakistan. Another important aspect at the political level is to play an active role in resolving long-standing problems such as the Kashmir issue for durable peace in the region and not cooperating with any single country that would lead to strategic instability in South Asia.

Conclusion

From the discussion and analysis in the study, it can be inferred that power holds the central feature in the relations among states. Power resources are instrumental in accomplishing the policy objectives pursued by states. However, in this complex interdependent world, mere reliance on traditional power resources, i.e. military and economic power, deprive states to project their true influence in global affairs. Non-traditional power resources such as soft power are making headways vis-à-vis hard power and powerful states such as the US are realizing the importance of these elements in achieving their foreign policy objectives. There is a growing realization that sole reliance on hard power is rusting the US global image as a trustworthy super power.

Pakistan is arguably the litmus test in the US Smart Power based foreign policy agenda. Since 2009, the US has put Smart Power to test in its dealing with Pakistan. Both hard and soft power resources have been significantly employed in seeking Pakistan's compliance in the War against Terror. Fundamentally, this approach supports the US policy objective of defeating and dismantling al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Therefore, Smart Power is directed mainly towards establishing and achieving tactical goals through the use of hard and soft power.

Smart Power is not something naïve, without consequences for the host. It comes with its set of implications in terms of the impact of its hard and soft components, respectively. Undoubtedly, soft power such as humanitarian assistance during natural calamities, higher education scholarships, and the provision of various services through the USAID projects form a large part of

the Smart Power Strategy; yet it can fall short of attaining its potential impact owing to the intense use of hard power simultaneously. Hard power invites far more media, public attention and subsequent criticism compared to the positive impact generated by the soft power.

It can thus be inferred that the US needs to revisit its Smart Power strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan, particularly the harder components. This could be achieved by halting the drone attacks and OBL like special operations and by persuading Pakistan to channelize its efforts in a more streamlined fashion in order to ensure the effective combat of terrorism. This would enhance trust between the two allies and help in developing a reliable partnership. Moreover, the soft power component of the strategy, moving in the right direction, should be enhanced.

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TURNING THE TIDE: DEVELOPING COOPERATION ON WATER RESOURCES IN SOUTH ASIA

KHAGA NATH ADHIKARI*

Introduction

Four countries in South Asia (Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan)¹ cover 3.26 per cent of the world's surface area and are home to about 21 per cent of the world population. However, they possess only 6.8 per cent of the world's replenishable water resources.² Besides, against the world average of 7,000 cubic metres (m³), South Asia's per capita availability of water in 1995 was only 2,665m³, indicating a possible shortfall of water in the future.³ According to a survey, South Asia as a whole will have a surplus of 2,737 billion cubic metres (BCM) of water by 2025. But the distribution is not even. Among the four countries, only Pakistan will have a shortfall of 102 BCM by 2025.⁴ This does not mean that other countries will have abundant of water for their consumptive and non-consumptive uses. High rates of population growth, industrialization, and lack of effective management of available water have added to the increasing problem of water supply in the region.

Mark Twain is often quoted as having said, "Whiskey is for drinking; water is for fighting over".⁵ This statement seems increasingly true as growing scarcity of natural resources — including water — has become one of the most contentious issues in international relations. South Asia is no exception. As Imtiaz Alam says, "If there is any single most important issue that mars bilateral relations among the countries of the subcontinent, it is water."⁶ One of the many problems in the proper utilization and sharing of international watercourses in South Asia is the political rivalry and mistrust among the states in the region.

* Khaga Nath Adhikari is a PhD Scholar in Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.
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These problems are compounded by growing water needs, depleting water resources and the mismanagement of available water resources.

Table Water Resources in South Asia (Availability and Requirements)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Area (sq. km.)</i>	<i>Population (million)*</i>	<i>Average Annual Water Potential (BCM)**</i>	<i>Present Use of Water (BCM/year)#</i>	<i>Projected Demand in 2025 (BCM)##</i>
Bangladesh	1,47,570	149.70	373	40	161.0
India	32,87,240	1210.00	1870	629	1060.0
Nepal	1,47,181	26.49	237	39	60.0
Pakistan	8,03,940	177.10	236	158	337.9
Total	43,85,931	1563.29	2716	866	1618.9

* *Population as per latest census.*

** *Source: Water Needs in South Asia: Closing the Demand Supply Gap, Toufiq A. Siddiqui and Shirin Tahir-Kheli (coordinators and editors), (Honolulu, Hawaii: Global Environment and Energy in the 21st Century, 2004), p. 8.*

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India is not only at the centre of the SAARC region geographically, but it is also at the centre of water disputes in South Asia. Interestingly, India is the only country in the region which shares borders with all other countries, except for Afghanistan.⁷ It is, therefore, natural that India is the only country in the region that has water issues and disputes with other countries. There are international watercourses in this region, which are shared by two or more countries. According to international law, an international river is "one either flowing through territory of two or more states (also referred to as a successive river), or one separating the territory of two states from one another (also referred to as a boundary river or a contiguous river)."⁸ The Koshi River of Nepal, for example, originates from China, and passes through Nepal before joining the Ganges in India and flowing into the Bay of Bengal via Bangladesh. Similarly, the Brahmaputra, which originates from China, passes along with its tributaries through India and Bangladesh, and flows into the Bay of Bengal. It is, therefore, necessary for Bangladesh, China, India, Nepal, Pakistan and possibly Bhutan to develop a certain mechanism to jointly develop and share these international watercourses in the future. Depleting resources and increasing demand, resulted from growing population and industrialisation, and provisions of international law will make such an arrangement a compelling necessity.

