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Harvesting Hunger: The Fight for Food Sovereignty in Pakistan

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Abstract

Pakistan's agriculture sector is the backbone of rural livelihood in Pakistan, employing close to 38 per cent of the workforce and contributing 24 per cent to GDP. It is now at risk of climate-induced food sovereignty, with increasing temperatures, melting glaciers, and eroded agricultural land in the interest of commercial farming, jeopardising the livelihood of millions. From the arid regions of Balochistan and Tharparkar to the flooded plains of Sindh and South Punjab, the effects of climate change are worsening. This article discusses Pakistan's food sovereignty crisis in the context of climate justice, focusing on the convergence of low on-set events, institutional colonial reliance, and polluter pay principle of the UNFCCC in the context of the Paris Accord. It analyses the existing policy interventions, global colonial levers, and local adaptive strategies and calls for a sovereignty-led approach to food security that gives precedence to localised resilience, grass root inclusion, and cultural proximity. Based on national statistics, local truths, and international frameworks

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such as the UNFCCC and COP summits, the research presents an urgent need for food sovereignty climate action in Pakistan.
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Introduction

Today, Pakistan stands at a critical juncture where climatic uncertainty meets deep-rooted institutional vulnerability, and food insecurity emerges not only as a humanitarian crisis but as a symptom of systemic disparity. More than 16 per cent of Pakistan's population suffers from moderate to severe food insecurity as rising temperatures, water shortages, repeated flooding, and extended droughts weaken the country's agricultural base.[1]

In Pakistan, climate change is not just an imagination, it is visible in the cracked soil of South Punjab, the vanishing glacier water in Gilgit Baltistan, and the unseasonal rains that destroy standing crops across the Indus Basin.[2] These changes are not troublesome anymore, they are becoming the new norm. And yet, the state's response remains incomplete, insensitive, and often dismissive of the original socio-political forces that worsen the crisis.

The shadow of food colonialism continues to mark Pakistan's food systems in exploitative uses of land, extractive agricultural systems, and market arrangements privileging global commerce over local sustenance. From the British colonial-era, canal colonies that remapped Punjab for imperial grain extraction to current export-oriented cropping systems, Pakistan's agriculture has been one geared to serve interests of everyone other than those of its most impoverished communities.

Monocultural water intensive crops such as sugarcane and cotton, promoted for profit, have drained the soil quality, overspent freshwater resources, and eroded conventional farming practices based on sustainability and local diets.

Such extractive rationality replicates colonial modes of resource harvesting and management where land, water, and labour are turned into commodities, while the peripheral communities, especially smallholders and women, are kept out of ownership, decision-making, and access to innovation. As noted in recent climate justice writing, in the research of Amina Wali, "ecological and economic externalisation" allows influential actors to off-load environmental degradation onto already-vulnerable groups in the Global South, heightening both environmental degradation and food insecurity.[3] Any climate adaptation policy that does not address this inherent structural imbalance risks perpetuating the same inequalities that spawned the crisis.

This paper seeks to examine the deepening crisis of food insecurity in Pakistan from a climate justice perspective. It will examine how the intersection of environmental degradation, misaligned policy, and socioeconomic disparities intensifies food-related vulnerabilities across various regions. Based on climate indicators, on the ground data, and global mechanisms like the UNFCCC, Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), and the Loss and Damage Fund agreed upon at COP27 and COP28, this research suggests a transition to a sovereignty model of food security founded in resilience, inclusivity, and cultural sensitivity.[4]

Understanding the Crisis: Policy, Science, and Silence

With Pakistan's food sovereignty crisis worsening, an overabundance of frameworks, international, national, and grassroots have been developing in efforts to answer climate-driven agricultural collapse and rural exposure. It varies by geography, class, and political access, revealing not only policy failure but a more profound structural issue and that the persistence of an extractive food and development paradigm.

Pakistan's participation in international climate forums such as the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement demonstrates its openness to embracing global adaptation agendas. Through its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), Pakistan has pledged to advance climate-resilient agriculture and sustainable water management, while financial support from the Green Climate Fund and Adaptation Fund has been directed toward initiatives such as small scale irrigation, solar powered farming, and drought forecasting systems. But these interventions, as symbolically promising as they are, too often remain disconnected from the realities of rural Pakistan's dispersed pilots, constructed without communal engagement, tracked in solitude, and not infrequently scaled with little purpose.