In South Asia, India has water-related problems with Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan. As noted above, one of the main reasons for this is India's central location in the region. The second reason is India's unilateral behaviour viz-a-viz other countries and its power politics. The third, and equally important, reason for these disputes is strong nationalistic sentiments among the smaller

countries. Such sentiments have their roots in historical rivalries, and lack of understanding and appreciation of each other's situation and problems. This article, therefore, intends to look into the major water issues among Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan, and, make some suggestions on how to resolve these problems and share water resources in an equitable manner.

Water issues in South Asia

India and Bangladesh

Bangladesh and India share 54 rivers, including the Ganges, the Brahmaputra and the Meghna. The 1996 agreement on Farakka Barrage⁹ has resolved a longstanding dispute between the two countries.¹⁰ However, there are people in Bangladesh who are not happy with the arrangement and the behaviour of India in the course leading to the conclusion of the treaty. Another major issue between the two countries is India's river-linking project. It would, therefore, be appropriate to have a cursory look at the Farakka Barrage agreement, and to consider the 'river-linking' plan of India.

The Farakka Barrage Agreement

The Farakka Barrage problem far precedes the creation of Bangladesh itself. India first took a decision to construct the Barrage in 1951; actual construction work began in 1961; and the construction was completed in 1971. The 25-mile long feeder canal was completed in early 1975 and became operational from April the same year. The purpose of the construction of the barrage was to "ensure that the Hoogli River would receive, however low the flow of the Ganges may be, up to 40,000 cusecs of water diverted from the Ganges."¹¹

Ever since India's decision to construct the Farakka Barrage, the undivided Pakistan strongly opposed the project and tried hard to get it stopped. India, in a way, tried to ignore Pakistan's objection claiming that the Ganges was not an international river.¹² Despite its contention to this effect, India denounced the Barcelona Convention on 26 March 1956, which, according to Pakistan's conclusion, was aimed at going ahead with the construction of the barrage without being seen as violating international law. India's reply was that "the Barcelona convention and statute dealt with only some aspects of inland navigation and its purpose had been superseded by GATT."¹³ It should also be noted at this point that India and Pakistan, at that point of time, were negotiating the Indus Water Treaty, which was signed in September 1960. However, India refused to change its position or reconsider the construction of the Farakka Barrage.

After its creation in 1971, Bangladesh, too, continued raising the issue of Farakka Barrage with India. During the first ever visit to India by Bangladesh Prime Minister in February 1971, this matter, too, was discussed, and the Joint Communiqué issued on 8 February mentions this matter as well. Again, during the visit to Bangladesh by India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Farakka Barrage was one of the two most prominent issues discussed, the other issue was

concerning the case of refugees. The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Peace between Bangladesh and India, signed on 19 March 1972, also mentions water issue saying "the parties agreed to make joint studies and take joint action in the fields of flood control, river basin development and the field of hydroelectric power and irrigation". It should be noted here that the two countries in this Treaty agreed to take *joint* measures for the development and utilization of water resources.

Farakka Barrage could create serious problems for Bangladesh. During the lean season, from January to May every year, the flow of the Ganges used to go as down as 50,000 to 55,000 cusecs. Diversion of 40,000 cusecs from the feeder canal could be disastrous for Bangladesh, and could result in serious drought. Bangladesh claimed that "there is not enough flow in the Ganges that could be diverted through Bhagirathi-Hoogli to flush Calcutta Port and at the same time maintain the agriculture, ecology and economy of the areas downstream, particularly the southern part of Bangladesh".¹⁴ During the heydays of Indo-Bangladesh friendship, i. e. from 1972 to 1973, the two countries created the Joint River Commission and Bangladesh tried to take some measures to limit possible damage. Gradually, Bangladesh came to realize that Farakka Barrage was a *fait accompli*, and that it was not possible to undo it. Consequently, the two countries signed a short-term Partial Agreement in 1975, in which they agreed on a water sharing formula. Such short-term arrangements were agreed upon again in 1977 and 1982. They also concluded another MoU on Teesta River in 1985.

If we look at the negotiations between Bangladesh and India from the very beginning, we realize how Bangladesh had been gradually losing ground. Bangladesh had taken this issue to the United Nations, but not much was achieved, except the Consensus Statement of November 1976.¹⁵ Its proposal for construction of storage reservoirs in the upper reaches of the Ganges (in India and Nepal) also went unheeded. The 1975 Accord contained a clause that guaranteed a certain amount of water for Bangladesh, but the 1977 Agreement and the 1982 MoU did not have any such guarantee clauses.

Finally, the two countries concluded Farakka Barrage Treaty in 1996, which will remain valid for 30 years. This Treaty has resolved the longstanding issue between the two countries. However, there are still concerns about the guarantee of minimum flow for Bangladesh.¹⁶ Through this Treaty, Bangladesh tacitly accepted that construction of storage reservoirs in the upper reaches of the Ganges could not be possible. India, on its part, gave up its demand for augmentation of the rivers in the region (particularly Brahmaputra) for bilateral use.

The River Linking Project of India

Another problematic issue between Bangladesh and India is India's major river-linking project. India has announced to undertake the river-linking project, which intends to divert water from "water-surplus areas" to "water-deficit areas". The major river basins in the eastern region, including the Ganga and the Brahmaputra basins, have been identified as marginally surplus and

surplus areas, respectively, while the southern and western regions are identified as water deficit regions. Under this project, India intends to divert a large volume of water from its eastern region (i.e. from Ganga-Brahmaputra basin) to its western and southwestern regions. Bangladesh has taken it seriously, and has voiced its serious concern to the Indian side. Bangladesh has felt that Indian response so far has remained "discouraging to initiate a fruitful dialogue on the issue,"¹⁷ furthermore, it was hoped that the change of government in India from NDA to UPA would help review the plan.¹⁸ However, the Manmohan Singh-led UPA government not only decided to go along with the project but also reiterated it in early 2014.

India and Nepal

Nepal is rich in water resources, with 237 billion cubic metres of average annual potential of internal renewable water resources.¹⁹ It has also very high potential of hydropower generation, with a potential of 83,000 megawatts of electricity. More than a half of the potential is technically and economically feasible. Paradoxically, only a little over one per cent of potential electricity has so far been generated in Nepal; and only a little over 40 per cent of the Nepalese people have access to electricity. Moreover, Nepal's agricultural hub in the southern part of the country needs irrigation facilities. However, due to the lack of awareness, financial capacity and technical expertise, Nepal has so far not been able to develop and harness its water resources adequately. On the other hand, the northeastern part of India is in need of a large quantity of power; and the fertile Gangetic plains, especially in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, are in great need of water for irrigation. The rivers flowing from Nepal are the only viable alternatives for irrigating these lands. Against such a background, there are real potentials and possibilities for harnessing and developing Nepal's water resources for the benefit of both Nepal and India.

Not that these two countries have not thought about or acted on developing Nepal's water resources. Nepal and India concluded, through an exchange of letters, an agreement as early as in 1920 on utilizing the waters of Mahakali River, a border river between Nepal and India.²⁰ After that, the two countries have concluded the Koshi Agreement in 1954, the Gandak Agreement in 1959, the Tanakpur Agreement in 1991, and the Mahakali Treaty in 1996. There are a number of other agreements and understandings between Nepal and India on developing and harnessing Nepal's water resources.

There is a feeling among the Nepalese people that India, as a big and powerful neighbour, has taken undue advantage from the earlier agreements on Nepal's water resources, at the expense of Nepal's rights and interests. India's behaviour with other neighbours like Bangladesh, Bhutan and Pakistan has contributed to vindicating this perception among the Nepalese people. On the other hand, there are views in India that Nepalese politicians are "rendered so paranoid by nationalist sentiments that they were incapable of striking sensible deals with New Delhi".²¹ Scholars in India also agree that the earlier treaties were unequal. S. D. Muni, a Nepali analyst, says: "There is some truth in the allegation of one sided and exploitative use of Nepal's water resources by India

in what is known as mutual benefit projects between the two countries such as Kosi and Gandak projects. It is generally conceded that these projects give greater advantage to India than to Nepal and thus could have been better designed to ensure adequate benefits to the Nepali side."²² Similarly, another expert, Mr. Ramaswamy R. Iyer, says: "All I can say is that both the Indian tendency to blunder and the Nepalese tendency to misunderstand seem to be very strong... India has a propensity to make mistakes repeatedly, and Nepal has a propensity to misinterpret everything that India does or says, put the worst possible construction on Indian actions and statements, and ascribe active malevolence to India."²³

From the very beginning, i.e. from the Exchange of Letters of 1920, Nepal-India water treaties seem to ignore international law, prevailing practices and also the sense of equity and justice. Going through the earlier Nepal-India water treaties, one feels that they are not agreements reached between two sovereign states on the basis of equality. Though Nepal is an upper riparian country, the treaties seem to give a message that India was in a giving position and Nepal at the receiving end. Following is a brief account of the major water treaties between Nepal and India.