At the center of this fragmentation lies a contradiction that largely goes unsaid, that Pakistan's food insecurity is not so much the result of climate unpredictability, it is an extension of *food colonialism*. The same logic that formerly pulled out cotton, grain, and labour for imperial markets has been replaced in terms of productivity, commerce, and 'development'. As Fadhel Kaboub persuasively contends, food crises in the Global South are not the product of scarcity, but the outcome of *historically created* *dependency.*[5] Modern trade agreements, supply chains, and financial networks are structured to make countries like Pakistan dependent on imported food, fertilizers, and machinery while shipping raw materials and value. Our land harvests cotton for other people, our wheat is left to rot in rotten grain storage, and our children go hungry.

Global adaptation funds continue to carry echoes of colonial power, bound by conditions that prioritise donor agendas over local needs and exclude small-scale farmers from meaningful participation. These projects remain donor-driven rather than people-centered, reinforcing a model of *controlled survival* that sustains unequal power relations under the guise of sustainability. Within Pakistan, frameworks such as the National Climate Change Policy (NCCP), its 2021 Implementation Framework, and the National Food Security Policy provide ambitious blueprints, yet policy direction has remained stagnant. While Punjab and Sindh have introduced provincial climate plans, provinces like Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa remain marginalised due to institutional weaknesses, constrained budgets, and token coordination. Disaster management remains reactive rather than preventive, with agencies like the NDMA and PDMAs centralised in structure but limited in capacity and field presence. In this context, food security strategies are largely designed in bureaucratic offices, yet continue to falter in the very fields where hunger is most acute.

Food sovereignty as practice and principle requires a radical transformation in the way we conceive food not as a commodity, but a right, not an export statistic, but a public heritage. As Kaboub writes, without changing the international economic order that holds nations hostage and disempowered, food sovereignty will remain a dream.[6]

Regional Analysis: Food Insecurity in Pakistan

Climate-related food insecurity in Pakistan is a regional issue, influenced by geography, governance, and socio-economic inequalities. Food insecurity in Pakistan is not just a matter of scarcity, it is a reflection of structural violence. Where climate shocks, extractive policy histories, and governance breakdowns converge regionally, hunger arises not consistently but in waves that etch across geography, class, gender, and political authority.

IPC Acute Food Insecurity Data

From November 2024 to March 2025, the lean season for most districts with an estimated 11 million rural Pakistanis (about 22 per cent of the 68 flood-affected districts' population) were facing a high level of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or higher). Of these, approximately 1.7 million were in Phase 4 (Emergency) and 9.3 million in Phase 3 (Crisis).[7] These statistics show not an isolated crisis, but one baked into regional food economies and emergency relief.

Sindh: Flooding and Chronic Hunger

In Sindh, flood-hit districts still record high food insecurity. In previous IPC rounds (April-October 2023), an estimated 10.5 million individuals in Sindh, Balochistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, who represent 29 per cent of the ones analysed, were classified in IPC Phase 3 or higher, out of which 2.1 million in Phase 4.[8] Sindh's crisis is not just environmental, it is institutional. The province overflows repeatedly without reform in drainage, tenancy, or water justice.

Balochistan & Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: Double Marginalisation

Of the 68 districts looked at most recently, Balochistan, Sindh, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are the worst-hit with nearly 50.8 million, or 20 per cent of Pakistan's population, under acute food stress. Musakhel is one of the districts that indicates that 35 per cent of the population lie in IPC Phase 3 or higher, with 10 per cent in Phase 4, the highest proportion in the country. Other administrative areas such as Chagai, Kachhi, Kalat, Kolai-Palas, Kohistan, and Torghar are around 30 per cent in Phase 3 or higher, 5 per cent in Emergency.[9] This is compounded food insecurity and not arbitrary, but systematic.

Structural Inequalities

This data confirms that what we've long observed food insecurity is spatially and politically uneven. It follows lines of soil deprivation, gender exclusion, provincial neglect, and export-oriented agriculture, rather than natural boundaries. In Balochistan, where over 40 per cent of households face food insecurity, the lack of irrigation infrastructure, storage facilities, and market access deepens dependency on aid-derived food flows.[10] In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, mountainous geography and low institutional presence compound vulnerability.

In Pakistan, the dominant models on food security have traditionally rested on supply-side issues with an overemphasis on macro-level food availability over accessibility at the household level. Lying in the list of the most climate-vulnerable countries in the world, Pakistan is confronted by an interesting paradox even with adequate provision of staple foods with just about 63 per cent of households being food secure. About 25 per cent of the country's population falls below the poverty line, and the fact that almost 55 million individuals find it difficult to meet minimum nutritional requirements comes as a reminder.[11]

These acute figures require immediate action and not just additional relief. They reveal the failures of top-down adaptation models, donor-implemented resilience projects, and political economies that commodify or export food as opposed to it being a right.

Social and Economic Impacts of Climate-Induced Food Insecurity

The food insecurity crisis in Pakistan is not silent or superficial. It runs through the social fabric and economic stability of the country. This crisis at its roots, shatters the very vow of survival, while incessantly bleeding the economy, undermining human capital, and depleting intergenerational prosperity.

Food insecurity reinforces malnutrition, child stunting, and micronutrient deficiencies, which not only damage the dignity of individuals but incapacitate the potential of communities. The National Nutrition Survey 2018 reveals that almost 37 per cent of Pakistani households are food insecure, of which 18.3 per cent are under severe hunger, which disproportionately impacts women and children living in rural areas. Provinces such as Balochistan and Sindh experience relatively intense food deprivation based on the country's poor infrastructure, climate exposure, and poor institutional responses.[12]

The economic cost of this malnourishment is equally alarming. A 2017 report estimates that Pakistan loses 3 per cent of its GDP annually, i.e., approximately US$7.6 billion due to the direct and indirect effects of undernutrition. This includes lost labour productivity, healthcare costs, reduced educational outcomes, and premature mortality.[13] Stunting alone affects 45 per cent of children under five, placing Pakistan among the worst-affected countries globally.[14]

Apart from the nutritional aspects, food insecurity has also increased economic disparities. The lower 60 per cent of income groups spend close to 45 per cent of their income on food, with hardly any margin for savings, health, or education. When the world food prices increase or when climatic shocks strike local supply chains, these families become extremely susceptible.[15] Dependence on imports of strategic commodities such as pulses, edible oils, and milk also leaves Pakistan's poor lot open to the vagaries of global markets, increasing inflation and depleting purchasing power.[16]

While that, social protection initiatives like BISP and utility store subsidy schemes are still inadequate and poorly distributed. Currently, only 0.3 per cent of the population in Balochistan and 1.8 per cent in Punjab enjoy such programs, as opposed to 12.7 per cent in Sindh.[17] Poor administration and irregular supply in such safety nets increases regional differentials, perpetuating a cycle of exclusion.

Malnutrition and Public Health

Both acute and chronic malnutrition are increasing in Pakistan, especially where drought and floods hit most often. The National Nutrition Survey estimates that more than 40 per cent of children under the age of five in rural areas are stunted, with levels of more than 50 per cent in Tharparkar.[18] Malnutrition also compromises immune systems, making them more vulnerable to diseases like malaria, cholera, and diarrheal diseases, especially after climate-related disasters like the 2022 floods.[19]

Disrupted Education and Child Labour

Education is the first to suffer in food-insecure areas. Economically stressed or climate-hit families often pull out their children, particularly girls, from school. According to a Save the Children Report, in 2023 dropout rates in schools rose by 30-40 per cent in drought or flood-hit areas.[20] Many children are pushed into labour as a survival strategy, such as farm work, water collection, or domestic work, continuing cycles of poverty and illiteracy.