The Koshi Agreement of 1954

Nepal and India concluded the Koshi Agreement on 25 April 1954. Though the project was essentially conceived for flood control, it is a multipurpose scheme including hydropower generation and irrigation as well. A 1,150-metre barrage is built in Bhimnagar in Nepal, about 8 kilometres from Nepal-India border. Two canals have been built on either side of the canal. The eastern canal irrigates 6,12,000 hectares of Indian territory, and the western canal irrigates 11,300 hectares of Nepalese and 3,56,610 hectares of Indian agricultural land. A powerhouse with an installed capacity of 20,000 kW of electricity (four units of 5,000 kW each) is constructed along the eastern canal.

The Koshi Agreement of 1954 was so one-sided, in favour of India, that it was severely criticized in Nepal soon after its conclusion. The critics asserted that the project was not beneficial to Nepal in any manner, and that it granted extraterritorial rights to India for an indefinite period without adequate compensation to Nepal. They also asserted that India would get undue benefit in irrigation and electricity as well. The resentment was so wide and severe that India agreed to revise the agreement. Subsequently, it was extensively revised in 1966. The preamble of the revised agreement states that "Nepal had suggested revision of the said (1954) Agreement in order to meet the requirements of the changed circumstances" and that India had agreed to the revision "with a view to maintaining friendship and good relation subsisting between Nepal and India."²⁴

The revised Agreement has rectified many of the criticisms. The general layout of the project was changed before signing the agreement. In the agreement, it was agreed that the land in which the Nepal Link Bund was situated would be surrendered to Nepal and that any construction and other undertakings by India would be carried out in consultation with the Government of Nepal. The revision also delineated the responsibilities of each government.

However, some reservations still remain on Nepalese side. These resentments pertain to sovereignty, benefits and compensation. The agreement, for example, refers to India as "the Union" whereas Nepalese side is referred to as the "Government of Nepal". Some have interpreted it as the violation of Nepal's sovereignty.²⁵ Other contentious issues include land ownership, water and power use, navigational and fishing rights and dispute settlement mechanism.

The Gandak²⁶ Treaty

Nepal and India signed the Gandak Agreement on 4 December 1959. A barrage has been built at Bhaisalotan, on the reaches of the Gandaki River, which forms the boundary between Nepal and India. Two canals have been constructed on either side of the barrage. In total, the canals irrigate 57,900 hectares of Nepalese and 1,850,000 hectares of Indian land. A powerhouse with an installed capacity of 15,000 kW of electricity has been built in Nepalese territory. It needs to be noted that the project was built by, and at the cost of, India. Nepal would get an aggregate maximum of 10,000 kW of electricity up to 60 per cent load factor at power factor not below 0.85. However, Nepal has to make payment for such electricity on the basis of the actual cost of production.

As this agreement, too, was criticized in Nepal, it was revised in 1964. The revision attempted to address some of the concerns of the Nepalese side. The amended Article 9, for example, gives Nepal exclusive right to withdraw for irrigation or any other purposes from the river and its tributaries such supply of water as may be required from time to time. However, the same article also restricts Nepal from trans-valley transfer of water from the months of February to April. The treaty has "maintained an ominous silence as far as the project's irrigation prospects for India were concerned."²⁷

Under the agreement, the Nepalese Government undertook to acquire the land necessary for the project. The land thus acquired would be transferred to the Government of India, which would pay compensation. The Government of India will remain the proprietor of such land. If the land ceases to be required by the Government of India for the project, it would be reconveyed to the Nepalese Government free of cost. The agreement authorizes the officers of the Government of India to execute all necessary works in case of any apprehended danger or accident to any of the structures.

From the Nepalese perspective, the Gandak Agreement is favourable if compared with the Koshi Agreement. However, questions can be raised whether Nepal has reasonable and equitable share of benefits from the project. Though the project was implemented at the cost of the Indian Government, Nepal gets only a negligible share of benefit, both in terms of irrigation facility and electricity. Moreover, the social cost Nepal has to incur is higher than the benefits it gets. The submergence of land behind the barrage and rehabilitation of displaced persons have remained serious problems for Nepal. The Gandak Agreement also gives India the ownership of the land acquired for the project. Under the Koshi Agreement, the Government of India holds the land under a

199-year lease but there is no mention about the term or expiry of the Gandak Agreement.

The Mahakali Treaty

The Mahakali Treaty²⁸ was concluded between Nepal and India in February 1996. It carries significance in that it sets forth the foundation for an integrated approach in developing and harnessing water resources between Nepal and India. Moreover, this is the first treaty in the history of Nepal-India water relations, providing for equal investment and benefits. The Treaty mentions the "desirability (of the two Governments) to a treaty on the basis of equal partnership to define their obligations and corresponding rights and duties thereto."²⁹

The Mahakali Treaty consists of three parts. The first part relates to Sharada Barrage. Nepal and India had concluded, through an Exchange of Letter in 1920, the Sharada Agreement. This agreement gives Nepal a right to a minimum supply of 28.35 m³/s (1000 cusecs) and a maximum of 10,000 cusecs of water from the Sharada Canal and 70 million kW/hour of electricity annually (the total capacity is 448.4 million kW/hour) for giving its consent to use a piece of its land of about 577 metres to India for the construction of eastern afflux bund. There is no mention about the share of India. Nepal was not satisfied with this arrangement, and kept trying to obtain an increase. However, it could not succeed in its efforts. Finally, the 1996-Mahakali Treaty replaced this treaty, and incorporated its arrangements without making any changes.