Gender Inequality and Food Sovereignty

Food insecurity in Pakistan cannot be untied from deep rooted gender inequalities. Across rural households, women and girls are often the first to sacrifice food, eating last and least during shortages. This injustice is intensified by physical exclusion, fewer than 10 per cent of rural women own land, a fact that limits their decision making power and access to agricultural subsidies, and training in climate adaptation.[21] As several studies point out, when women lack land rights, their ability to shape farming choices, crop diversification, and resilience strategies is systematically undermined.[22]

Women, however, are not passive victims of food insecurity they are central actors in household nutrition, water management, and climate coping strategies. Research from Balochistan and Tharparkar highlights how women-led cooperatives, microfinance groups, and seed-saving networks have improved both nutritional outcomes and adaptive capacity in drought-prone areas.[23] Similarly, localised evidence shows that female participation in agricultural decision making correlates with higher household dietary diversity and better food sovereignty outcomes. Yet policy frameworks continue to treat women primarily as beneficiaries rather than stakeholders, reproducing a paternalistic model that sidelines their knowledge systems and leadership.[24]

Empowering women through secure land rights, targeted social protection, and genuine inclusion in climate planning is not merely a gender issue, it is a food sovereignty authority. As recent analyses emphasise, without dismantling patriarchal barriers within property ownership, credit markets, and extension services, Pakistan's food systems will remain structurally unjust and chronically insecure.[25]

Displacement and Urban Tension

Climate-induced food insecurity is a leading cause for rural-urban migration. In 2022, more than 2.1 million individuals were displaced by floods in Sindh and South Punjab.[26] Most of them moved to urban slums in Karachi, Lahore, and Multan, where they had poor sanitation, shelter, and work access. Internal displacement has overwhelmed local authorities, putting extra pressure on the already weak public infrastructure and expanding social inequality.

Policy Frameworks and Responses

Food insecurity in Pakistan due to climate change is not merely a humanitarian emergency but also a policy failure. Solving this issue demands a multi-scalar policy strategy combining global alliances, national promises, and efficient provincial implementation. However, though there is intense documentation, generous pledges, and institutional frameworks in place, food insecurity continues to expand. What is lacking is not policy but coherence, equity, and implementation.

Global Commitments and Gaps in Access

Pakistan has been a proactive participant in global climate diplomacy, primarily under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. Its updated NDCs, enshrined in 2021, commit to reducing probable emissions by 50 per cent by 2030 subject to international community support and enhancing adaptation in water, agriculture, and disaster risk reduction.[27] It is a demonstration of high ambition, particularly for Pakistan's small share of world emissions.

After the 2022 floods, which left more than 2.1 million people displaced, Pakistan was an outspoken proponent of operationalising the Loss and Damage Fund at COP27 and COP28.[28] This activism is not just a response to its own domestic crisis but also an expression of a deeper appeal for climate justice and equality within international climate finance frameworks.

Notwithstanding this global commitment, the inflow of money and technology to Pakistan has been plagued by bureaucratic delays, donor constraints, and inadequate absorptive capacity. Though the nation has seen donor-driven project-level assistance from the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and Global Environment Facility (GEF) such as solar irrigation in South Punjab and drought early warning systems in Balochistan, these are not scalable.[29] As the Wilson Center points out, this projectised strategy of climate finance weakens institutional sustainability and resilience over the long term.[30]

National Policy Landscape: Disconnects in Design

Domestically, Pakistan has created a set of policy tools to manage food security and climate resilience. The National Climate Change Policy (NCCP) 2021, Implementation Framework set objectives like climate-smart agriculture, water harvesting, and early warning.[31] The National Food Security Policy (2018) also aims to provide affordable and accessible nutrition in the country. However, these frameworks tend to emphasise productivity, access to markets, and large-scale reforms while neglecting important concerns like gender equality, agro-ecological diversity at local levels, and community adaptation. Studies at the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) and the Aga Khan University (AKU) indicate, the technocratic and overly centralised approach to national policy does not reflect ground realities, particularly for rural women and smallholder farmers.[32] [33] They also do not address indigenous practices, informal food systems, and the social infrastructure behind household food access.

Food security as a notion has almost exclusively been understood as caloric abundance and farm production instead of access, agency, and rights. This limited conception reinforces a vicious circle where state food availability grows but household food insecurity intensifies. Only when the state rescales its policies towards food sovereignty focused on justice, environmental harmony, and local agency.

Provincial Policy Readiness: Uneven Capacities

After the 18th Amendment, agriculture and land use were devolved subjects, with provinces taking on the role of implementing climate and food policy. While decentralisation provides potential for tailored solutions, it has also unearthed profound asymmetries between provinces' preparedness and capability.

Province	Policy Initiatives	Challenges
Punjab	Climate Adaptation Strategy (2023), canal upgrades, insurance for farmers	Resource limitations in district agriculture departments
Sindh	Climate Change Policy (2022), flood management, rural resilience projects	Limited inter-agency coordination, donor-led programs remain unscaled
Balochistan	Early-stage planning, drought relief projects	Severe funding shortfalls, minimal staff capacity, fragmented governance
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP)	Forest-based climate mitigation and limited food security programs	Institutional disconnection from national-level strategies; weak local execution

Source: Compiled from LEAD Pakistan, ISSI, and SDPI policy reviews.

Provinces like Punjab and Sindh have begun formalising climate response plans. Punjab Climate Adaptation Strategy focuses on canal restoration and climate insurance, and Sindh identifies disaster risk management as its 2022 climate policy priority.[34] Balochistan and KP, however, are seriously constrained, with budgetary shortfalls, weak institutional presence in far-flung areas, and inadequate coordination among agencies.[35]

Policies do exist, their application is blocked by inadequate monitoring frameworks, lack of localised data, and poor integration between agricultural, environmental, and planning departments. Agricultural offices at the district level often lack proper personnel, climate forecasting equipment, or powers to implement top-down policies as per ground realities.[36]

Systemic Failures and Missed Opportunities

Notwithstanding many programs and strategies, Pakistan's food policy environment continues to be characterised by institutional feed store, overlapping mandates, and non-participatory governance. Several key lessons from Pakistan's history and current failures are worth considering. First, climate, agriculture, and disaster management agencies tend to operate in silos, precluding integrated responses. Second, climate finance is overly centralised so that money seldom reaches provinces or frontline communities in time to have any impact. Third, policies often disengage from local knowledge and indigenous agriculture and resilience practices, resulting in poorly adapted and unsustainable solutions.

Gaps and Constraints

Even with widespread policy documentation and global outreach, Pakistan's climate and food security landscape continues to be marred by systemic shortcomings. Perhaps the most enduring of these is the fragmentation among institutions that are responsible for governing agriculture, disaster management, and climate adaptation. Ministries and other governmental offices work in silos with duplicate mandates and little coordination, which critically hinders the development of integrated policy initiatives to respond to interlinked challenges such as drought resilience or emergency food distribution.[37]

Another significant constraint is over-centralisation of climate finance. Pakistan has been able to access international funding through avenues such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the Global Environment Facility (GEF), but the disbursement and utilisation of these funds are extremely central at the federal level. Provincial governments and district administrations, which are generally closer to the targeted communities, neither have autonomy, nor the capacity to effectively use the funds. This top-heaviness causes the allocation of resources to be pushed back to frontline areas and inhibits context-adaptation strategies.[38]

Pakistan's climate and food policies continue to be largely technocratic and productivity-oriented. Policies like the National Climate Change Policy (NCCP) and the National Food Security Policy are centered on massive-scale reforms and enhanced agricultural production but overlook structural injustices, gender relations, and site-specific ecological understanding.[39] The top-down approach in these policies overshadows the actual demands of rural societies and small farmers, as quantified by a Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) research.[40]

After the 18th Amendment, the transfer of agriculture and environmental planning functions to provinces aimed to enhance policy responsiveness. Yet, the results have been variable. While Punjab and Sindh have framed formal plans like Punjab's Climate Adaptation Strategy (2023) and Sindh's Climate Change Policy (2022), Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are still vulnerable by institutional weakness, shortage of funds, and restricted access to climate information and forecasting facilities.[41] Even in the more advanced provinces, implementation at the district level is hindered by unavailability of trained staff and weak coordination between agriculture and environmental departments.[42]

Most government-initiated projects do not integrate indigenous knowledge systems or agro-ecological practices at the local level. They leave out centuries-old sustainable practices, developing maladapted projects that disregard sustainable techniques.[43] Aga Khan University conducted a strategic review highlighting that rejection of informal food systems and community customs undermines the long-term food security intervention sustainability.[44] Data limitations further compound the problem. Planning and response rely often on national-level statistics that conceal intra-provincial and district-level heterogeneities. The absence of timely, disaggregated data hinders local governments from formulating responsive strategies for their respective ecological and demographic conditions.[45] This lack of data from ground level is particularly challenging in districts prone to chronic climate shocks, like Tharparkar, Chagai, and the Indus Delta.