The second part relates to Tanakpur Barrage. Nepal and India had reached a Memorandum of Understanding on Tanakpur Barrage in 1991. The agreement provided for the construction of the left afflux bund in Nepalese territory. Nepal agreed to provide 2.9 hectares of land to build the bund and a 120-megawatt power station. In exchange, Nepal would get 150 cusecs of water from the head regulator and 10 megawatts of electricity. This agreement was strongly criticized in Nepal. Questions were raised as regards the territorial sovereignty of Nepal (for giving the land to India) and benefits from the project. Nepal's Parliament debated the issue and a writ petition was filed in the Supreme Court. The issue was highly politicized. However, by the time Nepal's Supreme Court gave its verdict, the physical work at Tanakpur area had almost been completed. It was another example of India's high-handedness and unilateral behaviour.

The third part of the Mahakali Treaty is related to Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project (PMP). The project requires the construction of a 315-metre high dam (Pancheshwar Dam) with a capacity of generating 3,480 megawatts of electricity. The dam will be implemented in accordance with the Detailed Project Report (DPR) to be jointly agreed upon between the two sides.

The Mahakali Treaty also establishes some guiding principles on the sharing of water resources between Nepal and India. The treaty specifies that both Nepal and India are entitled to an equal utilization of water, without prejudice to their respective consumptive use. It also provides that future projects in the border area would be designed and implemented by agreement

between the two countries using the principles established by the treaty. The treaty requires Nepal and India "not to use, obstruct, or divert the waters of the Mahakali River, so as to adversely affect the natural flow and level of the river."³⁰

Besides, the Mahakali Treaty establishes four new principles. The first principle is that the PMP would be designed and implemented to produce maximum total net benefit for both countries. The second principle is that both countries would work together in an integrated manner to develop and share their water resources. The third principle is about sharing the cost of the project in proportion to the benefits accruing to each country. And, the fourth principle is that a portion of Nepal's share of energy will be sold to India.

There are people who still hold a view that the Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project is in fact a myth, and within it lies the disguised deception of Indian intent. The first concern is that the treaty recognises the Mahakali River as the border river on major stretches, which goes against the Treaty of Sugauli concluded between Nepal and British India in 1816.³¹ Moreover, even after 18 years of its conclusion, the Detailed Project Report (DPR), which is a must for the implementation of the treaty, has not been agreed upon.³² Besides, India, in 1997, presented a proposal for water sharing, requiring that "the Mahakali waters should be shared only after ensuring that the flow of water to the canal to the lower Sharada Project, situated about 160 kilometres downstream from the Sharada Barrage at the Nepal-India border, was assured prior use."³³ This surprised the Nepalese side, and has created real problem in the preparation of the DPR.

The earlier bitter experiences notwithstanding, Nepal and India have recently moved forward with new understanding. The Governments of Nepal and India have concluded the Power Trade Agreement in October 2014.³⁴ Similarly, the Government of Nepal has concluded Project Development Agreement (PDAs) with two Indian companies.³⁵ These initiatives are expected to reverse the earlier trend and usher in a new era of cooperation on water resources between the two countries.

India and Pakistan

India and Pakistan had serious dispute on Indus river system. However, they have resolved the dispute by concluding the Indus Water Treaty on 19 September 1960 under the auspices and mediation of the World Bank. This treaty has stood major wars between India and Pakistan, and has been successful in regulating water issue between the two countries.

The Indus River originates near Mansarovar in Tibet, and is about 2,000 miles long. The Indus system of rivers comprises three principal tributaries in the West: the Kabul, the Swat and the Kurram; and five principal tributaries in the East: the Jhelum, the Chenab, the Sutlej, the Beas and the Ravi. The Indus rivers cover a drainage area of 450,000 square miles.³⁶

Disputes over the Indus system of rivers began long before the creation of Pakistan. Historically, the disputes emerged as inter-state differences among Punjab, Sindh, Bahawalpur and Bikaner. A tripartite agreement was signed

among Punjab, Bikaner and Bahawalpur as early as 1919.³⁷ However, the issue developed into an international dispute, especially between East (Indian) and West (Pakistani) Punjab, after the creation of Pakistan in 1947. Since the boundary of the two states had not by then been demarcated, the British Act of Parliament did not deal with the allocation of water between India and Pakistan. As mentioned by Salman M. A. Salman and Kishor Uprety, Mr. Radcliffe "in his deliberations did acknowledge the importance of the Indus system to both countries, but did not make any explicit recommendation other than to hope that they would work together in finding a solution".³⁸ Until 1960, when they reached agreement on the Indus Water Treaty, India and Pakistan, though with serious differences and problems, managed to work out a *modus operandi* through the Stand Still Agreement of 20 December 1947, the Delhi Agreement of 4 May 1948, and the understanding of 10 March 1952. The World Bank played crucial functional role in negotiating the treaty. The WB also acted as the administrator of the Indus Basin Development Fund.