Additionally, donor dependence is a persistent issue. A large proportion of Pakistan's climate and food-related programming is conceptualised around short-term international budget cycles. These externally generated projects usually do not consider national or provincial plans, leading to chopped-up implementation and weak sustainability.[46] The Wilson Center observes that this ‘projectisation’ of assistance not only watered down long-term institutional learning but also eroded the continuity of services in the most vulnerable populations.[47] Pakistan's climate and food adaptation policies are not legally codified. Most policy structures exist as guidelines and not as binding agreements, which diminishes their enforceability and makes them vulnerable to political change or bureaucratic inaction. Until policy is translated into law and institutions for accountability are established, the state's ability to make steady progress is diminished.[48]

Recommendations

To address Pakistan’s deepening food insecurity crisis, there is a pressing need to shift from short-term relief toward long-term systemic change. This begins with a mainstreaming food sovereignty model that emphasises local control over food systems, ecological sustainability, and social justice. Instead of prioritising yield and export, Pakistan must embrace policies that protect smallholder farmers, indigenous knowledge, and equitable land distribution.

- First, the government should decentralise climate finance and build provincial capacity to utilise it effectively. International funds such as those from the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and Loss and Damage mechanisms must be coupled with robust provincial mechanisms for planning, execution, and monitoring. Capacity-building programs for district-level agricultural and disaster departments should be prioritised to overcome current bottlenecks in coordination and technical expertise.
- Second, legal codification of food and climate policies is essential. Policies like the National Food Security Policy and Climate Change Framework should not remain aspirational documents, they must be backed by legislation, enforcement mechanisms, and accountability frameworks to ensure continuity across political transitions.
- Third, climate-smart agriculture should move beyond pilot projects and be embedded in the national extension system. Investments in water-efficient technologies, heat-resilient

crop varieties, solar irrigation, and community seed banks can help buffer small farmers against extreme weather events.

- Fourth, reform of data systems is essential to support localised planning. Disaggregated, real-time data on nutrition, crop health, migration, and weather events must be integrated into early warning systems and policy dashboards. Collaboration with universities, civil society, and local governments can fill these data gaps.
- Lastly, inclusive governance models, including community participation in planning and monitoring, should be prioritised. Empowering marginalised voices, especially those of women, landless labourers, and climate-affected communities, will ensure that policies are grounded in lived realities rather than top-down prescriptions. By aligning policies with principles of justice, sovereignty, and resilience, Pakistan can begin to transform its vulnerable food systems into engines of equity and sustainability.

Conclusion

This is not a temporary disruption. Climate-induced food insecurity in Pakistan has become a lived permanence for millions. It is no longer enough to call it a crisis; it is a failure of imagination, of governance, and of empathy. Across the arid landscapes of Balochistan, the flooded plains of Sindh, and the drought-worn hills of KP, hunger is not caused by a lack of food, but by broken systems, colonial legacies, and extractive priorities that have long devalued lives on the margins.

We do not suffer from a shortage of policies. Pakistan has drafted bold frameworks, signed global compacts, and hosted international dialogues. And yet, malnutrition is rising. Children are dropping out of school. Women continue to eat last. If policies remain confined to papers and donor dashboards, then they are not solutions, they are performances. Implementation is not just about logistics, it is about power who decides, who benefits, and who is left unheard. Food insecurity, in truth, is a mirror held up to our collective conscience. It asks uncomfortable questions about land, equity, and sovereignty. It exposes the distance between Islamabad's policy rooms and a small farmer's parched field. It reveals how climate finance trickles slowly, unevenly into the lives of those who need it the most. It reminds us that resilience cannot be imported, and justice cannot be delayed. If there is a path forward, it must begin at the roots; with communities, with women, with indigenous knowledge and the quiet wisdom of those who have farmed sustainably long before the word climate entered our vocabulary. The state must listen, not only to experts, but to those who live through hunger. Aid must shift from charity to rights. Planning must move from the center to the border.

There is still time to reimagine Pakistan's food systems, not as fragile supply chains, but as networks of care, of autonomy, and of survival. But that time is closing. And if we continue to treat this moment as temporary, we will find ourselves building policies for a future that never arrives.

Let the future be just. Let the fields belong to those who sow them.

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