The preamble to the Indus Water Treaty says that the two governments were equally desirous of attaining the most complete and satisfactory utilization of the waters of the Indus system of rivers, and recognized the need for "fixing and delimiting, in a spirit of goodwill and friendship, the rights and obligations of each in relation to the other concerning the use of waters and of making provision for the settlement, in a cooperative spirit, of all such questions as may hereafter arise."³⁹

According to the Indus Water Treaty, all the waters of the Eastern Rivers, viz. the Sutlej, the Beas and the Ravi, shall be available for the unrestricted use of India. Pakistan agreed not to permit any interference with the waters of the Eastern Rivers, except for domestic and non-consumptive use. Similarly, all the waters of the Western Rivers, viz. the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab, shall be available for unrestricted use of Pakistan; and India would not interfere with their waters, except for domestic and non-consumptive use. However, in addition to domestic and non-consumptive use, each country was allowed to use waters of the rivers allocated to the other party for agricultural use (as set out in Annex C) and the generation of hydropower (as set out in Annex D).

Under the treaty, India and Pakistan also agreed to cooperate in undertaking engineering works, and to exchange data and other relevant information. They also agreed to a comprehensive dispute settlement mechanism, under which any differences would be settled by the Indus Water Commission, comprising a Commissioner from each party. If the Commission cannot settle the differences, they would be referred to a neutral expert. In case the neutral expert fails to resolve the issues, they would go for arbitration.

The Indus Water Treaty tried to address every concern of both India and Pakistan. Some opine that "[e]very conceivable safeguard that Pakistan's engineers and lawyers could suggest was included to prevent India from altering the amount or the time of its water supplies to Pakistan during the transition period."⁴⁰ However, there are some complaints, too, on both sides. To quote Ramaswami R. Iyer, "[m]any in India feel that the allocation of 80 per cent of

the waters to Pakistan and 20 per cent to India was an unfair settlement foolishly accepted by the Indian negotiators; and many in Pakistan argue that the territories that went to India under the partition were historically using less than 10 per cent of the Indus waters, and that the Treaty was generous to India in giving it 20 per cent of the waters".⁴¹ However, Mr. Iyer concludes that both are "fallacious" arguments, and that 20 per cent is not *ipso facto* low, nor is *a priori* view on what is fair or possible.⁴²

As noted above, the conclusion of the Indus Water Treaty was an achievement for both India and Pakistan. The negotiations on the treaty not only helped avoid war between the two countries,⁴³ it has also provided a strong framework for settling water disputes. The treaty is also an example of the effectiveness of the third-party mediation in dispute settlement. A few years back, the Baglihar Dam dispute between India and Pakistan was resolved through the "neutral expert" appointed by the World Bank to the satisfaction of the both sides. Experts hold the view that other disputes between India and Pakistan can also be resolved under the framework of the Indus Water Treaty.

There are water-related disputes between India and Pakistan, basically on projects initiated by India and protested by Pakistan as going against the provisions of the Indus Water Treaty. The major among the disputes include the 690 MW Salal Hydroelectric Project (India started its construction in 1970), Wullar/Tulbul Barrage Project (India started its construction in 1984; Pakistan knew about it and lodged its protest in 1986), and the 330-MW Kishanganga Hydroelectricity Project. Though these issues are yet to be settled, the good thing is that both sides have referred to the Indus Water Treaty as the basis for their claims (Pakistan claims that the projects violate the provisions of the treaty while India claims that they are in accordance with the treaty).

Conclusion

An analysis of water issues in South Asia shows some striking features. The first of such features is the unilateral behaviour of India. India constructed Farakka Barrage against the protest of Pakistan. Such behaviour can be seen in relation to Bangladesh, too. Similar trends were visible with regard to Nepal as well. The Koshi and the Gandak Agreements were concluded without detailed discussions with Nepal, though they were implemented with the consent of the Nepalese Government, yet a clear example of India's high handedness and unilateralism can be seen in the case of Tanakpur Barrage.

The second feature is the asymmetric power relation between states that has resulted in unequal treaties or one-sided behaviour on the part of the more powerful state. The Koshi Agreement of 1954 between Nepal and India demonstrated India's plan to get unreasonable and undue benefits from Nepal. Similar example can also be seen with regard to Bangladesh. However, such treatment is absent in relations between India and Pakistan. The main reasons for equal treatment can be accrued to the political strength of Pakistan, its awareness of its rights and obligations, its expertise in the area of water resources, and its capacity to mobilize financial resources necessary to implement projects.

The third feature relates to the involvement of a third party in the development and management of water resources. The World Bank's involvement was crucial and decisive in the negotiation of the Indus Water Treaty between India and Pakistan. As we have seen above, no third party was involved in cases of Bangladesh and Nepal. It can be argued that involvement of a neutral and influential third party could have resulted in better and more equal and equitable treaties between Bangladesh and India, and between Nepal and India as well.

The fourth feature is the absence of an over-arching treaty between Bangladesh and India and Nepal and India. The Indus Water Treaty has provided an overarching framework for water relations between India and Pakistan, but no such frameworks exist between other countries. It can be assumed that had there been a framework agreement between those countries, their water relations could have been more cooperative and mutually beneficial.

One more feature visible in the area of water resources in this region is the extra sensitivities among smaller states. The unilateral behaviour and high-handedness of India has greatly contributed to creating, developing and perpetuating sensitivity, cautiousness and concerns among the peoples of Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan. However, it is also true that undue cautiousness and mistrust have affected the effective and realistic utilisation of projects. India can be expected to show flexibility and magnanimity commensurate with its size and strength, and, at the same time, smaller countries should be more practical and realistic, and should refrain from being too nationalistic and sensitive while taking up developmental projects.

Finally, a regional arrangement on water resources seems highly desirable. Two reasons can be cited to justify this proposition. One, all riparian states need to be consulted while harnessing an international watercourse.⁴⁴ As we have seen above, many rivers in South Asia originate from Tibet, a part of the People's Republic of China. Again, the Kabul River, a tributary of the Indus River originates from Afghanistan. Therefore, a comprehensive agreement among Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, India, Nepal and Pakistan needs to be worked out. Such an agreement will ensure compliance with international law, and, at the same time, make cooperation among the parties smooth, reasonable and equitable. Given India's preference for bilateralism, such an agreement may seem a little bit difficult, but ultimately, it would be beneficial for India as well.

The second basis for the justification of regional arrangement is the presence of SAARC. Under SAARC, the members have been exchanging cooperation on a number of areas. Though the Charter does not specifically mention the sharing of water resources, it mentions that promoting "active collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields" is one of its objectives.⁴⁵ Afghanistan is a member of SAARC, and China is an observer. The association of Afghanistan and China with SAARC will facilitate conclusion of a regional arrangement for developing and harnessing water resources in this part of the world.

During the 18th SAARC Summit held in Kathmandu, Nepal, on 26-27 November 2014, the member countries have concluded the *SAARC Framework Agreement for Energy Cooperation (Electricity)*. Under this agreement, authorized public and private entities would be allowed to buy and sell electricity. This agreement has accepted electricity as a tradable commodity; and electricity produced in a country could be exported to any of the SAARC member states. Similarly, development and maintenance of transmission lines also come under the scope of this agreement. If implemented effectively, this agreement can be a forceful catalyst for the development of water resources, especially hydropower, in the region.

Thus, if the states of South Asia can be more forthcoming and cooperative; if they can leave their historical baggage behind and move forward with a sense of trust and understanding; and if they try to harness the water resources under a regional mechanism, the peoples of South Asia could hope to enjoy a better and peaceful future.

Notes and References

- 1 As these are the major water sharing countries in South Asia, this article has discussed water issues among these countries only.
- 2 Toufik A Siddiqui and Shirin Tahir-Kheli (coordinator and editor), *Water Needs in South Asia: Closing the Demand Supply Gap* (Honolulu, Hawaii: Global Environment and Energy in the 21st Century, 2004), p.7.
- 3 Ibid.
- 4 Ibid, pp.7-8
- 5 Timothy Foote, "The Rape of the West", *The New York Times*, 6 September 1998.
- 6 Intiaz Alam, *South Asian Journal* (editorial), Volume 8, April-June 2005.
- 7 Among SAARC members, Afghanistan and Pakistan are the only countries that share a border except with India. However, as Afghanistan is excluded from the scope of this article, this article states that no other SAARC countries share borders except with India.
- 8 Salman M. A. Salman and Kishor Uprety, *Conflict and Cooperation on South Asia's International Rivers, A Legal Perspective*, (Washington D. C.: The World Bank, 2002), p.3.
The UN Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 1997, has identified 'international watercourse' as "a watercourse, parts of which are situated in different states" (Article 2 (b) of the Convention).
- 9 Treaty between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh on Sharing of the Ganga/Ganges Waters at Farakka, signed on December 12, 1996.
- 10 The Farakka Barrage is constructed in West Bengal, about 10 miles from the border with Bangladesh. The Barrage is about 2240 metres

long, and has a capacity of diverting 40,000 cubic feet of water per second (cusecs) from the Ganges.

11 Salman M. A. Salman and Kishor Uprety, *Conflict and Cooperation on South Asian Rivers*, pp. 135-136.

12 India had been taking a position that the Ganges was not an international river. This position is based on the ground that about eighty per cent of the Ganga Basin area lies within Indian territory. Therefore, from Indian perspective, discussions on the Ganges with other countries would go against India's existing position. For details, please see Ben Crow et al., *Sharing the Ganges-The Politics and Technology of River Development* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1995), p.84.

13 Salman and Uprety, "*Conflict and Cooperation...*," ref. 8, p.136.

14 Op.cit. Imtiaz Alam, ref. 6), p.55.

15 Bangladesh succeeded in getting the issue included in the agenda of the 31st Session of the UN General Assembly and get it discussed in the Political Committee. For details about the Project, please see World Bank Report No. TO-146B: "Appraisal of the Port of Calcutta Rehabilitation Project" dated 7 April 1958.

16 Emaduddin Ahmad, *South Asian Journal*, Imtiaz Alam (Editor and Publisher), Volume 8, April-June 2005, p.64.

17 Ibid.

18 Ramaswamy R. Iyer, *South Asian Journal*, Imtiaz Alam (Ed. and Pub.), Volume 8, April-June 2005, p.16.

19 Siddiqui and Tahir-Kheli, "*Water Needs in South Asia...*," ref. 2, pp.7-8.

20 Nepal and British India exchanged the letters on 21 October 1920 for irrigation and power in Uttar Pradesh, the northern state of India. This agreement has been incorporated as a part in the 1996 Mahakali Treaty between Nepal and India.

21 "Nepal and India: Splashing Out", *The Economist*, London, 25 January 1997, p.79.

22 S. D. Muni, *India and Nepal: A Changing Relationship* (New Delhi: Konark Publishers), p.3.

23 Interview with Mr. Ramaswamy R. Iyer by the author.

24 Preamble to the 1966 Agreement. The text of the Agreement is available at <www.moen.gov.np/treaties>.

25 Aditya Man Shrestha, *Bleeding Mountains of Nepal* (Kathmandu: Ekta Books, 1999), p.157.

26 The River is called Gandaki in Nepal and Gandak in India.

27 Salman and Uprety, ref. 8, p.91.

28 The name of the treaty is *Treaty between His Majesty's Government of Nepal and the Government of India Concerning the Integrated Development of the Mahakali River including Sarada Barrage, Tanakpur Barrage and Pancheshwar Project*.

- 29 Preamble to the Mahakali Treaty. The text of the Treaty is available at
<www.moen.gov.np/treaties>.
- 30 Mahakali Treaty, Article 7.
- 31 Recognition of the Mahakali River as a boundary river on major
stretches is a controversial provision. Article 5 of the Sugauli Treaty of
1815/16 (proposed by British India on 2 December 1815 and
exchanged on 4 March 1816), reads, "*The Rajah of Nepal renounces
for himself, his heirs, and successors, all claim to or connexion with the
countries lying to the west of the River Kali and engages never to have
any concern with those countries or the inhabitants thereof.*"
According to this provision, Nepal renounced its claims to the
countries/areas lying to the 'west' of the Mahakali River, meaning the
river itself belongs to Nepal. Therefore, there is a section of people in
Nepal which believes that recognition of the Mahakali River as a
boundary river stands against the Sugauli Treaty.
- 32 As per the understanding between the two sides, the DPR was to be
prepared within six months from the conclusion of the Treaty.
- 33 Dipak Gyawali and Ajaya Dixit, "How not to do a South Asian Treaty"
in *Himal South Asian*, Kathmandu, April 2001. The article is available
at <[http://old.himalmag.com/component/content/article/1975-How-not-
to-do-a-South-Asian-Treaty....html](http://old.himalmag.com/component/content/article/1975-How-not-to-do-a-South-Asian-Treaty....html)>
- 34 The Agreement was signed in Kathmandu on 21 October 2014. Under
the Agreement, electricity produced in one country can be exported to
the other country at a negotiated price. The two sides would also
develop and maintain transmission lines.
- 35 The two PDAs are concluded with GMR-ITD Consortium and Satlaj
Jalvidyut Nigam Ltd., two private companies of India on the
development of Upper Karnali and Arun 3rd projects, respectively.
- 36 Salman and Uprety, ref. 8, p.37.
- 37 Ibid, pp.40-41
- 38 Ibid, p.42, note 15.
- 39 Preamble to the Indus Water Treaty of 1960. The text of the Treaty is
available also at <[http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTSOUTHASIA/Resources/223497-1105737253588/
IndusWatersTreaty1960.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOUTHASIA/Resources/223497-1105737253588/IndusWatersTreaty1960.pdf)>
- 40 Salman and Uprety, ref.8, p.50.
- 41 Iyer, *South Asian Journal*, ref.18, p.18.
- 42 Ibid.
- 43 Salman M. A. Salman and Kishor Uprety write, "In this situation (in
which India claimed after the expiry of Stand Still Agreement that the
West Punjab had no rights to any share of waters), one option for
Pakistan was war, and there were many who advocated for it...", please
see *Conflict and Cooperation on South Asia's International Rivers*,
p.43.

- 44 Article 4 (1) of the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 1997, states: "Every watercourse state is entitled to participate in the negotiation of and to become a party to any watercourse agreement that applies to the entire international watercourse, as well as to participate in any relevant consultations". The text of the Convention is available at <http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_3_1997.pdf>.
- 45 Article 1 (e) of Charter of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, available at <www.sarc-sec-org>.